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ABSTRACT

An abstract of the thesis of Louis B. Livingston for the Master of Arts in History
presented October 14, 2010.

Title: Theodore Roosevelt on Labor Unions: A New Perspective

Historical studies of Theodore Roosevelt's views about labor and labor
unions are in conflict. This was also true of contemporary disagreements
about the meaning of his labor rhetoric and actions. The uncertainties revolve
around whether or not he was sincere in his support of working people and
labor unions, whether his words and actions were political only or were based
on a philosophical foundation, and why he did not propose comprehensive
labor policies.
Roosevelt historiography has addressed these questions without
considering his stated admiration for Octave Thanet's writings about "labor
problems." Octave Thanet was the pseudonym of Alice French, a popular
fiction writer during Roosevelt's adult years. Roosevelt on several occasions
praised her knowledge of factory conditions and discussions of labor
problems, and he invited her to the White House. The thesis analyzes her
labor stories, Roosevelt's comments about her labor writings, and their
relevance to how he responded to the growth and tactics of organized labor. It
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also addresses the influence on Roosevelt of contemporary writing on labor
unions by John Hay, Henry George, and Herbert Croly, as well as his
relationship with labor leader Samuel Gompers.
The thesis concludes that Roosevelt was sincere about improving the
social and industrial conditions of workers, primarily through government
action. It further concludes that his support of labor unions in principle was
genuine, but was contingent on organized labor's repudiation of violence and
attempts to justify violence; and that he opposed union boycotts and
mandatory union membership as inimical to his vision of a classless society.
The thesis additionally considers the extent to which Roosevelt's views were
embodied in national labor legislation after his death.
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I. Introduction
Theodore Roosevelt's description of his early success in politics, that
he "rose like a rocket," is an apt simile for his nearly forty-year trail through
public affairs, from the early 1880s until his death in 1919. It was not merely a
boast, because he conceded that it caused him to lose "perspective," which in
turn also taught him "by bitter experience the lesson that I was not allimportant and that I had to take account of many different elements in life."1
Roosevelt's simile and the ensuing lesson could also describe the course of
America's labor movement during those years. Sometimes following the same
trajectory and sometimes seeming destined to crash, the two rockets changed
the relationship between government and organized labor. This study is about
one of the mysteries they left behind, namely, the nature of Roosevelt's view
of labor unions.
The mystery remains unsolved after a century of Theodore Roosevelt
scholarship. Organized labor regarded his words and actions as mixing
favorable and unfriendly elements. These are both legitimate interpretations
that also perplexed Roosevelt's non-union contemporaries and continue to be
a cause of debate among historians. One clue that has not been pursued in
TR historiography has been a fundamental component of Roosevelt's
intellectual and emotional orientation toward organized labor, namely, his taste

1

TR letter to his son Theodore, October 20, 1903, in Elting E. Morison, ed. , The Letters of
Theodore Roosevelt (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1951}, 3:634--635.
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in literature about "labor problems." Accordingly, it is appropriate to reconsider
Roosevelt's views about labor unions in light of this previously unexamined
evidence.
A brief review of what others have said about Roosevelt and labor is in
order, beginning with Richard Hofstadter's characterization of the labor subject
as "[o]ne of the best indices of Roosevelt's place in the political spectrum."
Hofstadter minimizes Roosevelt's pro-labor reputation as the result of
animosity by some businessmen, notably the mine operators whom he
declined to champion in the 1902 anthracite coal strike. Such business
opposition "provided the dramatic foil that enabled him to stay on the stage
plausibly as a reformer." Looking backstage, Hofstadter questions the
motivations behind Roosevelt's ostensibly pro-labor actions- whether his
intervention on labor's behalf in the 1902 strike showed sympathy for the
strikers or fear of socialistic action, and whether his support of workmen's
compensation legislation showed concern for crippled wage earners or fear
that Democratic politicians would occupy the field if he did not. Thus,
Hofstadter doubts that Roosevelt deserved "his reputation as a strenuous
reformer."2
2

Richard Hofstadter, The American Political Tradition and the Men Who Made It (New York:
Vintage, 1948), 217, 223, 225, 230-231. An early Roosevelt biography takes the Hofstadterlike position that TR used his intervention in the 1902 anthracite coal strike to make the
political claim that he had defended the legitimate rights of labor. Overall, however, the
biographer regards TR as a centrist who "bared his white teeth at the conservatives on the
right and the liberals on the extreme left." Henry F. Pringle, Theodore Roosevelt: A Biography
(San Diego: Harvest, 1956), 145, 195.

3

Putting aside the question of the historical legitimacy of elevating
uncertain personal motives over known facts , the reality is that Roosevelt
scholarship subsequent to Hofstadter's speculations contains major
disagreements about Roosevelt's attitude toward labor and labor unions. For
example, William Henry Harbaugh describes Roosevelt's intervention in the
anthracite coal strike as a "great service" to the American labor movement and
Roosevelt as "the first great President-reformer of the modem industrial era,•
because he encouraged, "however cautiously, the growth c:i countervailing
labor unions [in a capitalistic society]." Roosevelt was, Harbaugh argues, "the
first President, in fine, to understand and react constructively to the challenge
to existing institutions raised by the technological revolution.oo3
In contrast, Kevin Phillips contends that Roosevelt's predecessor in the
White House, William McKinley, did more for labor than Roosevelt because
McKinley as a lawyer provided pro bono legal services for strikers accused of
rioting, as a congressman and governor of Ohio pursued federal and state
•
systems of labor arbitration, and as governor supported workmen's
compensation and union non-discrimination laws. Phillips diminishes
Roosevelt's labor record as "half-submerged in an upper-class derogation of
labor unions.""

• William Henry Harbaugh, The Life and Times of Theodore Roosevelt (New York; Collier,
1963), 179. 492-493.
• Kevin Phillips, Willia m McKinley (New York; Times Books, 2003), 32-33, 37, 39, 111, 118.
Phillips' biography enthusiastically attempts to redeem President McKinley from the shadows
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Conflicting interpretations about Roosevelt's real intentions toward
organized labor also mark the work of the two historians who made
Roosevelt's labor record their central scholarly concern. Howard Lawrence
Hurwitz's study of Roosevelt's pre-presidential labor attitudes acknowledges
TR's labor-friendly evolution from early anti-unionism, but he attributes it to
political motives. According to Hurwitz, the second-place showing of a unionbacked candidate in New York City's 1886 mayoral election, with Roosevelt in
third place, alerted TR to the political strength of unions. The positive
treatment of unions that he displayed thereafter, Hurwitz contends,

w~s

the

result of TR's desire to avoid jeopardizing his political career. Hurwitz also
argues that Roosevelt never understood that strikes were "labor's chief means
of bringing about an adjustment of grievances," that labor violence arose from
"existing inequalities," that organized labor should have "bargaining power with
rights equal to those of employers and government," and that TR's emotional
opposition to strike violence reflected his frustration that unions did not
appreciate his efforts on behalf of working people.5

cast by TR's popularity as McKinley's successor. To a similar effect, but without analysis, see
Nathan Miller, Theodore Roosevelt: A Life (New York: HarperCollins Perennial Paperback,
1992), 377-378 ("Basically, Roosevelt's aim was to prevent radical change.").
5
Howard Lawrence Hurwitz, Theodore Roosevelt and Labor In New York State, 1880-1900
(New York: AMS Press, 1943; reprint, 1968), 100 ("anti-labor bias"), 138 (election lesson),
197-199 (gubernatorial enforcement of labor laws), 217-219 (friendly interactions with labor
leaders), 238 (political decision-making), 278 (importance of labor vote), 285 (violence and
"existing inequalities"), 289 (political jeopardy of antagonizing unions), 292 (labor's use of
strikes), 297 (union bargaining rights and TR's frustration at being unappreciated).
Concentrating on the final two years of the period covered by Hurwitz, another historian
reaches different conclusions. G. Wallace Chessman, Governor Theodore Roosevelt

5

Irving Greenberg's appraisal of Roosevelt's presidential and postpresidential labor record takes issue with Hurwitz's finding of TR's coolness to
unionism. Greenberg accepts the sincerity of Roosevelt's distinction between
the positive underlying value of organized labor and the negative of unionrelated violence. He argues, contrary to Hurwitz's and Hofstadter's
interpretations of TR's motivation, that Roosevelt's goal was to secure laborers
"all just and proper consideration."6
Much harder on Roosevelt than any other critic, the Marxist labor
historian PhilipS. Foner has nothing favorable to say about TR's labor record.
He gives Roosevelt little credit for settling the 1902 anthracite coal strike or
attempting to moderate the use of judicial injunctions against labor, preferring
instead to accuse him repeatedly of being a tool of anti-union employers. Even
when Foner praises the Progressive Party platform on which Roosevelt ran in
1912, he dismisses Roosevelt as a captive of capitalist millionaires who were
trying to stave off social revolution?
There is ample interpretive space between such conflicting views. Thus,
Edward Wagenknecht concludes that "Roosevelt's essential moderation is

(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1965), 304-305, 320. Roosevelt's labor program,
Chessman argues, was the same as his "square deal" approach to most issues, namely, not
allowing any interest group to dictate policy that endangered the public good.
6
1rving Greenberg, Theodore Roosevelt and Labor: 1900-1918 (New York: Garland
Publishing Co. , 1988), 74, 76-77. As evident from the titles of the Hurwitz and Greenberg
books, they cover different periods of time; consequently, neither work analyzes the
consistencies and evolution of Roosevelt's thinking during his full career.
7
Philip S. Foner, History of the Labor Movement in the United States, (New York: International
Publishers, 1947-1980), 3:51, 301 , 310-311 , 5:108, 110-112.

6

seen most clearly in connection with his attitude toward the problem of capital
and labor." Wagenknecht's appraisal of Roosevelt from multiple angles
includes the proposition that TR's study of the declines of ancient and
medieval republics led him to a labor policy based upon "his desire to avoid a
class war." His interpretation is that Roosevelt adopted "middle-of-the-roadism
on capital-labor problems," i.e., friendliness to labor unions tempered by fear
of labor tyranny and insistence on enforcement of the law whenever labor
acted unlawfully, regardless of labor's rationale . More recently, H. W . Brands
likens Roosevelt's "steering a middle course in labor-management disputes" to
his foreign policy approach: "Just as Roosevelt aimed for a balance of power
between Russia and Japan, so he sought a balance of power between
management and labor."8
The discord among historians about Roosevelt's attitude in labor
matters echoes comparable disagreements during his lifetime, when he was
the object of attacks by some business organizations and newspapers for
excessive pro-unionism and by some union leaders for excessive antiunionism. Roosevelt dismissed both sets of attackers as standing on "a plane
of mendacity," a word he enjoyed using to describe his critics.9 "Honest

8

Edward Wagenknecht, The Seven Worlds of Th eodore Roosevelt (New York: Longmans,
Green, 1958), 210, 216-2 19; H. W . Brands, TR. : The Last Romantic (New York: Basic Books,
1997), 508, 542-543.
9
See, for example, Theodore Roosevelt, American Ideals (New York: Putnam, 1897), 174;
and TR's letter to his son Kermit, November 14, 1907, in W ill Irwin, ed. , Letters to Kermit from
Theodore Roosevelt, 1902-1908 (New York: Scribner, 1946), 222.
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workingmen are misled," he said, "into believing that I am an enemy of labor
by [Eugene] Debs' [newspaper] Appeal to Reason, and other men are misled
into believing that I am an improper friend of labor. "10 Apparently relishing the
variance in press interpretations of his labor actions, Roosevelt observed that
one New York newspaper accused him of "truckling to capital" while another
New York newspaper regarded the same set of facts as proof that he was
11

"truckling to labor."

Both the historical and contemporary variances in respect to
Roosevelt's attitude toward organized labor can be traced in part to the twosided nature of what he had to say on the subject. A dichotomy between his
embrace and critique of organized labor appears repeatedly in his public
atically in organized labor," President Roosevelt told
remarks. "I believe emph_
railroad union members in 1902, but he cautioned them that his praise of
union organizations was conditional. "To call an organization an organization
does not make it a good one," he continued. "The worth of an organization
depends upon its being handled with the courage, the skill, the wisdom, the
spirit of fair dealing as between man and man, and the wise self-restraint
which, I am glad to be able to say, your Brotherhood has shown." 12 In other
10

TR letter to Pennsylvania progressive Thomas Robins, January 2, 1912, in Morison, Letters
ofTR, 7:471-473.
11
TR letter to Nicholas Murray Butler, president of Columbia University, August 2, 1904, in
Morison, Letters of TR, 4:878.
12
TR speech to Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen, in Chattanooga, September 8, 1902, in
Hermann Hagedorn, ed. , The Works of Theodore Roosevelt, National Edition (New York:
Scribner, 1926), 16:152.

8

words, he refused to find virtue in unionism per se. A union had to earn and to
keep earning his approval to prove its worth.
Roosevelt proudly trumpeted his honorary membership in the
Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen, but he coupled it with the assertion that,
as he explained in 1910 after leaving the presidency, this was "because the
organization is fundamentally managed as an organization should be - in
conformity with the law and in conformity with the interest and best judgment
of the American people." 13 The editors of the indispensable eight volumes of
Roosevelt's letters note "the Rooseveltian manner" of referring "to the rights of
the laboring man and labor unions on the one hand, and, on the other, to theii'
obligations. •M
Missing from both the historical appraisals and the contemporary
reactions has been Roosevelt's admiration for the labor writings of Octave
Thanet. A conservative and popular short-story writer of Roosevelt's era, she
is virtually forgotten today. Roosevelt historiography either ignores his esteem
for her depiction of "labor problems" or simply does not bother to study what
her views were. 15 This study tries to fill that gap, as a means to understanding
Roosevelt's rhetoric and actions regarding organized labor.
13

I

TR speech in Freeport, Illinois, September 8, 1910, in Hagedorn, Works of TR, 16:160-161.
14
Morison, Letters of TR, 5:796n.
15
This oversight is true even of Wagenknecht's comprehensive review of Roosevelt's reading
interests. Wagenknecht, Seven Worlds of TR, 44-76. He groups Thanet w ith other women
writers at page 76 for the general proposition that the "social usefulness of literature is
stressed heavily in what he [TRJ has to say" about them, without any indication of Thanet's
focus on labor matters or TR's reaction to it.

9

In his efforts to resolve what Thanet called "labor problems," Roosevelt
seems to have been guided by his distinction between "politics and applied
ethics," even while arguing that they "ought to be interchangeable." His ethical
approach transcended his enthusiasm for politics, the latter of which he
equated with "the same kind of interest one takes in big game hunting, or
football, the kind of interest quite compatible with doing excellent work but
which cannot inspire the highest kind of work." In contrast, applied ethics led
him to be "deeply and indeed painfully impressed with the tremendous
problems of our social and industrial life." For Roosevelt, it was not enough to
have "a material and economic foundation [essential] for every successful
civilization," because even a successful civilization could not survive without
"lofty disinterestedness and power of community feeling ."16
Grappling with the tension between politics and applied ethics,
Roosevelt embraced organized labor's aspirations for the material and
economic progress of working people, but he was troubled by unethical
methods employed by some unions. As a master of practical politics, he
cultivated some (but definitely not all) labor leaders and accommodated
organized labor with vigor, unless its methods and goals conflicted with his

16

TR letter to the author Rider Haggard, June 28, 1912, in Morison, Letters of TR, 7:567-568.
For TR's enthusiasm for big game hunting, see his Outdoor Pastimes of an American Hunter
(New York: Scribner, 1923), and African Game Trails, 2 vols. (New York: Scribner, 1923); and
for football, see his letter to Walter Camp, the "father of American football," March 11, 1895, in
Morison, Letters of TR, 8: 1434.

10
opinion of what ought to be. The ethicist in him insisted that his endorsement
of unionism had to be conditional.
In reconsidering Roosevelt's labor views, we should keep in mind
Roosevelt's watchword for historians. He once told another eminent
politician/historian that "it is one of the commonest and cheapest of all forms of
intellectual entertainment to hold up to ridicule and reprobation a man who in
the past has done a very great work, because he does not come up to the
ideas which are indispensable for the present."17 Roosevelt was a man of his
time, not ours. In our time, labor unions have achieved political and economic
power far beyond what they possessed in Roosevelt's day, and the praise and
criticism directed at them now are different from then. Yet, Roosevelt's
engagement with labor questions and problems remains exciting to read -- for
his insights, his willingness to question traditional responses to labor issues,
his determination to explain his views logically, his style, and his wit-- whether
our experience leads us to agree or disagree with him.

17

TR letter to Senator Henry Cabot Lodge, June 27, 1907, in Morison, Letters of TR, 5:696.
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Figure 1

THEODOJU: ROOSEVELT,

Presideat of lhe United Statu.

12
11. "Curious Signs of Demoralization": Unions by the 1880s

In theory, American labor unions had won their rights to exist and to
apply economic pressure through strikes and other means by the time of
Theodore Roosevelt's birth in 1858. Sixteen years earlier, the Massachusetts
Supreme Judicial Court, in the landmark case of Commonwealth v. Hunt, held
that unions were lawful entities and strikes were lawful union actions. But the
case also reconfigured the labor battlefield, by suggesting that government
might still constrain union actions, including some strikes, if they were deemed
socially undesirable. 1
Commonwealth v. Hunt was a criminal case in which the state alleged
that members of the Boston Journeymen Bootworkers' Society had unlawfully
conspired among themselves not to work for employers who also employed
non-members of the union. After being convicted by a jury, the accused
members of the Society won reversal on appeal to the state's highest court,
which held that employees could lawfully insist upon a shop limited exclusively
to unionized workers. The court said this was because it was "useful and
honorable" to assist fellow union members in times of poverty, sickness, or
distress; raise their intellectual, moral, and social conditions; or improve their
work. In that sense, said the court, union encouragement of its members'
1

Commonwealth v. Hunt, 45 Mass. (4 Metcalf) 111 (1842). Labor history treats the case as
the first in which "the highest court in a state had finally recognized the right of workers to
organize" and as commencing four decades of protecting unions from litigation based on
unlawful conspiracy. Foner, History of Labor Movement, 1:164; Selig Perlman, A History of
Trade Unionism in the United States (New York: Macmillan, 1923), 25-26, 151-152.
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refusal to work with a non-member was no more unlawful than a refusal to
work with an intoxicated co-worker. Although a strike might economically harm
the targeted employer, it was lawful because it was like "all competition in
every branch of trade and industry" where the ultimate object was "meritorious
and public spirited.n
Despite this holding, the court articulated two reasons why its decision
did not end disputes about the legality of union activity. First, if the union had
"purposes of oppression and injustice," rather than useful and honorable
goals, then it might still be liable. Second, the court warned that even when
strikers pursued lawful ends, they could not utilize unlawful means. The court
identified a few such unlawful means, namely, violating the strikers' own
contracts of employment, seeking an employer's violation of cohtracts with
other employees, engaging in one of the three F's (fraud, force, or falsehood) ,
or- albeit imprecisely and tautologically- "other crime or unlawful means." A
fuller definition of what purposes and means would be considered unlawful
was left for future cases, but the key point was that the right to strike was not
absolute.
As a result, what remained in play was whether or not both the purpose
and the means of union activity were legitimate.2 Since the court declined to
uphold the jury's verdict, it would be up to judges to decide questions of
legitimacy as a matter of law. The implication was, as a later commentator
2

45 Mass. at 122.

14

observes, that "the rights of labor are determined quite as much, if not more,
by the social and economic philosophy of the judges as by so-called
immutable principles of the law." Subsequent exercises of judicial power to
determine labor rights were to raise the hackles of Theodore Roosevelt. On its
face, however, the holding of Commonwealth v. Hunt clothed most labor
unions in legitimacy and authorized them to engage in effective economic
actions against employers, while the court's language warned that there were
some actions, largely undefined, that unions could not pursue.3
If we fast forward to Roosevelt's pre-presidential years as an adult,
1880 to 1900, we can see that legitimizing unions did not guarantee labor
tranquility. During those years, there ·were twenty-three thousand strikes in the
United States, 75 percent of which occurred in the main industrial states of
Illinois, Massachusetts, New York, Ohio, and Pennsylvania. Labor history
refers to the turbulence in the middle of the 1880s as the "Great Upheaval. "4 In
1885, railroad workers represented by the Knights of Labor forced a major
railroad operator to negotiate the end of a strike, what one historian identifies
3

Alpheus T. Mason, Organized Labor and the Law (Durham: Duke University Press, 1925;
New York: Amo, 1969}, vii-viii, 65-67, 90-91. Although this decision applied only in
Massachusetts, the same tension existed in the labor jurisprudence of the other major
industrial states of the period . Moores & Co. v. Bricklayers' Union, 10 Ohio Dec. Rep. 48
(1889) (unlawful secondary boycott); Flaccus v. Smith, 199 Pa. 128 (1901) (unlawful to
organize employees who had employment contracts promising not to join a union); National
Protective Association of Steam Fitters v. Cumming, 170 N.Y. 315 (1902) (lawful to strike for a
closed shop); People v. Hughes, 137 N.Y. 29, 37-39 (unlawful to threaten boycott); Wilson v.
Hey, 232 Ill. 389 (1908) (unlawful secondary boycott).
4
Hurwitz, TR and Labor in New York, 11-12; Perlman, History of Trade Unionism, 90-91 ,1 06.
One effect of the "Great Upheaval" was increased judicial and legislative efforts to control
labor militancy through the use of injunctions and criminal penalties. Ibid., 154-158.
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as "the first such demonstration of union power in American history."5 Another
labor dispute, leading to violent May 1886 demonstrations in Chicago, is of
particular interest to any labor study of Roosevelt because of his reaction to
what he regarded as its unacceptable manifestations.
Organized labor's long-time campaign to limit the legal workday to eight
hours had reached a crescendo with union calls for a national strike beginning
on May 1, 1886. An estimated three hundred fifty thousand workers heeded
the call. Many employers acceded to the eight-hour demand, but in Chicago
the strike took a violent turn. There, during a violent demonstration against
strikebreakers at the McCormick harvesting machine factory, the police fired
into the crowd and killed four demonstrators. On the following day, at a mass
meeting in Chicago's Haymarket Square to protest the shootings, a police
contingent of nearly two hundred officers appeared and ordered the crowd to
disperse. Someone threw a bomb toward the police, killing six policemen and
injuring another four dozen. The police retaliated, causing more deaths and
injuries. 6
Although the actual bomb-thrower was never identified, Roosevelt
shared the nationwide public and press disapproval of the bombing as part of
labor agitation. Eight Haymarket rally supporters were indicted for murder on
5

Eric F. Goldman, Rendezvous with Destiny.(New York: Knopf, 1952; Vintage, 1956}, 34.
Foner, History of Labor Movement, 2:99, 103-107. Foner's editorializing about violence
during labor disputes is highly colored in favor of victimized workers and against capitalist
treachery, but his work provides wide-ranging details. Compare the treatment of the May
violence in Perlman, History of Trade Unionism, 92-93.
6

16

the basis that they had instigated the bombing. All were convicted, and seven
were sentenced to die by hanging. Arguing that an unfair trial and overly
severe punishment undermined the cause of labor, many labor organizations
supported demonstrations urging clemency for the Haymarket defendants. In
1893, three defendants were pardoned by Illinois Governor John Peter Altgeld,
on the basis that they were innocent and had been victimized by a packed jury
and biased judge. Elements of the press, including the New York Times and
Chicago Tribune , protested the pardons. Roosevelt never forgave Altgeld. 7
Meanwhile, the labor movement was undergoing transformation in its
strategies and organization. Beginning in the early 1880s, labor unions
publicly sought and politically achieved a "laborer's national holiday" to be held
on the first Monday in September. 8 In 1886, unions throughout the nation
undertook to form independent labor parties and to run pro-labor candidates

7

Foner, History of Labor Movement, 2:108-112, 114; Melvyn Dubofsky, Industrialism and the
American Worker, 1865-1920 (Arlington Heights, Ill.: Harlan Davidson, 1975), 43; TR letter to
his sister, May 15, 1886, in Anna Roosevelt Cowles, ed., Letters from Theodore Roosevelt to
Anna Roosevelt Cowles, 1870-1918 (New York: Scribner, 1924), 80-81 . Also unsympathetic to
the Haymarket defendants was the leadership of the Knights of Labor, the largest national
union of the day, who condemned the "Haymarket anarchistsn for placing the union movement
in jeopardy. Foner, History of Labor Movement, 162-163. Roosevelt variously condemned
Altgeld for pardoning "the Anarchist bomb throwers," openly sympathizing with "the Chicago
mob," practicing politics that led to McKinley's assassination, contributing to "unhealthy
sentimentality and morbid 'class-consciousness,'" and even making it impossible for Roosevelt
to appoint a former Altgeld associate because employers would protest that "This is
Altgeldism." TR letters to Jacob Riis, January 23, 1899; Edward N. Buxton, November 19,
1900; William Allen White, September 7, 1901; and Lyman Abbott, April13, 1906, in Morison,
Letters of TR, 2:921-922, 1427, 3:140, 5:219.
8
In 1887, Oregon became the first state to make Labor Day an official holiday; and in 1894,
Congress and President Cleveland made it a national holiday. Foner, History of Labor
Movement, 2:96-98.

.17

for political office. 9 As discussed below, Roosevelt was a mayoral candidate in
the election that best illustrates the labor party trend.
Perhaps most significantly, in December 1886, dozens of labor unions
created the American Federation of Labor (AFL). Its purposes included
formation and unification of trade unions, lobbying for pro-labor legislation, and
emphasis on the autonomy of each skilled trade. The AFL was formed in
reaction to what its member unions perceived as major shortcomings,
particularly insufficient labor solidarity, of the dominant labor organization of
the day. An ideal of that organization, the Knights of Labor (KOL), was
replacement of the existing wage system with a more cooperative society.
Unlike the KOL, the AFL began by stressing confrontation within the wage

°

system by "oppressed" laborers against "oppressor'' capitalists. 1 For reasons
beyond the scope of this study, the KOL declined from seven hundred
thousand members in 1886 to less than a third of that number in 1888. In
contrast, by the end of the decade, the AFL claimed that its own membership
had more than quadrupled. 11

9

1bid., 2:119, 129-1 31.
Another distinction was the AFL's emphasis on worker representation by craft and the
KOL's philosophy of representing a broad constituency of skilled and unskilled workers. A
caveat to distinguishing the two organizations by these tests is that they also shared practical
and idealistic goals, as well as parallel membership components like the AFL's representation
of unskilled laborers in its "trade" unions and the KOL's trade-specific "assemblies." Robert E~
Weir, Knights Unhorsed: Internal Conflict in a Gilded Age Social Movement (Detroit: Wayne
State University Press, 2000), 16, 18, 36-37, 43-44.
·
11
AFL membership figures for the period are reputedly unreliable. Foner, History of Labor
Movement, 2:141-144, 157-158, 171 . See also Perlman, History of Trade Unionism, 71-72,
78-80, 100-101, 121.
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A contemporary establishment response to strikes, labor violence, and
the growing influence of organized labor came from John Hay, an old friend of
Roosevelt and later a key member of his presidential administration. Hay was
a formidable nineteenth-century personage. He had served as one of
President Lincoln's two private secretaries and co-authored a massive Lincoln
biography; worked as editor of Horace Greeley's New York Tribune; wrote
popular poetry and non-fiction; and had filled high-ranking diplomatic posts for
the United States in Spain, France, and Britain before becoming secretary of
state under McKinley and Roosevelt. Roosevelt regarded Hay as "one of the
most delightful of companions, one of the most charming of all men of
cultivation and action."12
In late 1883 and January 1884, Hay anonymously wrote a popular
novel, The Bread-Winners, using as background a fictional short strike in the
1870s. Hay had experienced such a strike during a two-week period in the
summer of 1877. It began as a railroad strike over wage reductions in
Maryland and West Virginia and then became a national strike that a labor
historian describes as "one of the most widespread and militant strikes" in the
nation's history. Assigned to establish order, some local militias killed
demonstrators and were in turn besieged, while other militias fraternized with
the strikers. At the request of governors in affected states, President
12

W illiam Roscoe Thayer, The Life and Letters of John Hay (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1915),
1:90 et seq., 334, 355, 360, 403, 405; 2:9, 173-175, 268; Theodore Roosevelt, An
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Rutherford B. Hayes dispatched federal troops to restore order. Newspapers
treated the strikes as insurrections and a "labor revolution."13
Hay's novel first appeared in magazine installments and then in book
form during Hay's lifetime in 1884, 1893, and 1899. None of these versions
identified the author. An early Hay biographer says that the magazine success
of the novel "outran that of any previous American novel," in part because of
the mystery about the author's identity and in part because the novel was "the
first important polemic in American fiction in defense of Property."14
On its face, The Breadwinners satirizes the romantic entanglements of
two beautiful women, one from the working class and the other from the
propertied class. Each woman resolves her multiple relationships in the
aftermath of a strike marked by rioting, damage to homes of the wealthy, and
violence inflicted on or by their true loves. One of the working-class heroine's
admirers is a villainous, self-styled "Labor Reformer," Ananias Offitt, who leads
a tiny union called the Brotherhood of Bread-winners. Hay depicts Offitt as a
13

Foner, History of Labor Movement, 1:464-474, 506-507; Perlman, History of Trade
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physically repulsive ("oleaginous") thief, attempted murderer, conscienceless
liar, and potentially fatal betrayer of the workers he purports to lead. 15
Neither Hay nor William Dean Howells, a literary contemporary and
friend of Hay, regarded the novel as anti-union. In an anonymous preface to
the 1899 edition, Hay insisted that the novel expressed "no opinion" of labor
unions in general. "I have told about a little society," he wrote, "organized for
his own ends by a criminal, who uses the labor-reformers' slang and
something of their methods to swindle a few workmen out of their money."
Howells, who favored the right to strike, wrote that the novel "shows no strong
antipathy to strikers till they begin to burn and rob and propose to kill."16
Rather than specifically anti-union in content, construction, or style, the
novel is an egalitarian parody of many social institutions and classes. Its
principal symbol of capital, a factory magnate, is lampooned for his inability to
speak without cursing, his inclination to unnecessary violence in defense of
property, and his complacency about use of industrial and social spies. The
15
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novel also pillories public officials for their self-serving use of patronage, as
well as for their platitudinous embrace of labor against capital until laborers
literally get in their way .17
Contrary to the satirical treatment of these targets, the novel treats
striking workers almost sympathetically. The mass of strikers are good-natured
and "ma[k]e no threats," and the strike does not cross law-and-order
boundaries until the union leadership loses control because "a few tonguey
vagrants and convicts from the city and neighboring towns" begin to exercise
"wholly unexpected authority." The factory magnate directs his concern about
violence at "a lot of bad eggs among the strikers- not the unionists proper."
As for the villain's Brotherhood, it is a fringe group of a few disreputable men,
does not have any leadership role in beginning the strike, and self-destructs
when it stumbles in its effort to transform the strike into mob destruction of
property because of personal grudges or opportunities for theft.18
Instead of attacking the labor movement as such, the novel's more
subtle point is that worker strikes unintentionally open a Pandora's box of
misfits and attitudes that jeopardize society as a whole. The strike leads, even
among non-strikers, to "curious signs of demoralization, as if the spirit of work
was partially disintegrating."19
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The Breadwinners, 148-151, 183-187, 301 .
1bid., 184, 215-216, 253-254.
19
1bid., 191-192, 223-225, 234.
18

22
Hay's dismay about strikes reflected his personal assessment of the
1877 railroad strikes that had turned into mob riots. In contemporaneous
letters to his businessman father-in-law, he described the nation as "at the
mercy of the mob" with the government "utterly helpless and powerless in the
face of an unarmed rebellion of foreign workmen, mostly Irish." There were,
Hay noted, "plenty of scoundrels to encourage them [workingmen] to all
lengths." In an anonymous letter defending his novel, Hay argued that "no
important strike has ever been carried through without violence." Privately,
Hay expressed labor concerns that went beyond strikes, complaining that
unions interfered with employees' rights to make their own employment
agreements and select the trade they wanted.20
In essence, Commonwealth v. Hunt and Hay's novel both seem to be
asking how to approve of unions as societal partners while simultaneously
preventing union tactics from harming either social norms or other segments of
society with whom unions were supposedly not in conflict. Neither offered a
solution. This was the labor context in which Roosevelt began his rise to
political power. 21
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Ill. "A Little Loose on the Relations of Capital and Labor'': PrePresidency

In his 1913 Autobiography, Roosevelt seemed to divide his views of
labor issues into two phases. As a young man, he was obtuse about social
problems. As he matured, however, he became socially conscious. The
division is marked by changes in his understanding of the relative importance
of individual responsibility and collective power. In the initial phase,
individualism was triumphant, which he attributed largely to his Harvard
education. What Harvard taught him was that "the whole duty of the man lay in
thus making the best of himself," a duty that did not include joining with others
"to make things better for the many by curbing the abnormal and excessive
development of individualism in a few." In political economy, that meant
devotion to "canonical" /aissez-faire doctrines. The Harvard of his day offered
"almost no teaching of the need for collective action, and of the fact that in
addition to, not as a substitute for, individual responsibility , there is a collective
responsibility."1
In 1881 , not long after his Harvard graduation and at the age of twentythree, Roosevelt was elected to the New York State Assembly, one of the
state's two legislative houses, where he was to serve for three years. He
admittted in his Autobiography that he was not then "alive to social and
industrial needs which (three decades later] we now all of us recognize." To be

' Roosevelt, Autobiography, 27-28.
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sure, the young legislator believed in "the virtues of consideration and fair
dealing in business as between man and man, and especially as between the
man who is an employer and the man who is an employee." That being said,
however, Roosevelt underscored his lack of responsiveness to social reform
by remembering that "as yet I understood little" of the effort "to secure a more
genuine social and industrial justice."2
It is therefore not surprising that Roosevelt's New York legislative votes
did not often suggest progressivism on labor matters. He opposed unionsupported abolition of cheap convict contract labor; pay increases for city
laborers, police, and firemen; limitation of daily work hours; and premium pay
for working more than a specified number of hours. He did, however, vote for
union-supported protective legislation for women and children, safety
regulations for workers in various industries, and the establishment of a
bureau of labor statistics.3
Intentionally or not, Roosevelt's autobiographical reminiscences of his
early years of public service depict a snob at work. 4 For his "slowness in
grasping the importance" of controlling big business, he offered a "partial
reason" that was not "an excuse or a justification." The reason was "the

2
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corrupt and unattractive nature of so many of the men [whom he did not
identify] who championed poputar reforms, their insincerity, and the folly of so
many of the actions ~hich they advocated." He blamed unnamed hypocritical
demagogues, who openly defended labor and privately deserted it, for
arousing his "indignant and contemptuous dislike," which in turn "prevented
those of us whose instincts were sound from going as far as we ought to have
gone along the lines of governmental control of corporations and
governmental interference on behalf of labor. "5
Roosevelt's Autobiography employs the mea culpa description of his
early public service years to set the scene for his eventual epiphany, namely,
his first personal experience of social injustice. He was appointed to a
legislative committee studying a bill to prevent the manufacture of cigars in
tenements where families also lived. The bill was sponsored by the Cigar
Makers' Union, and driven largely by one of its officers, Samuel Gompers, the
future president of the American Federation of Labor.6 Roosevelt initially
regarded the bill as "contrary to the principles of political economy of the
laissez faire kind; and the business men who spoke to me about it shook their

5
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heads and said that it was designed to prevent a man doing as he wished and
as he had a right to do with what was his own."
Roosevelt's investigative visits to tenement houses shocked him to a
new viewpoint. His "practical common sense" told him that th~ crowded,
unhealthy conditions he witnessed made it impossible for the children living
there to "grow up fitted for the exacting duties of American citizenship."
Consequently, he successfully championed passage of the bill and then, at the
request of "the battered, undersized foreigners who represented the Union and
the workers," personally appealed to Governor Grover Cleveland to sign it.
Cleveland signed the bill, but the highest court in New York State later
declared it unconstitutional in the Jacobs case as a deprivation of personal
liberty and property rights. 7 Roosevelt, dismayed by the court's decision, said
that the case "first waked me to a dim and partial understanding of the fact that
the courts were not necessarily the best judges of what should be done to
better social and industrial conditions."8
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In Roosevelt's tenement-house narrative, we can see a number of labor
attitudes that surfaced throughout his career. He was sympathetic to workers
who were mistreated. He regarded the government as the proper forum for
correcting such abuses. Unions served a valuable purpose when they brought
unfair working cond itions to the government's attention. The courts could not
be counted on to do right by workers. On the contrary, cases like Jacobs
(echoing the effect of the Dred Scott decision before the Civil War) constituted
"bars across the path of social reform" that "brought to naught so much of the
effort to secure justice and fair dealing for workingmen and workingwomen,
and for plain citizens generally.,.g
Labor reform to the Roosevelt of this period did not. however, depend
on unions and certainly did not imply approval of union tactics. 10 As
mentioned above. in 1886, two years after leaving the New York legislature,
Roosevelt condemned Chicago's strike-related Haymarket Square bombing by
focusing on the strikers. Writing to his sister, he said:
My men here [on the ranch] are hard working, labouring men,
who work longer hours for no greater wages than many of the
strikers; but they are Americans through and through; I believe
nothing would give them greater pleasure than a chance with
their rifles at one of the mobs. When we get the papers,
especially in relation to the dynamite burners, they become more
' liberty' to work under unhealthy conditions.' Theodore Roosevelt, The New Nationalism (New
York: Outlook, 1910), 40-41 .
• Roosevelt, Autobiography, 83.
10
Roosevelt's sense of the propriety or impropriety of a bill was Independent of union
sponsorship. "For the labor unions, per se, I care absolutely nothing," he told the Assembly in
1884, in explanation of his legislative philosophy. Hurwitz, TR and Labor in New York, 15.
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furiously angry and excited than I do. I wish I had them with me
and a fair show at ten times our number of rioters; my men shoot
· well and fear very little.11
This statement has come down to us as a blot on Roosevelt's labor
record .12 Its intemperate tone, however, rarely recurred in his later utterances
about strikes, although its substance contains several themes that did. He
regarded mob violence as un-American, and he associated it with strikes.
When the two occurred together, Roosevelt was inclined to consider force or
the threat of force as justifiable in order to suppress strike-related violence.
Yet; we should not presume that the excited remark of the twentyseven-year-old Roosevelt, about a deeply shocking and unpopular incident,
meant that he would always be violently predisposed against unions. Contrary
to such a presumption, we know that Roosevelt used similar violent imagery to
emphasize his feelings about a host of issues. For example, in the same year
as the letter suggesting he would shoot rioting strikers, he made a speech
saying hyperbolically that as an elected official he would "chop [the] head off'
any public servant who was dishonest. Hofstadter, a less than admiring
historian of Roosevelt's career, cuts TR some slack for his rhetorical ferocity
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by observing that he discharged his penchant for violence "on a purely verbal
level, appeased by exploding in every direction at once." 13
In another incident, Roosevelt used similarly violent language in
connection with the 1912 Republican national convention at which he was
defeated for the presidential nomination by then-President William Howard
Taft. Alleging that the ·convention deployed police and barbed wire to
intimidate Roosevelt supporters, he blamed such actions partially on the
convention's chairman, Elihu Root, his formerly trusted friend and cabinet
officer. He said that he ''wanted to take a pistol and go into the convention,"
where, if trouble started, "by George, I wouldn't have wasted a bullet on a
policeman. I would have got Root and got him quick." The outburst was,
however, evanescent. An observer noted that Roosevelt almost immediately
metamorphosed into a smiling TR, "his rage being spent." Root acknowledged
that, after the 1912 presidential campaign ended, he and TR became political
confidants and "friends again without any discussion of the past."14
In the same year as Roosevelt's 1886 violent outburst against the
Chicago strikers, he became a central player in one of the era's most dramatic
political confrontations between labor and capital, and he did not repeat the
anti-striker tirade. Republican leaders in late 1886 persuaded the young
13
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Roosevelt to run for mayor of New York City. His opponents were a strong
Democratic opponent, Congressman Abram S. Hewitt, and Henry George, a
union-backed independent. 15
George had written a popular book, Progress and Poverty (1879), in
which he blamed material progress for causing poverty and attributed this to
the private ownership of land. His theory was that some landowners
deliberately failed to make improvements on their land, speculating that land
values would inevitably rise. The result was lack of productive opportunities for
both labor and capital, leading to the spread of poverty. George believed that
the real "antagonism of interests" was land ownership vs. labor and capital, not
labor vs. capital. His proposed solution was abolition of all taxes except a
single tax on "land values, irrespective of improvements," which would
encourage landowners to generate income by making improvements on their
land, and thereby lead to more jobs with higher wages and investment of
capital- and neither labor nor capital would have to pay taxes on their gains. 16
As noted earlier, the election year of 1886 was a time of widespread
labor disturbances. In addition to the May strike accompanied by the
Haymarket bombing, there had been approximately fifteen hundred strikes
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nationwide and strike violence in New York City. George seized the moment
as a time for change in New York governance and accepted the invitation of
union leaders to run for mayor as an Independent Labor Party candidate, on
condition of pledges of support from thirty thousand workingmen. Thirty-four
thousand made the pledge. As a mayoral candidate, George called for "the
ending of industrial slavery." Gompers, shortly to become president of the
newly formed AFL, actively campaigned for George, and organized labor
helped to fund George's race by levying a twenty-five cent per capita
assessment on union members. 17
The paradox of George's union alliance was that George had grave
concerns about organized labor's effectiveness in solving social problems. He
believed that unions' potential benefit to working people was "extremely
limited" because wage increases achieved for workers in a particular trade
increased prices and therefore tended to lessen demand for what they
produced, and their wage gains were further diluted by attracting an excess of
workers to that trade. Although proud of his former union membership, George
openly frowned on strikes, notwithstanding his recognition that they were the
essential method for union action, because they were "necessarily destructive"
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of worker wealth and, like organizing for war, "necessarily tyrannical" as an
infringement on personal freedom. 18
The Democratic candidate, Hewitt, was the perfect counterpoint to
George and his labor supporters. A wealthy iron magnate as well as a member
of Congress, Hewitt the businessman personified principles of social justice,
having protected the jobs of his employees despite operating losses during the
depression of the 1870s. He believed that strong unions could advance
workers' economic interests, but he regarded a labor-dominated political party
like that supporting George as representative only of one class of citizens. His
fear was that this would undermine good government and the rights of other
classes. He and George engaged in a public debate that a Roosevelt
biographer summarizes as "a stately series of open letters which expounded
the philosophies of Labor v. Capital [George arguing for social justice, Hewitt
warning about the dangers of unionized politics] so brilliantly that Roosevelt
himself suggested they should be published in book form."19
The George-Hewitt labor debate was not a triangular correspondence.
For reasons still not clear, Roosevelt was less confrontational than Hewitt
about George's labor support. Nevertheless, both Roosevelt and Hewitt
18
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repudiated "class" politics. When Roosevelt in his writings invokes "class,"
whether based on wealth or occupation, he means it as a curse. He regarded
class interests as a substitute "for devotion to the interest of the state and to
the elementary ideas of morality." To him, division along class lines leads
"inevitably" to the anti-democratic triumph of one class-based party over
another and "the supremacy of a part over the whole," whether the ultimate
result is oligarchy or "mob rule." In response to George's faction-directed claim
that he ''would make a better mayor for the working men" of New York,
Roosevelt simplified the philosophical divide between them, asserting that the
issue was who would be the mayor for "every citizen of New York."20
Apart from his use of coded language about "class," Roosevelt's
campaign approach adhered to his earlier views that "individual setf-help" was
the cure for social evils. Notwithstanding his espousal of the tenement-house
bill, Roosevelt wrote a public letter arguing that class legislation was not the
answer to social ills, any more "than you could do away with the bruises which
you receive when you tumble down, by passing an act to repeal the laws of
gravitation. "21
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Partially because of the Republican Party's last-minute decision to
recommend shifting votes from Roosevelt to Hewitt in order to ensure
George's defeat, Roosevelt ran third in the mayoral race, with 60,435 votes to
Hewitt's 90,552 and George's 68,110. Roosevelt's interpretation of George's
strong showing was that labor was "a new element to be bid for by the old
parties." In an analysis of the election, Hurwitz argues that what Roosevelt
learned "was to be more careful of public statements on his attitude toward the
labor movement."22 We should, however, be wary of the implication that
Roosevelt's subsequent statements and views about labor unions were based
only on political considerations.
From the time of Roosevelt's mayoral defeat in 1886 until his
appointment as a New York City police commissioner in 1895, he did not hold
a position from which he could act on matters of social justice or labor unions,
but his reported comments indicate very little change in his generally negative
attitude about organized labor. 23 His reaction to the national government's
handling of the Pullman strike and boycotts in 1894 shows not only his attitude
profits" or had the opportunity to invest in the business. TR letter to a Henry George Campaign
Club, October22, 1886, in Hagedorn, WorksofTR, 14:71.
22
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23
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at the time, but also provides a useful comparison to how (as we will see) he
responded as president to another national crisis eight years later during the
1902 anthracite coal strike.
In 1894, workers employed by the Pullman sleeping-car manufacturer
joined Eugene Debs's recently formed American Railway Union to protest rent
increases in their company-supplied housing, alleged workplace abuses, and
wage reductions. After a month on strike against the Pullman employer, the
union decided to boycott any railroad that handled Pullman cars, eventually
expanding the strike nationally to one hundred fifty thousand railroad workers.
The boycotts substantially halted rail traffic, despite the continued work by
members of traditional railroad brotherhoods (organized by craft in
contradistinction to the American Railway Union's one-big-union policy of
admitting to membership any railroad worker, skilled or unskilled).
At the direction of President Grover Cleveland's attorney general, the
national government obtained a sweeping court injunction against the strike
and boycotts, in part because mail could not be delivered to some railroadserved localities. Regarding the injunction as fatal to their strike and boycotts,
Debs and his union disobeyed it and were held in contempt of court. President
Cleveland then sent federal troops to enforce the injunction by force of arms,
and Debs and other labor leaders were arrested.24

24

Foner, History of Labor Movement, 2:255, 261 , 263-267, 269-270; Perlman, History of
Trade Unionism, 137-139.

37

The United States Supreme Court unanimously upheld the injunction
and contempt citations. Disapproving of settling labor disputes "by the club of
the policeman and the bayonet of the soldier," the Court nevertheless declared
that traditional criminal trials by local juries "would be doomed in advance to
failure" when "the whole interests of the nation in these respects would be at
the absolute mercy of a portion of the inhabitants of that single state." Since
the Court knew that the Debs injunction had been enforced by club and
bayonet, its reliance on judge-issued labor injunctions as a preferred
pacification of labor disruption seems in retrospect to have been a triumph of
wishfully selective thinking. In any event, the Pullman strike and boycotts
ended in defeat for the American Railway Union, which soon disappeared .
Roosevelt supported as "admirable" the Cleveland administration's "quick" and
"emphatic" use of the labor injunction and federal troops, on the basis that it
averted a repetition of the Paris Commune and "fierce social war." 25
As of 1895, Roosevelt still admitted only to. "dimly realiz[ing]" that
beyond improvement in political conditions, there was a need "to improve
economic conditions, and to secure social and industrial justice, justice as
between individuals and justice as between classes." Assuming the duties that
year of an appointed New York City police commissioner, Roosevelt coupled
his "ignorance" of the full scope of causes of social injustice with being "well
25
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awake to the need of making ours in good faith both an economic and an
industrial as well as political democracy."26
From then until he was elected as President McKinley's vice president
in 1900, Roosevelt held in succession four government offices- one of the
four New York City police commissioner positions, assistant secretary of the
navy, lieutenant colonel (promoted to colonel) of the Rough Rider cavalry
regiment in the Spanish-American War, and governor of New York. In the first
and last of these, Roosevelt built a more complicated intellectual structure in
respect to social reform and labor unions.
It is useful to begin a discussion of this period with Roosevelt's
definition of "social and industrial problems," what he called in his 1913

Autobiography "the most interesting and important of the problems with which
our public life must deal." He described these problems as "the protection of all
the crushable elements of labor," not just women and children; obtaining
justice between "the big corporation" and its employees, its smaller rivals, its
customers, and the general public; addressing concerns when rising dividends
accompany falling wages; sharing the benefits of improved machinery with the
workers who use the machinery; and creating "some correspondence"
between rewarding workers and the value of their work.
Organized labor could as easily have issued such a to-do list, but
Roosevelt did not mention labor unions or their role in this discussion of "social
26
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and industrial problems." Instead, Roosevelt delineated a non-union ranking of
responsibilities to handle these problems: government first, then individual
action ("the most vital of all factors" being individual character), and then nongovernmental "collective action" and specifically a "body of public opinion" that
will"in the end transform, and be transformed by, the gradual raising of
individual standards of conduct. "27 As shown by the Autobiography's later
references to organized labor, he did not exclude unions from playing some
role, but he was not inclined to put the union movement on the marquee.
During his police commissionership, however, he found ways to relate
to union leadership that he had not pursued since his tenement-house bill
cooperation with the Cigar Makers' Union. He modified his prior attitude that
many union leaders possessed a "corrupt and unattractive nature."28 Instead
of his statement as a mayoral candidate that legislation could no more cure
social ills than it could repeal the laws of gravity, he also acknowledged that
"sometimes [as expressly distinct from "always"] human affairs can be much
bettered by legislation."29
His old and newly emerging attitudes were not mutually exclusive. They
converged in Roosevelt's handling of the police response to New York City
strikes. During the winters of 1895.-1896 and 1896-1897, Roosevelt displayed
his old attitude by assigning both uniformed and plainclothes policemen to
27
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protect the cabs and other property of struck taxi companies. When a union
official complained about such a police presence in the absence of rioting or
mob violence, Roosevelt expanded his rationale for government action to
prevent violence, by pointing to prior "brutal assaults on the peaceable
employees of the New York Cab Company" plus his concern about "the
slightest danger of one repetition of such an assault." He said that "if any man
is incited to violence by the presence of an officer of the law, the very fact
affords proof that he is of disorderly and vicious character."30
Yet, two weeks after making that statement, Roosevelt demonstrated
his new attitude by meeting with union leaders to discuss the matter. ''We
talked for over three hours with entire courtesy and also entire frankness," he
told his si.ster, "and we got along together much better than I had expected. In
fact, I think we parted distinctly pleased with one another."31 Roosevelt's
powerful and persuasive personality probably contributed to the friendly
outcome of his meeting with the New York labor leaders. 32 Beyond that, he
also assured the union leaders that the labor men "were allowed to picket just
30
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so far as under the law picketing could be permitted, so that the strikers had
ample opportunity peacefully to persuade other labor men not to take their
places." But even then he insisted upon "the keeping of order" as a
prerequisite to resolving "all other questions" and said that "no rioter was
permitted to masquerade under the guise of being a friend of labor or a
sympathizer with labor."33
In his Autobiography, written sixteen years after this labor meeting,
Roosevelt emphasized his friendliness to organized labor. "By this time," he
wrote, "I was becoming a strong believer in labor unions. a strong believer in
the rights of labor." On that score, the Autobiography took some historical
liberties, because at the time of the labor meeting he had also written that
labor leaders were "the worst foe of the poor man• when they taught that the
poor were victims of "conspiracy and injustice." He regarded the "average"
labor leader as uncooperative in helping to achieve civic improvements and
largely "sullen," "shortsighted," and unpatriotic.34
Despite the inconsistency between his contemporary writings and his
later Autobiography, Roosevelt seems to have found a formula for dealing with
union leaders, namely, openly embracing both the leaders and the principle of
unionization without abandoning his law-and-order approach to strikes.
Roosevelt believed this had persuaded some labor leaders to accept his
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sincerity, because when he left the police commissionership in April1897,
several of them told him they were sorry to see him depart. One of them wrote
that he was "particularly grateful for your liberal attitude toward organized
. labor, your cordial championship of those speaking in behalf of the toilers, and
your evident desire to do the right thing as you saw it at whatever cost. "35
Roosevelt nevertheless firmly believed that prevention of labor violence
involved more than suppressing violence after it occurred. It also required
action in anticipation of lawbreaking. If, as his taxi strike approach showed, his
goal was to prevent violence, then a relevant question is how far he thought
government should go. While police commissioner, Roosevelt opposed
legislation that would have prohibited using detectives to infiltrate
organizations in order to obtain evidence to convict potential lawbreakers.
Explaining his position, he used a labor example. He referred to "[t]he 'Molly
Maguires' who terrorized a large section of Pennsylvania through murder,
arson, and violence of every kind, [and] were broken up by the employment of
the very means which these bills would forbid the police force of New York to
employ."36
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After the election of McKinley as president in 1896, the new
administration in Washington appointed him to federal positions that allowed
him to gain political respect and national fame during 1897-1898. His cunning
advocacy of naval preparedness as assistant secretary of the navy in
Washington and especially his Rough Rider heroism in Cuba during the war
with Spain led to Roosevelt's election as governor of New York State in
1898.37
One of the most intriguing contemporary statements of Roosevelt's
labor attitude occurred in the spring of 1899, when Roosevelt ~ad been
governor for only a few months. Senator Thomas C. Platt, the "Boss" of New
York State's Republican Party, wrote to him and alluded to "many views" at the
time of the gubernatorial nominating process that Roosevelt was "a little loose
on the relations of capital and labor, on trusts and combinations, and, indeed,
on those numerous questions which have recently arisen in politics affecting
the security of earnings and the right of a man to run his own business in his
own way, with due respe.c t of course to the Ten Commandments and the
Penal Code." Platt grouped this somewhat vague catalogue under the vaguer
friend in 1897 that "in our country at any rate, I am convinced that there is no real oppression
of the mass of the people by these capitalists. The condition of the workman and the man of
small means has been improved." TR letter to Cecil Spring Rice, May 29, 1897, in Morison,
Letters of TR, 1:620. See also Roosevelt's 1894 comment that "The workingman is, on the
whole, better fed, better clothed, better housed, and provided with greater opportunities for
pleasure and for mental and spiritual improvement than ever before." Roosevelt, American
Ideals, 264.
37
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notion that "a number of business men" believed that Roosevelt "entertained
various altruistic ideas."38
The reason behind Platt's letter was not a labor issue. Its genesis was
Governor Roosevelt's having, "at the last moment" of the New York legislative
session, done "a thing which has caused the business community of New York
to wonder how far the notions of Populism, as laid down in Kansas and
Nebraska, have taken hold upon the Republican party of the State of New
York." The "thing" that Roosevelt had done was to support, strongly and
successfully, a bill to tax the franchises granted to corporations that operated
electric street car lines in big cities like New York and Buffalo. 39
Roosevelt seized upon the labor reference to defend himself by
insisting that his attitude toward organized labor actually proved his support of
business interests. He reminded Platt of his response as governor to a recent
strike by seven thousand dock workers in Buffalo, when he had stood ready to
call out the National Guard to "intimidate" any labor man "anxious to commit
lawlessness." Roosevelt argued that taxing corporations would make the
Republican Party "all the stronger when we declare that the laborers shall
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commit no disorder and that we are utterly against any attack on the lawful use
of wealth." There were evils to be corrected, he wrote to Platt, and he urged
that "whereas the populists, socialists and others really do not correct the evils
at all ... on the contrary we Republicans hold the just balance and [should]
set our faces as resolutely against improper corporate influence on the one
hand as against 'demagogy and mob rule on the other.'140 In other words,
Roosevelt portrayed his tough stance against union militancy as redeeming his
tough stance against corporations.
Although the absence of violence and a relatively quick labor settlement
made it unnecessary for him to send troops to the Buffalo dock strike
mentioned in his letter to Platt, Roosevelt turned threat into action the following
year, in April 1900, when he sent thirteen hundred National Guardsmen to
police a strike by non-union workers constructing the Croton Dam. The troops
kept the strikers from gathering in crowds, protected the few strikebreakers,
and arrested strike ringleaders. Writing to a friend after one of the soldiers had
been shot, Roosevelt admitted that the cause of the strike might well have
been employer unfairness to the workers, but ''where the riotous Italians [who
preponderated in the workforce] have begun by assassinating one of the
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National Guard ... we have got to put them down and shall do it at any
cost."41
Just as Roosevelt insisted that he provided assistance to corporations
through governmental restraint on organized labor's militancy, he utilized a
similar backdoor argument to show his support for unions. Governor Roosevelt
contended that "I have been all along the staunchest believer in the immense
possibilities for good through the organization of labor," based on his support
of labor actions that paralleled union goals, namely, limiting daily hours of
work, elimination of sweatshops, efficient government enforcement of a factory
inspection Jaw, and appointment of union men to various state jobs. 42
Roosevelt's pro-labor self-justification, although generally accurate,43
requires some qualification. His support of worker legislation did not arise in
lockstep with its endorsement by organized labor. On the contrary, in 1899 he
vetoed a union-supported bill limiting the hours of drug clerks, based on
concerns about its effect on smaller druggists and his characterization of the
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bill's union advocates as showing only that "they go for anything that calls for
shorter hours.'144 He did not hesitate to look behind union rationales for
particular pieces of legislation, as in his determination to veto a unionsponsored bill designed to transfer non-union prison manufacture of school
furniture to private manufacturers. Despite his stated desire "to do anything I
properly can for'' the unions, "it seems to me that this bill is really in the interest
of one big furniture firm and that we ought to be very cautious about breaking
down our present system of employment in the prisons."45
Similarly, although Governor Roosevelt sought to amplify his outreach
to union leaders that marked his police commissionership, by following their
recommendations for appointments to state jobs, he bowed to political and
practical obstacles. Thus, he withdrew the appointment of Henry White, a
founder of the United Garment Workers union, as chief factory inspector, when
"Boss" Platt objected. Even when he was able to appoint wageworkers
recommended by labor leaders, he was frustrated by their performance. "What
I did not foresee," he lamented, ''was their intense jealousy of one another."
This persuaded him that in the future he should appoint the best
administrators "without regard to whether these men were wageworkers or
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not.'>46 By the time of his New York governorship, therefore, Roosevelt was no
longer a snob about social issues or labor unions. He was instead treating
organized labor as a mechanism to be used for achieving his broader
policies. 47 Hurwitz contends that the gambit "failed to win the support of either
labor or capital," but by 1900 it did not inhibit the Republican Party from
nominating TR to run for vice president on McKinley's re-election ticket. 48
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IV. The Labor Union "Has Come to Stay": Presidential Rhetoric
From the time he became president in 1901 upon the death of the
assassinated President McKinley, Roosevelt often spoke favorably, if
qualifiedly, about labor unions. A characteristic statement was included in his
acceptance of the Republican nomination for the presidency in 1904, when he
declared, "We recognize the organization of capital and the organization of
labor as natural outcomes of our industrial system." A few months earlier, he
had written to a supporter, "I want it understood that I am not against unions
any more than I am against corporations." But he revealingly added, "I am
against abuses in both."1
Roosevelt made a more detailed statement of his qualified
endorsement of organized labor early in 1904, when he wrote to his eldest
son, then sixteen years old, about how to discuss unions. "I would not discuss
the labor-union question from the side that labor unions are harmful," he wrote.
"I think they are beneficial if handled as they should be, and that the attack
should be made, not upon the principle of association among working people,
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but upon the abuses in the manifestation of that principle."2 He realized that
this was a challenging distinction. As he told a favorite correspondent in
England after the 1904 election, "Somehow or other we shall have to work out
methods of controlling the big corporations without paralyzing the energies of
the business community and of preventing any tyranny on the part of the labor
unions while cordially assisting in every proper effort made by the
wageworkers to better themselves by combinations."3
There is in these letters a sense that unions, as well as big business,
tend toward abuse, even evil, and need to be "handled" or managed by
government. Indeed, in another letter to the same English correspondent,
Roosevelt explicitly argued that both corporations and labor unions "are potent
weapons for evil, when under the control of unscrupulous men.'"' Roosevelt
was skeptical that Americans could count on the fairness or public spirit of
either business managers or union representatives, and he sought to stake out
a position where he was not the political agent of either side in labor conflicts.
He told a journalist who requested a statement of Roosevelt's real views about
organized labor, "My action on labor should always be considered in
connection with my action as regards capital, and both are reducible to my
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favorite formula- A square deal for every man."5 No wonder that
contemporaries found , and historians have continued to find , difficulty in
defining Roosevelt as either pro-union or anti-union.
We can observe President Roosevelt trying to define his labor views in
each of his eight year-end official messages to Congress. The purpose of the
messages was to describe what he considered to be the issues of the moment
and to suggest ways of dealing with them.6 Every message contains
references either to labor matters in general or to organized labor specifically,
and sometimes to both. What is remarkable from the perspective of our
current union-saturated legal environment is how little legislation Roosevelt
proposed for the benefit of organized labor, as distinct from legislation
beneficial to workers generally, and how he inevitably balanced praise for
organized labor with cautionary words ?
As the starting point of his first message, Roosevelt drew lessons from
the assassination of President McKinley. Pointing to "the reckless utterances"
of anarchists who inflamed the assassin by appealing "to the dark and evil
spirits of malice and greed, envy and sullen hatred," he argued that
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inflammatory speech was dangerous to society. This was an accusation that in
later years he would apply directly to public statements of labor leaders.8 "The
wind is sowed by the men who preach such doctrines," he warned, "and they
cannot escape their share of responsibility for the whirlwind that is reaped ."
On labor matters, however, Roosevelt spoke positively. He told
Congress that the purpose of American political institutions was to "afford
opportunity to every honest and intelligent son of toil." In that spirit, he
proposed that the government regulate the labor of women and children, as
well as the hours of work and the sanitary conditions of all employees of the
government and its contractors. He proposed a department of commerce and
industries to concern itself with, among other business issues, "whatever
concerns labor."9
As for labor unions, "[v]ery great good has been and will be
accomplished" by them, provided -- and here, again, is the dichotomy in
Roosevelt's labor union rhetoric -- that they are "managed with forethought,
and when they combine insistence upon their own rights with law-abiding
respect for the rights of others."10 While repeatedly recognizing in later

8

For example, in his famous "man w ith the muckraken speech, on April 14, 1906, Roosevelt
included a reference to "the so-called labor leader who clamorously strives to excite a foul
class feeling on behalf of some other labor leader w ho is implicated in murder." Hagedorn,
Works of TR, 16:420.
9
Hagedorn, Works of TR, 15:84, 93-94. These were legislative goals that TR repeatedly
proposed; in subsequent messages he added recommendations for safety, employers'
liability, workers' compensation , unemployment insurance, and old-age pension legislation.
Ibid., 15:218, 283-284, 358-359, 435, 437-438, 501-502.
10
Hagedorn. Works of TR, 15:84, 93-95 (emphasis added).

53
messages that America was in "an era of federation and combination" of both

capital and labor that should not be attacked "as such," he continued to
emphasize the dichotomy. Both kinds of combination could do good, but "as a
necessary corollary they can both do evil." He called for opposition to
"whatever is bad in the conduct of any given corporation or union," identifying
the "bad" as including "arbitrary or tyrannous interference with the rights of
others."11
These are, of course, abstractions that do not define what constitutes
"evil" or the "bad," the boundaries of labor rights vs. public or employer rights,
or how to resolve conflicts between opposing assertions of right. Moreover,
despite his personal intervention to resolve the 1902 anthracite coal strike (as
discussed below), Roosevelt seemed reluctant to have the national
government either define or police such issues. In his 1904 message, he
asserted that the states had "primary control of the police power," which meant
that federal interference should be limited to "altogether extreme"
circumstances either for labor rights or against "unruly persons who shield
themselves behind the name of labor." The only extremes he acknowledged
as sufficient to invoke federal power were interference with federal property or
rights, or if a state called for federal help in a crisis. Even then, federal
intervention to assist_ the states should be restricted to "restoring order without
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regard to the questions which have caused the breach of order . .. all other
questions sink into abeyance until order has been restored."12
In Roosevelt's final four annual messages (1905-1908), there was a
definite shift in tone and content that did not favor organized labor. Roosevelt's
perception was that labor disputes were tending to degenerate into class
conflict, which he warned was a threat to the republic. He began the shift by
condemning as "most unwise" organized labor's efforts to have Congress
legislate limits on the judiciary's power to grant injunctions in labor disputes.
Although he recognized that the injunctive power had sometimes ·been
misused, that did not "justify a denial of the power any more than an improper
exercise of the power to call a strike by a labor leader would justify the denial
of the right to strike." He did, however, suggest imposing on the courts a
requirement of due notice to adverse parties before granting a labor injunction.
In addition, rather than limiting federal intervention in labor disputes to extreme
circumstances, Roosevelt began to call for a greater federal role in labor
disputes. He advocated federal investigation of the issues in "any great labor
disturbance," followed by publicity about its findings .13
In 1906, he intensified his opposition to organized labor's desire to
abolish labor injunctions. "It is criminal to permit sympathy for criminals to
weaken our hands in upholding the law," he said, "and if men seek to destroy
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1bid., 15:215-216.
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life or property by mob violence there should be no impairment of the power of
the courts to deal with them in the most summary and effective way possible."
In an echo of his attack on preachers of violence whom he had accused of
provoking McKinley's assassin, he inveighed against preaching "mere
discontent" by men "who seek to excite a violent class hatred against all men
of wealth. " Accompanying such heated language was the most far-reaching
legislative proposal Roosevelt had yet made to deal with labor disputes. He
called it "compulsory investigation" of labor disputes, in which the parties
would be required to explain their respective positions to a non-binding but
"unprejudiced body representing the nation," thereby enabling public opinion
to "crystallize and thus to exert its full force for the right. "14
Whether or not "compulsory investigation" and a "crystallized" public
opinion could ever be sufficient to achieve labor peace, Roosevelt's embrace
of these notions demonstrated recognition that labor conflict was increasing.
His 1907 message spelled out the magnitude of the dilemma posed by a more
militant form of organized labor. During the five years ending on December 31 ,
1905, Roosevelt noted, the number of strikes and lockouts was double the
number of those in the preceding five years and greater than in any prior tenyear period. The trade union, like the corporation, "has come to stay," he
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Hagedorn, Works of TR, 15:347, 356, 361-362.
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observed, and both shared responsibility with politicians for labor problems. 15
The president's 1908 message to Congress seems notable today for its
despair over both conservative business interests and militant labor leaders.
On one side, "a blind and ignorant resistance to every effort for the reform of
abuses and for the readjustment of society to modern industrial conditions
represents not true conservatism, but an incitement to the wildest radicalism."
On the other side, "certain leaders of organized labor" were still attacking the
judiciary's power in labor matters, "refusing all compromise, " and seeking an
outcome that would legalize blacklisting, boycotts, secondary boycotts, and
giving juries power in contempt of court trials that was previously the
responsibility of judges. This was "the enthronement of class privilege in its
crudest and most brutal form, and the destruction of one of the most essential
functions of the judiciary in all civilized lands."
Unions' class-selfishness, he feared, would lead to a division of society
and "would inevitably in the end cause a violent reaction." He continued to
propose worker-friendly legislation and "some way" to limit the abuse of labor
injunctions, but he also suggested blurring the distinction between employer
and employee, by giving the latter the opportunity to "own a far greater share
than at present of the wealth they produoe."16
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In late January 1908, Roosevelt sent Congress a special message
containing strong criticisms of business. Roosevelt advocated expansion of
government supervision over virtually all aspects of railroad operations and
chastised great corporations and their representatives for teaching dishonesty
as the path to business success. This did not mean elevating the power of
unions as a counterweight to corporations. "If a labor union does wrong, we
oppose it as firmly as we oppose a corporation which does wrong," he said,
"and we stand equally strongly for the. rights of the man of wealth and for the
rights of the wageworker."17
Roosevelt's reactions to two Supreme Court decisions that had been
issued earlier in the month of his special message suggest where his labor
priorities resided. Both cases had declared federal labor legislation
unconstitutional on the ground that the laws sought to regulate intrastate
actions, because congressional authority was limited to interstate commerce.
In the Howard case, the Court struck down an employers' liability law that
provided compensation when railroad employees were killed on the job due to
the negligence of others. Although the employee in the case was on an
interstate trip, the Court said the statute was also broad enough to cover
employees who worked excl usively in a single state. Since such employees
were constitutionally subject only to state law, this "interblending" of interstate

17

The special message is p ublished in Morison, Letters of TR, 6: 1575-1577, 1580, 1582; see
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and intrastate workers rendered the statute unconstitutional. 18 Roosevelt
asked Congress for a new law covering only those employees engaged in
interstate commerce.
In the other case, Adair, the Court struck down a statute making it a
federal crime to discharge an employee, even if engaged exclusively in
intrastate work, because of union membership.19 That decision had an
obviously negative impact on unions. Roosevelt circumspectly urged
Congress's "careful consideration" of the case while he decided "in what way
to call the matter to your attention."20 One explanation for the circumspection
is that the case was decided only a few days before, in contrast to the several
weeks during which he had to consider the first case. That being said,
however, there was a level of urgency in Roosevelt's request for new
legislation addressing employee safety that did not appear with respect to
replacing a law that primarily benefited union interests.

18

Howard v. Illinois Central R. Co., 207 U.S. 463 (1908). As explained in the dissent by
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20
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Presidential words provide important clues to what Roosevelt thought
abOut unions, but behind his words was what he liked to call his big stick,
which leads next to examination of how he wielded that stick in labor matters.2 '

21

Roosevelt wrote to Nicholas Murray Butler of Columbia University on August 29, 1903, that
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V.

'~Each .Given

Case As It Arose": Presidential Actions

In his Autobiography, Roosevelt wrote that when he became president,
he believed in efficient government, in industrial and political democracy, in
people's rights, and "in invoking the National power with absolute freedom for
every National need." But as to his realization of these high-minded
abstractions, " [i]n internal affairs I cannot say that I entered the Presidency
with any deliberately planned and far-reaching scheme of social betterment."
Instead, "I was content to wait and see what method might be necessary in
each given case as it arose." 1 Action "in each given case as it arose,"
however, begs the question of what principles held the cases together.
Like his carefully balanced labor rhetoric, President Roosevelt's labor
actions do not fully answer the question. His actions in respect to seven unionrelated subjects underscore the puzzle created by his words. These subjects
are labor legislation and enforcement that improved American conditions of
work; intervention to resolve the 1902 anthracite coal strike; use of the military
in labor conflicts; resistance to organized labor's goal of mandatory union
membership of all employees whom they claimed to represent; criteria for
Supreme Court nominations; modification rather than (as unions wanted)
elimination of judicial injunctions against union conduct; and the creation and
demise of a Foundation for the Promotion of Industrial Peace.

1

Roosevelt, Autobiography, 400-401.
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A. Labor Legislation and Enforcement
The Autobiography's chapter on "Social and Industrial Justice" begins
by emphasizing government action for the betterment of working people.
There is no mention of legislation to assist unions or union organization, one
reason being that President Roosevelt had not sought such legislation. His
recital of the actions he took as president "to fight for the rights of the
workingman" were making the national government "a model employer of
labor," seeking "good laws" for workers wherever the national government had
power, and enforcing the existing eight-hour workday law. The meaning of
"labor'' in reciting his commitments to social and industrial justice simply does
not include labor organizations.2
More specifically, the "good laws" mentioned in the Autobiography are
workmen's compensation for federal employees, health protections for miners
in the territories and for motormen and conductors on street railways in the
District of Columbia, supervision of District employment agencies, safety
requirements for factory employees in the District and for interstate railway
employees, and a new employers' liability law for interstate railroads after the
courts had declared a prior law unconstitutional. All of these laws and actions
2

Roosevelt as president offered a similar recital in a long Jetter he wrote to a railway union
member and then released publicly as a campaign document in support of Taft's presidential
candidacy. Apart from an introductory statement of his pride at being an honorary member of
a railway union and a discussion of the legal right of uworkingmen" to strike and picket, most of
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Taft to continue doing if elected. Union contributions were treated as little more than incidental
to worker betterment. TR letter to P. H. Grace, October 19, 1908, in Morison, Letters of TR,
5:1295-1302.
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were expressions of Roosevelt's feeling "most strongly that all that the
government could do in the interest of labor should be done."3
It was not merely a stylistic choice that Roosevelt began his
autobiographical chapter on labor matters without mentioning labor unions. It
reflected the substantive advice he had given in 1904 to his former attorney
general, Philander C. Knox, upon the latter's election to the Senate. Roosevelt
was then at the height of his power and fame, having overwhelmingly been
elected president the week before, and his letter reads like an anointment of
Knox as his senatorial tribune. He told Knox that the great challenge of the day
was that the organized labor movement was growing as "a factor of vital
importance" in American society and politics. In response, continuation of a
conservative, business-first Republican hostility would lead to "a radical and
extreme democracy with a crash which will be disastrous to the Nation."
Roosevelt feared the "dreadful calamity" of a nation divided between two
parties: property owners and conservatives against wageworkers and the less
prosperous.4
Having dramatically described the challenge, Roosevelt went on to
share with Knox his conceptual cure. He concentrated on government's
beneficence to working people, not on what their representatives in organized
labor could do for them. "We must not only do justice," he wrote, "but be able

3
4

Roosevelt, Autobiography, 476-478. See Gould, Presidency, 106-107.
TR letter to Knox, November 10, 1904, in Morison, Letters of TR, 4:1022-1024.
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to show the wageworkers that we are doing justice . . . [W]hile we
unflinchingly demand good conduct from them, yet we are equally resolute· in
the effort to secure them all just and proper consideration." His credo was the
golden rule, not collective bargaining, because "here. in this republic it is
peculiarly incumbent upon the man with whom things have prospered to be in
a certain sense the keeper of his brother with whom life has gone hard."
Although the letter began with "the great problem of organized labor,"
Roosevelt returned to unions only toward its end, obliquely and without
enthusiasm, suggesting that Knox "could get in tovch with some of the labor
people." That was not because they had solutions to offer, since "you might
find that you had to go against most of what they wished." It was because "I
would like you to know what they desire to do - what their real feelings are."
President Roosevelt believed that organized labor performed an educational
role that could be useful in solving labor problems, but that employers and
ultimately the government should play the lead roles in reaching solutions.
This was not just cant. Roosevelt tried, as we would now colloquially
express it, to walk the talk. When he visited the Panama Canal construction
zone in late 1906, he personally met with machinists and other workers whose
complaints about working conditions had been transmitted to him in part by the
International Association of Machinists (lAM) union. He then visited sites the
workers had identified as problems and, if he agreed with their complaints,
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ordered corrective action and informed the lAM what he had done. Where he
found that their compla!nts had not been substantiated, he wrote to the lAM's
president and explained his findings. It was his demonstration that government
employees could count on the government and on him as its CEO to provide
them with fair employment.5
B. Anthracite Coal Strike
Only after describing what his government had done directly for workers
does Roosevelt's Autobiography move to a detailed description of his
government's interactions with organized labor. His Exhibit A was the
government's intervention to settle the 1902 anthracite coal strike, which
Roosevelt characterized as "[v]ery much the most important action I took as
regards labor...e If so, then why did Roosevelt place the coal strike intervention
after his enumeration of his non-union actions respecting "Social and Industrial
Justice"? One interpretation is that it was a belated expansion of Roosevelt's
definition of "labor" to include labor organizations. An alternative reading ,
consistent with his ambivalent style whenever he discussed labor unions,
suggests that he saw the strike in terms of the government's extrication of
workers and the public from a socially dangerous situation.

5
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Historians treat the coal strike as Roosevelt's most important labor
action, at least based on the space they give it? It remains a riveting tale,
national drama juxtaposed against deliciously low comedy, illustrating
Roosevelt's talents for negotiation and adaptability to complex circumstances.
Questions remain, however, about what Roosevelt's ad hoc strike intervention
contributed to the development of the government's labor union attitudes and
policies and, indeed, whether Roosevelt even had a long-term view of how the
government should react to the growth of union power and ambitions.8
When the coal strike began in May 1902, Roosevelt had been the
president of the United States for eight months. United Mine Workers (UMW)
delegates had voted to strike the Pennsylvania anthracite coal mines after
their union failed to reach agreement with mine owners on a labor agreement,
and nearly one hundred fifty thousand miners stopped working. 9 The UMW
had in the years preceding this strike demonstrated willingness and ability to
lead massive miner strikes. In 1897, bituminous coal strikes had resulted in
labor agreements and an astonishing increase in union membership from ten
thousand to one hundred fifteen thousand miners. In 1900, UMW-Ied

7

See Morris, T Rex, 131-137, 146, 150-169; Brands, TR Romantic, 450-462; Miller, TR Life;
370-378.
8
One historian neatly captures the essence of the questions in the subtitle to his article about
the strike. Robert H. Wiebe, "The Anthracite Strike of 1902: A Record of Confusion," The
Mississippi Valley Historical Review 48 (September 1961 ): 229-251 .
9
Perlman, History of Trade Unionism, 175-176.

66

anthracite coal miners engaged in a successful six-week strike in
Pennsylvania shortly before the presidential election.

10

Although President McKinley did not intervene in the 1900 strike,
presidential politics led to its settlement. J. P. Morgan, the dominant financier
of the era, and Senator Marcus A. Hanna, Ohio colleague and 1900
presidential reelection campaign chairman for McKinley, feared that
continuation of the strike would favor the election of Democrat William
Jennings Bryan. Accordingly, Hanna convinced the mine operators to agree to
a pay increase and a grievance procedure to settle the strike. By that time,
Morgan interests had largely consolidated the coal-carrying railroads through
ownership and interlocking directorates, and these railroads had acquired
many of the coal mines. The men who ran the mines believed, however, that
they had been maneuvered into a political settlement that primarily benefited
the UMW, and they took a tough stance against the union's bargaining
11

demands in 1902.
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Roosevelt initially believed he had no power to intervene in the 1902
strike. There was no legally enforceable procedure for validati111g union claims
for recognition as the representative of employees, recognition that the UMW
demanded and the mine owners declined to give. There was no mechanism
for preventing either employer or union bad faith in bargaining, which arguably
surfaced in the owners' persistent refusals to make any bargaining
concessions and in the union's alleged responsibility for intimidating nonstrikers. There was no established government process or bureaucracy
dedicated to mediation of non-railroad labor disputes. All of these government
powers became law in the 1930s and 1940s, but they were not available to
Roosevelt in 1902.
Roosevelt also had little inclination to involve the presidency in what
initially appeared to be a dispute involving only miners and mine owners. "As
long as I cou ld avoid interfering I did so," he later acknowledged. He
understood and for a time accepted government inaction as working to the
mine owners' advantage. The mine owners believed that the economic
suffering of the miners and their families would eventually end the strike. They
"were confident that if order were kept, and nothing further done by the
Government, they would win." Roosevelt interpreted the owners' position as

68

"merely taking the extreme individualistic view of the rights of property and the
freedom of individual action upheld in the laissez faire political economies."12
What eventually led Roosevelt away from that viewpoint was his belief
that the economic struggle in the Pennsylvania mines was going to harm the
public. Normally conservative state and municipal officials reported to him that,
as autumn approached, their communities were facing a heating crisis that
Roosevelt referred to variously as "a National menace," a "calamity," even "the
direst disaster." Roosevelt recalled, "It is not too much to say that the situation
which confronted Pennsylvania, New York, and New England, and to a less
degree the States of the Middle West, in October, 1902, was quite as serious
as if they had been threatened by the invasion of a hostile army of
overwhelming force."13 Unfortunately for a Jaissez-faire strategy, the mine
owners were unable to extract much anthracite coal without the striking
employees, in part because of violence against strikebreakers· and their
families, despite the presence of private police forces hired by the mine
operators. 14
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Practical politics also pushed Roosevelt to intervene. During a oneweek period in late September, Roosevelt's closest friend and political adviser,
Senator Henry Cabot Lodge of Massachusetts, wrote him three nearly
hysterical letters translating the hike in coal prices and the growing lack of coal
at any price into a "political disaster" for their Republican Party. Lodge offered
no recommendations, plaintively asking, "Can nothing be done?" to press the
mine operators. Roosevelt acknowledged "the immediate political effect" of the
"unreasoning feeling" that made people blame the government for any large
calamity.15
During pre-strike mediation sponsored by the recently formed National
Civic Federation (NCF), an organization of union, management, and political
leaders seeking ways to achieve industrial peace, the gap between
management and union positions was enormous. The operators refused to
budge on any union demand. The union had not overcome this resistance by
halving its wage demands from 20 percent to 10 percent and, instead of its
original demand for reducing the ten-hour workday to eight hours, proposing a
nine-hour workday.16 Union leader John Mitchell had further offered to submit
all unresolved bargaining issues (which included UMW demands for formal
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management recognition of the union's right to represent miners) to an
arbitration panel appointed by the NCF.17
·,

The mine owners rejected the union's arbitration offer on the basis that
"business management" was the exclusive responsibility of a corporation's
president and directors. 18 The leading spokesman for the coal-carrying
railroads repeatedly voiced objections to union involvement in discussing mine
practices, on the grounds that the union lacked technical knowledge of mine
conditions, undermined mine efficiency by encouraging employees to disobey
management's reasonable orders, and practiced "terrorism, tyranny and
lawlessness."19
Blocked in bargaining, the UMW sought public support. Mitchell
thwarted a proposed sympathy strike by bituminous coal miners, despite their
argument that a sympathy strike's denial of this railroad fuel would increase
the pressure on the mine-owning railroads. Mitchell's successful rebuttal was
that a sympathy strike would constitute a violation of the bituminous coal mine
contracts that the UMW had previously negotiated and would undermine the
UMW's position that management and the public could rely on the union's
fidelity to signed contracts. His position was sustained at a union convention
on July 17, which led to favorable press portrayals of the union's
17
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reasonableness. 20 Mitchell also downplayed the UMW's self-interested goal of
obtaining formal owner recognition as the miners' representative, by depicting
the strike as "for living wages for American conditions of employment."21
In contrast to Mitchell's demonstrations of UMW willingness to
compromise and adhere to labor contracts, the mine owners' public relations
were disastrous. In late August, after owner rejection of NCF arbitration, the
press publicized a private letter written by the chief owner representative,
George F. Baer, president of the mine-owning Philadelphia & Reading
Railroad. The letter was Baer's ill-considered response to someone he did not
know who had written in a way that Baer characterized as "biased in favor" of
working men. Explaining the owners' position, Baer replied:
The rights and interests of the laboring man will be protected and cared
for- not by the labor agitators, but by the Christian men to whom God
in His infinite wisdom has given the control of the property interests of
the count~, and upon the successful Management of which so much
depends.

20
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Press and pulpit reaction ridiculed Baer's invocation of a management-only
deity. Roosevelt later referred to it as the "Viceregent of God" position.23
The combination of fear of winter coal shortages, Mitchell's appearance
of reasonableness, and Baer's selfish religiosity led even the conservative
Senator Lodge to tell Roosevelt that the mine owners were guilty of
"insensate folly."

24

Roosevelt later remembered, "As September passed

without any sign of weakening either among the employers or the striking
workmen, the situation became so grave that I felt I would have to try to do
something." As to the substance of the strike issues, he was largely silent. 25
Roosevelt considered and rejected a variety of suggestions to end the
strike. These included suing the mine owners or seizing their property on the
theories that they constituted an unlawful trust under the Sherman Antitrust
Act or were endangering public health; suing the UMW under the same law for
monopolizing coal-supplying labor; and replaying President Cleveland's Debs
case precedent, by seeking a court injunction against the strike and then, if
necessary, using the army to enforce it. 26
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Roosevelt believed that there was "literally nothing" that "the National
Government has any power to do in the matter." He followed the advice he
received from Attorney General Knox, whose papers contain an unsigned,
undated legal memorandum analyzing one of the letters from a mine owner
representative, plus a communication from Knox to Roosevelt in early October
begging the president's indulgence for him to present his analysis of the same
letter "in a more finished and fuller way." The thrust of the memorandum was
that the strike was not subject to federal government action because the
United States Supreme Court had declared the Sherman Antitrust Act
inapplicable to production of goods, as distinct from their interstate
transportation; and that the Debs case involved, unlike the coal strike,
interference with the transportation of federal mail. 27
As the strike dragged on, Roosevelt underwent a transformation in his
understanding of presidential power in labor disputes. He explained later that
the strike was a "great national crisis" that allowed him as president to move
beyond what the Constitution required or what Congress authorized him to do.
27
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He asserted the president's "legal right to do whatever the needs of the people
demand, unless the Constitution or the laws explicitly forbid him to do it."28 He
equated the coal strike and the contradictory advice he was receiving with
Lincoln's challenges during the Civil War and expressed his determination not
to follow pre-Civil War President Buchanan's principle "of striving to find some
constitutional reason for inaction."29
Roosevelt's first step in the direction of expanded presidential power
was tentative, in the sense that he first relied on his personality and the bully
pulpit of his office. He took the unprecedented and dramatic step of inviting representatives of the mine owners and the union to meet with him at the
temporary White House on October 3.30 Roosevelt heightened the drama by
appearing in a wheelchair. It was a legitimate posture, because Roosevelt's>
carriage had recently been sideswiped by a trolley car in Pittsfield,
Massachusetts, injuring the President and killing his bodyguard. Roosevelt's
injured left leg was operated on twice in the ensuing month.31
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In attendance before the wheelchair-bound President were six
representatives of the coal mine operators, including the deity-invoking
George Baer; four UMW officers, including John Mitchell; Attorney General
Knox; Commissioner of Labor Carroll D. Wright, who had been monitoring the
strike for the President; and George Cortelyou, Roosevelt's private secretary
and a future cabinet member.32 Roosevelt began the meeting by reading a
statement in which he "disclaim[ed] any right or duty to intervene in this way
upon legal grounds or upon any official relation that I bear to the situation."
Nevertheless, he said he represented the affected general public and asked
for "an immediate resumption of operations in the coal mines in some such
way as will without a day's unnecessary delay meet the crying needs of the
people."
At this stage, Roosevelt was leaving it to the management and union
parties to determine how to resolve their conflict, although they had been
unable to do so since early spring. Mitchell immediately offered face-to-face
negotiations with the mine operators or, if that failed, third-party resolution,
suggesting that the president name a tribunal whose award the parties would
agree in advance to accept. The mine owners took a different approach. Baer
32
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expressed their annoyance by first detailing the violent misdeeds of the union
and its supporters ("the fomentors of this anarchy"), but he then offered to
submit the miners' "alleged grievances" to the local courts. The offer was
significant because it meant that the mine operators were agreeing to thirdparty resolution, albeit in a venue different from that proposed by Mitchell.
Despite this significant concession and its acknowledgment in the
government's Report of the meeting, management's offer to let the courts
decide was ignored. Roosevelt did not mention it in his Autobiography. On the
contrary, his statement there was that the owners "refused to talk of arbitration
or other accommodation of any kind."33
What Roosevelt focused on later in discussing the owners' conduct at
the meeting was their "most insolent frame of mind" and their "language that
was insulting to the miners and offensive to me." He contrasted the operators'
conduct with that of Mitchell, ''who kept his temper admirably and showed to
much advantage." Mitchell later described the operators' performance at the
meeting as "a series of tirades and invectives against the union and its
officers, which left no ground for discussion or conciliation." He too omitted any
reference to the operators' offer to submit disputed issues to the local courts. 34
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It is difficult to believe that Roosevelt did not notice the operators' offer
of judicial resolution. Not only was it mentioned in the government Report, but
the chief of the federal government's Division of Mineral Resources also told
Roosevelt on October 8 that George Baer had amended the mine owners'
court-resolution proposal to allow referral of outstanding strike issues to any
higher court designated by the president. Roosevelt refused to convey this
amendment to the union unless other mine operators agreed to it and, further,
unless they apologized to him for their conduct at the meeting on October 3. 35
A more likely explanation for Roosevelt's course is that he concluded
that the October 3 meeting's publicity had weakened the operators' public
standing while strengthening that of the union. In the days after the meeting,
the press generally condemned the operators' attitude and reported that the
union had gained popular support. Lodge told Roosevelt that the striking
miners gained sympathy because of what was perceived as Mitchell's "fair
proposition." Even "so naturally conservative a man" as former President
Cleveland, who had forcibly suppressed the1894 railway strike, wrote that he
supported Roosevelt's actions. 36
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Having tried inaction and then mediation, Roosevelt devised a
supposedly secret plan to send the army to the coal fields. Upon a request
from the governor of Pennsylvania for federal troops to maintain order, he
would send the army to seize the mines and run them until an Investigating
Commission could "decide on the rights of the case· and report findings to him
for further action. He had already arranged for Cleveland to serve on the
commission, which Roosevelt said would investigate the conditions and
causes of the strike, including at this late date "whether there has been
violence and if so to what extent. "37 He did not tell Cleveland about the
military aspect of his plan.
Roosevelt was at pains in his Autobiography to dispel any inference
that army seizure of the mines smacked of dictatorship. Describing in an
avuncular way his selection of the retired Major General John M. Schofield as
commander of the troops, he later wrote, "He was a fine fellow- a most
respectable-looking old boy, with side whiskers and a black skull-cap, without
any of the outward aspect of the conventional military dictator." Although
neither Roosevelt in his Autobiography nor his biographers have shed much

TR, 3:342-343. The Cleveland letter of October 4, 1902, whi<:h suggested a cooling-off period,
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37
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light on why Roosevelt selected a supposedly unthreatening retiree to
command the troops, Schofield had a strike suppression background. Ten
years earlier, in 1892, Schofield commanded fifteen hundred federal soldiers
sent to the Coeur d'Alene mining district, where they assisted in protecting
strikebreakers and arresting strike leaders and sympathizers.38 This suggests
that Roosevelt picked Schofield to keep both owners and strikers in doubt
about his ultimate intentions.

..

Roosevelt claimed in his Autobiography that only General Schofield
knew about the mine-seizure component; 39 however, a few days after hatching
the mine seizure plan, Roosevelt wrote Governor Crane of Massachusetts that
he had "outlined" it to Secretary of War Elihu Root and Attorney General Knox
and told them to write letters of protest if they wanted to avoid responsibility, a
suggestion that implies their knowledge of a potentially controversial military
action. Supporting that implication, he also said that Root had informed him
that ten thousand army regulars were available immediately.40
Writing to his biographer in 1930, Root expressed uncertainty about
whether Roosevelt would have actually sent federal troops to take possession
of the mines. "Theodore, " Root wrote, ''was a bit of a bluffer occasionally, and
at the same time he had nerve to go on -to take a chance his statements
38
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would have the deciding effect and, if not, to go on and trust the country would
back him up." Attorney General Knox had firmer doubts about Roosevelt's
intention to seize the mines. Much later, Knox said that Roosevelt had asked
him for a legal opinion about seizure of the mines. When Knox responded that
Roosevelt lacked the power to do it, Roosevelt said he would abide by Knox's
opinion. Consistent with Knox's recollection, during the intermission of his
October 3 meeting with the mine and union representatives, Roosevelt wrote
the mayor of New York City that the idea of seizing the mines and having the
government act as a "receiver" was "absurd.'141
Root was concerned enough that he felt "as if Roosevelt needed a little
help ... Roosevelt, after all, was a young fellow [TR was forty-three years old;
Root was fifty-seven] without very much experience in the ordinary affairs of
life." The "little help" that Root devised was "a way for the people to get out of
the impasse without humiliation," and, by implication, without use offorce. His
concept was simultaneously to address the "double line of complaints" - the
miners' objection to existing work conditions and the owners' objection to any
41
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kind of recognition of the union's right to speak for the miners. What Root
wanted was a statement from the owners that while they remained unwilling to
make an agreement with or recognize the UMW as the representative of the
workers, they were willing to submit the existing situation to impartial
adjudication. ' [l]t was a damned lie," Root said, "but it looked fair on paper.'o4 2
Although Root's solution seemed to be a rehash of a union proposal that the
mine owners had already rejected, he framed it so that neither the union nor
the president would actually propose it.
On October 9, Root wrote to J. P. Morgan, outlining his proposed
solution. At Morgan's invitation, Root spent the day of October 11 on Morgan's
yacht, Corsair. He persuaded Morgan that his idea to resolve the strike would
be the best course for the mine owners. Root later denied that he had
threatened government action, which would preclude his having raised
Roosevelt's military option.43 Morgan was probably amenable without
government threats, because he had led Senator Hanna to believe in late
September that the financier would agree to a third-party "decision,• a position
that the operators, through Baer, "absolutely refused to entertain" at that early
date.44 Since Baer had expanded the owners' definition of acceptable third-
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party resolution three days before Root met with MorgaD, logic also suggests
that Root may not have needed to unsheathe Roosevelt's sword to convince
Morgan. Moreover, the failure of the Pennsylvania National Guard's recent
arrival in the coal fields to encourage a back-to-work movement would have
demonstrated to the mine owners that their wait-and-see strategy for breaking
the strike was moribund.45
Having reached agreement, Morgan and Root then drafted "a little
memorandum" on the yacht's stationery in which the owners. rather than the
union or the president, proposed a presidential commission to arbitrate the
labor dispute. When that was done, they took a cab to a private club, where
Morgan proposed the memorandum to various mine owners. The owners
approved the Root-Morgan memorandum, but added the condition that the
arbitration commission had to be composed of five members -- an expert
mining engineer, a man with experience in mining and selling coal, a military
officer from the engineering corps, a federal judge from the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania, and a person "eminent as a sociologist." Morgan and Root then
transmitted the amended mine owner proposal to Roosevelt. By October 13, it
was announced that the mine owners were proposing arbitration.46

" On the effect of the Pennsylvania National Guard's presence. see Com ell, Anthracite Coal
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It was Mitchell's turn to object. He questioned the fairness of an arbitral
body packed by the operators, but he was willing to agree if the commission
were enlarged by the addition of a representative of organized labor and a
Catholic ecclesiastic, because the miners were predominantly Catholic. The
mine owners demurred, emphatically on the first point, and Morgan sent two of
his associates, Robert Bacon and George W. Perkins, to discuss the
commission further with Roosevelt on October 15. Roosevelt knew and liked
both men. Bacon had been his Harvard classmate and later became his
secretary of state. Perkins would serve as Roosevelt's chief money-raiser and
head of the Progressive Party when Roosevelt tried to reclaim the presidency
in 1912. He regarded them as "entirely reasonable," but they were under strict
orders from the operators not to allow the appointment of a labor
representative. 47 Their meeting with Roosevelt became the occasion for the
strike's comic relief, and Roosevelt would later tell and retell the story with
glee.
"[A]fter about two hours' argument" over adding members to the
commission, Roosevelt wrote, "it dawned on me that they were not objecting
to the thing, but to the name. I found that they did not mind my appointing any
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man, whether he was a labor man or not, as long as he was not appointed as
a labor man, or as a representative of labor." Roosevelt wrote to Lodge (and
later used some of the same imagery in his Autobiography) that he finally
realized that "the mighty brains of these captains of industry had formulated
the theory that they would rather have anarchy than tweedledum, but that if I
would use the word tweedledee they would hail it as meaning peace."
With that illumination, Roosevelt announced that he would appoint as
the "eminent sociologist" the chief executive of one of the railroad unions, even
though he doubted the labor official "had ever previously heard" of such a title.
He then appointed a Catholic bishop to be the seventh man on the
commission. Bacon and Perkins, speaking for the operators, "saw nothing
offensive in my language and nothing ridiculous in the proposition, and
Pierpont Morgan and Baer, when called up by telephone, eagerly ratified the
absurdity.1148 Roosevelt's tweedledee appointment of an eminent sociologist to
the commission suggests the same labor relations insight as Root's earlier.
idea that an already rejected presidential commission could be resurrected by
shifting its sponsorship to the owners. Both TR and Root understood that the
appearance of things, no matter how bizarre, is what may count most in labor
disputes.
48
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Within a week, the representatives of the striking miners voted to end
the strike, and "all questions in dispute were submitted to the arbitration of the
commission appointed by the President of the United States.'149 After a threemonth period during which it heard 240 union witnesses, 154 operator
witnesses, and 153 strikebreaker witnesses, and gathered over ten thousand
pages of testimony and exhibits, the arbitration commission ordered significant
percentage wage increases along the lines demanded by the union and
workday hours reductions to eight hours without loss of pay for some
classifications and nine hours for others. 5° Although it did not order the
operators to recognize the union's representative status, it ordered de facto
recognition by establishing a conciliation board to interpret and administer its
other orders. The conciliation board was to be composed of an equal number
of operator and union representatives. 51
Mitchell regarded the outcome as "a clear victory for the men [that]
justified the declaration of the strike" and "a landmark in the history of labor. "52
AFL president Samuel Gompers later said that the strike was "the most
important single incident in the labor movement in the United States" and that
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it "abolished" the whole system of company dominance in the coal mines. 53
Roosevelt believed that "the great monied interests" and the newspapers they
controlled never forgave his coal strike actions. 54
Some historians agree that Roosevelt's handling of the strike was a
watershed in American labor relations, because it achieved a "new standing"
for organized labor, according to one,55 and defended "the legitimate rights of
labor," according to another. 56 Less effusively, Hofstadter credits Roosevelt for
deviating from prior presidents' strike interventions as "partisan.s of the
captains of industry" (i.e., Hayes in 1877 and Cleveland in 1894) by seeming
"in the public eye to stand not only apart from but above the opposing sides."57
Nevertheless, Roosevelt's twists and turns during the strike and his
virtual silence about its underlying issues suggest that he did not have a
principle at stake or a policy in mind. One historian of the coal conflict calls the
strike an example of the "passive nature" of Roosevelt's labor policy in his first
presidential term. 58 Roosevelt's intervention resolved only one labor dispute,
without establishing principles for government to follow in future strikes. That
the anthracite coal strike became part of American labor's folklore does not
alter the fact that it provided no long-term palliatives to labor strife when
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collective bargaining fails. 59 Although Roosevelt proved that government
intervention could resolve a major strike without·invoking the authority of the
courts or the military, the settlement of the coal strike did not include a
comprehensive labor relations program, rule, or precedent.
No one understood this better than Roosevelt. As he explained, the
strike was "absolutely peculiar, because we dealt with a necessity of life," so
that "everything [including resolution of bargaining issues, stopping strike
violence, and the rights of non-strikers to work] had to give way to the prime
necessity of saving people as a whole from a fearful calamity - or rather, had
to be postponed to thus saving them." Yet, he still believed that "under

ordinary conditions a strike is not a subject for interference by the President."60
In 1920, Joseph Bucklin Bishop wrote in his authorized biography of
Roosevelt that the coal strike commission secured labor peace in the
anthracite mines "permanently, for since 1902 there has been no strike there
and no serious labor trouble."61 Nevertheless, as a Roosevelt contemporary
observed, "In the quarter century that passed between the coal strike of 1902
59
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and the year 1927, it cannot be said that any measurable progress had been
made, either in England or in America, toward formulating means for settling
strikes through official governmental action."62 As this implies, the anthracite
coal strike exposed, without resolving, underlying weaknesses in collective
bargaining that seemed to call for further government attention.
We should not presume to judge what Roosevelt accomplished in 1902
from the perspectives of today, or of the labor management environments in
the 1930s and 1940s when Congress did try to formulate a labor policy.63 But
we should not forget that the problems were visible in 1902 and that Roosevelt
·did not attempt to craft structural solutions.
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C. Military Intervention in Labor Disputes

Roosevelt's threat to send the army to Pennsylvania during the
anthracite coal strike distracts us from the fact that for months he did not
seriously consider using federal troops to bring order to the coal fields. That
fact is significant because Roosevelt usually insisted on suppression of strike
violence before addressing the underlying labor problems.
Roosevelt had information about violence during the anthracite coal
strike, and he believed that strike violence was inevitable in such a massive
strike. At the October 3 wheelchair meeting, Mitchell's counter to the
operators' accusation that twenty people had been murdered was to admit to
only seven deaths. In his later recounting of strike events, Mitchell conceded
that some strikers and their sympathizers acted violently, sometimes fatally,
but he argued that it was "utterly impossible to control every act and deed"
among one hundred fifty thousand strikers. A case in point was when a mob of
five thousand strikers and strike sympathizers in late July 1902 beat two men
(one of them a shopkeeper) to death for trying to protect non-strikers. The
incident received national publicity.54
Roosevelt acknowledged to a biographer that disorder in the anthracite
coal strike "has been very great in the present instance and of a very evil
kind," but he also observed that he had received reports to "the exact
64
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contrary." In either event, he was of the opinion that the existence of violence
"in no way justifies a refusal to have some dispassionate body settle the
respective rights and wrongs of the two parties." Dealing with violence had to
wait, "vital though I deemed it that violence should be stamped out," because
the shortage of coal threatened innocent people with a calamity. "When the
calamity has been averted then the other question can be taken up." He
rejected a suggestion that he condemn the violence on the basis that "not a
particle of good would come from my denouncing the outrages in question.'.e5
In short, when faced with a strike of some undefined enormity, he was willing
to bypass his normal sequence of order before equity.
Moreover, the threat to dispatch troops under General Schofield did not
prefigure a policy for utilizing the military option in the future. Root's biographer
asserts that Roosevelt as president "was inclined to resort rather readily to the
use of federal troops" to control an impending riot of striking miners.66
Roosevelt was certainly not shy about threatening military action.
Representative of such rhetoric were the two opportunities he took in Chicago
in May 1905 to publicize his willingness to use the army there in response to
an ongoing strike. He told labor leaders that he would not hesitate to use the
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army to suppress rioting. Then he publicly announced "in the plainest possible
language" that his government would act against disorder "whenever the
necessity arose." He assessed his remarks proudly, ·so if the rioting in
Chicago gets beyond the control of the State and City, they now know well that
7

the regulars will come ...e

Similarly, during a post-presidential1910 speaking tour, he declared
that, notwithstanding his support of workers' rights, in labor disputes the first
duty of an "honest and upright civil official is to restore order" because "w hile
the mob rules there is no time to find out the right and the wrong of the
question at issue between that mob and any person or any corporation . .sa
In practice, however, President Roosevelt was hardly doctrinaire. He
approached each case as it arose. Subsequent to the anthracite coal strike,
Roosevelt faced four major occasions when state governors called on him for
military assistance in connection with labor conflicts: Arizona in 1903,
Colorado in 1903-1904, Idaho in 1906, and Nevada in 1907-1908. He reacted
differently to each request.
When mine workers in Morenci, Arizona, struck in June 1903 to protest
the territorial legislature's enactment of a limitation on daily hours of work
without maintaining their daily pay levels, the acting governor requested
federal troops to prevent an impending riot. The federal government promptly
51
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sent troops, who were ordered to take action only if local authorities could not
restore order. Secretary of War Root's biographer argues that this
demonstrates Roosevelt's inclination·to send troops to quell labor disturbances
unless restrained by Root, who happened to be away from Washington.
Roosevelt's role in the episode, however, is historically unclear. He was also
out of town, and the order to send troops was issued by the acting secretary of
war and the acting adjutant general. Roosevelt nevertheless took credit for the
order. In any event, the troops were quickly withdrawn when they found no
disorder, a recall that was not present in some of the other instances
discussed below. 69
During a strike in Colorado by the Western Federation of Miners (WFM)
beginning in 1903, the Roosevelt administration initially refused to send
troops, on the dual grounds that the governor failed to demonstrate the state's
inability to cope with violence and inappropriately sought to put federal troops
under state direction and control. 70 Root, a skilled lawyer trying to rationalize
federal intervention in labor conflicts, had shown Roosevelt that the United
States Constitution limited domestic use of the army to requests from affected
states for aid to suppress "insurrections," but that subsequent congressional
69
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enabling legislation gave the president power to decide if an insurrection
actually exists and what force is "necessary and sufficient to suppress such
insurrection."71 Whether or not Roosevelt intervened militarily, as we will see,
seems to have depended on how his decision would affect one particular
union, the WFM.
During the following summer, the Colorado labor dispute escalated in
the Cripple Creek mine area. There was evidence of violence perpetrated by
both the WFM and organizations supporting the mine owners. A local Citizens'
Alliance, frustrated by the economic effects of the strike, allied itself with the
Mine Owners Association to enforce the governor's order that the militia
transport union mine workers from the area.72 As the Cripple Creek violence
increased, the union asked for federal troops to protect their members from
what it characterized as state-supported violence. Roosevelt procrastinated,
waiting for several investigative reports on the situation. By September 1904,
state militia had neutralized the WFM by closing union-represented mines and
deporting union miners. 73
Roosevelt offered various rationales for his Colorado inaction. He told a
journalist that he could not accede to the union miners' request for protection
because it would "require" unlimited federal interference in local disputes,
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including "in every State where a negro is lynched." To his political confidant,
Philander C. Knox, however, Roosevelt sympathized with the Colorado
governor for "manfully [doing] his duty in stopping disorder and in battling
against a corrupt and murderous conspiracy among the Federation of
Miners."74 The suspicion from this episode is that Roosevelt's decision not to
send troops was motivated in large part by the fact that the WFM, a union that
he intensely disliked, had made the request. Anti-WFM motivation becomes
even more apparent as we examine the Idaho and Nevada situations.75
The Idaho request for federal troops in early 1906 did not involve a
strike in progress, but it did involve the WFM. Three of the union's leaders, its
secretary-treasurer William D. Haywood, its president Charles H. Moyer, and
their supporter and confidant George A. Pettibone, were arrested in Colorado
and extradited to Idaho, where they were indicted for the 1905 murder, by
dynamite, of former Idaho Governor Frank Steunenberg. The case against the
union leaders rested largely upon the testimony of the actual murderer, who
said they had hired him to kill Steunenberg. Their motivation was allegedly to
retaliate against Steunenberg for requesting, as Idaho governor in 1899,
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federal troops to put down what he termed an insurrection by striking miners in
the Coeur d'Alene region after they blew up a mine concentrator and drove all
non-striking company personnel away. 76
With the WFM leaders imprisoned in Idaho, organized labor undertook
a national publicity campaign to free them as, according to Roosevelt, "martyrs
to the cause of labor." The Idaho governor became concerned that there might
be riots on the defendants' behalf, and he requested Roosevelt to send federal
troops. Although no riot had occurred (and none subsequently occurred),
Roosevelt quickly sent troops to Boise, with instructions to remain there
indefinitely. In justification of this action, Roosevelt did not hide his hostility to
the WFM and the defendants for their many years of practicing "every form of
violence" and for past "incitement to assassination." He also inveighed against
their union supporters, including Eugene Debs, for threatening violent
revolution if the defendants were convicted, which he interpreted as "a certain
duress on the courts or on the Government authorities."77
Beginning in July 1907, all the Idaho defendants were acquitted or the
charges against them were dropped. But Roosevelt's condemnation of the
WFM leaders never abated. He regarded the acquittal of Haywood as a "gross
miscarriage of justice" that he supposed was the result of a "terrorized" jury.
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When the "infamous creatures at the head of the Western Federation of
Miners" late·r opposed the Idaho governor's re-election, Roosevelt actively
supported the governor. 78
In December 1907, the governor of Nevada requested Roosevelt to
send federal troops to reestablish order in his state because of reciprocal
violence between what Roosevelt later called "greedy" mine owners and the
"lawless" and "constantly armed" WFM. In his Autobiography, Roosevelt
justified his deployment of troops as temporary "until time had been given for
the State authorities to organize their force so that violence could at once be
checked."79 This obscures the full picture.
The WFM had gone on strike in late November in opposition to
Goldfield, Nevada, mine owners' payment of wages in scrip that merchants
then discounted. Roosevelt sent troops within three days after receiving the.,.
governor's request, even though there was little or no evidence of violence. "It
is far better to avoid conflict," he told the acting secretary of war, "by sending
too many troops than by sending too few to run the risk of inviting bloodshed."
After the arrival of the troops, the mine owners opportunistically announced
wage reductions and their intention not to hire men affiliated with the WFM.
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Yet, there was still no violence.80
During more than two months beginning on December 17, 1907,
Roosevelt wrote the governor of Nevada five times questioning the justification
for federal troops in the absence of insurrection and insisting that the governor
should call the Nevada legislature into session to provide for a state police
force. Roosevelt recognized that the governor was stalling, but he repeatedly
postponed removal of the troops from Nevada until March 7, 1908. One effect
of their presence was to help break the WFM strike.81
Roosevelt's various demonstrations of animosity toward the WFM in the
Colorado, Idaho, and Nevada incidents suggest that on labor matters his was
a government of men, not of laws or principle. As the eminent Roosevelt
scholar, Elting Morison, observes, justice for Roosevelt was a matter of
"personal intuition," lacking any "organized statement of self-evident truths
about man and his requirements to provide a direction or a basis for judgment
in political action."82
Roosevelt's hostility to the Western Federation of Miners and its leaders
did not mean, however, general hostility to unions or strikes. It reflected his
distinction between good and bad labor leaders. As he told a supporter of the
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WFM leaders, he drew the "sharpest possible line" between them and "lawabiding and upright representatives of labor."83 Just as he railed against
Haywo.od and Moyer of the WFM as bad labor leaders, he rewarded John
Mitchell of the United Mine Workers as a good labor leader during _the
anthracite coal strike. 84
When the WFM was not involved, Roosevelt showed restraint in his
exercise of government power in strike situations, as he demonstrated early in
1908 in response to a threatened railroad strike. The presidential precedent for
dealing with railroad strikes was Cleveland's 1894 decision to seek an
injunction and then prosecute strike leaders for contempt when the strike did
not end. Roosevelt's response was very different. He notified the Interstate .
Commerce Commission of his desire for an investigation and publicity about
the railroads' strike-provoking decision to reduce wages, and he offered
government conciliation of the dispute under a post-Cleveland law, the
Erdman Act. Roosevelt's pro-labor and mediating response led to rescission of
the wage reductions and settlement of the dispute, for which Gompers and
other labor leaders gave him the credit.85
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Roosevelt was equally vindictive toward some business leaders as he
was toward some union leaders. One footnote to the Haywood/Moyer affair
was Roosevelt's public condemnation of the railroad magnate, E. H. Harriman,
who had allegedly refused to donate to the Republican Party because he said
it was easy for him to buy Democrats, Congress, and the judiciary. Roosevelt
denounced Harriman for "cynicism and deep-seated corruption" and declared
him "at least as undesirable a citizen as Debs, or Moyer, or Haywood." This
reflected Roosevelt's viewpoint that it was "essential that we make it clear that
we war on the evil of human nature, whether shown in the labor man or the
capitalist. "86
To Roosevelt, the evils perpetrated by bad labor and corporate leaders
undermined the nation's democratic fabric. In the midst of the Haywood/Moyer
affair, Roosevelt wrote a revealing letter to the steel magnate and
philanthropist, Andrew Carnegie, in which he analogized the conflict aboi.Jt
"economic equity between labor and capital" to the French Revolution. On one
side were violent extremists who favored change, and they were "to be
dreaded almost or quite as much as the Bourbon reactionaries who are
against it." Violent labor leaders paralleled French revolutionaries like Marat,
Hebert, Robespierre, and Danton, who did no good because they "nullified the
good that others did" and produced "a reaction that re-enthroned despotism."
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Such men "did not improve on the morality of the worst nobles of the Old
regime; they merely damaged freedom as their predecessors had damaged
order."87
Roosevelt's comparison between the French Revolution and
contemporary economic and social conditions was not casually made. He was
a student of the French Revolution, having written a sympathetic biography of
Gouverneur Morris, the American minister to France during the Jacobin terror.
"There was never another great struggle, in the end productive of good to
mankind," he wrote, "where the tools and methods by which that end was won
were so wholly vile as in the French Revolution." Beyond his distaste for
Jacobin means, Roosevelt saw something even more sinister. In challenging
Bourbon absolutist misrule, the revolutionaries also "destroyed the principle of
authority" in a government that "represented the whole," by establishing "the
rule of an anarchic despotism which, by what seems to a free American a
gross misnomer, they called a democracy."
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When Roosevelt the champion of an ordered democracy equated
militant labor leaders with fanatical Jacobins, he did so because he regarded
both as threats to fundamental societal values. For him the worst aspects of
the French Revolution provided lessons that were not limited to eighteenthcentury France. He wrote:
Jacobinism, socialism, communism, nihilism, and anarch ism, these are the real foes of a democratic republic, for each one, if
it obtains control, obtains it only as the sure forerunner of a
despotic tyranny and of some form of the one-man power. 88
Roosevelt's opposition to such isms went beyond fears of bloody
revolution and despotism. It also reflected his commitment to achieving social
change by peaceful means. Tlhus, just as he distinguished between good and
bad unions, he distinguished between good and bad socialist principles and
methods, depending on whether or not they were "in the interest of the
people." Although there were aspects of socialism that he supported, this did
not mean that he was "therefore committed to all of Karl Marx's theories." He
disagreed "most emphatically" with Marxian Socialism because it was
"unalterably opposed to our whole industrial system," sought to destroy
capitalism through continual class struggle, and rejected the possibility of
reconciliation between the employer and worker classes.89
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During his 1910 post-presidential tour of Europe, he made a point of
observing European socialism. His comments were not positive. In Italy, he
sympathized with "some of the Socialistic aims," but had "a very profound
distrust of most of the Socialistic methods" and noted that the ''well-meaning"
Socialists he met had ''wild eyes." In France, the Republicans who treated him
as a soul mate were "very uneasy over the Socialistic propaganda" that
seemed headed toward "mob work and general sinister destruction." In
Sweden, he "could not understand the extreme bitterness of the Socialist
attitude" that welcomed class destruction by appealing for an end to having
children. In Germany, he studied the "advanced" social security system,
intended by the emperor "to draw the teeth of the Socialists by remedying all
the real abuses." But he found that this did not stem social discontent that
"was primarily political rather than economic." In Denmark, he was baffled that
Denmark's social security system for manual laborers was "a higher and more
intelligent social and governmental action than we have begun to have in
America; yet I encountered much bitterness towards the national government
among the large and growing Socialist party."90
The negative tendencies he found among Marxists and socialists
conflicted with his belief that "employer and employees have overwhelming
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interests in common, both as partners in industry and as citizens of the
Republic." Even when their interests diverged, he was confident that
adjustments could be made by changes in law and its interpretation.
Roosevelt's optimistic political philosophy led him to a middle-of-the-road
position between the revolutionary Marxian socialists and the "reactionaries"
whose "standing pat" on matters of industrial justice provoked revolution. He
was comfortable there, because it allowed him to place a foot on either side of
the road so that he could practice "sane radicalism."91
Roosevelt's linkage of dangerous isms with "bad" unions did not mean
that there were no limits on how he sought to control the Western Federation
of Miners. He drew the line against trying to manipulate the law to convict
WFM leaders. In a letter to his attorney general condemning Haywood, Moyer,
and the WFM for their historic espousal of violence, Roosevelt also insisted on
a fair trial and an investigation of contentions that the union leaders had been
improperly extradited from Colorado to stand trial in Idaho for the murder of
former Governor Steunenberg. The ensuing Department of Justice report that
the extradition had been lawful furnished him with a foundation for combining
adherence to "fair trial" protections with condemnation of the WFM defendants
and their sympathizers. 92 Our modern sensibility may nevertheless cringe at
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Roosevelt's seeming to base military intervention on how it would affect the
WFM.
Shortly before his presidency ended, Roosevelt was candid that as
president he "used every ounce of power there was in the office." One of his
examples for establishing "a precedent for strength in the executive" was
"keeping order in Nevada this year [1908] when the [Western] Federation of
Miners threatened anarchy." But he tried to balance his assertion of power by
insisting upon his sense of responsibility. Explaining his refusal to run for
almost certain re-election in 1908, he said, "I believe in a strong executive; I
believe in power; but I believe that responsibility should go with power, and
that it is not well that the strong executive should be a perpetual executive."93
This is an appealing bid to justify his treatment of the WFM as subject
to review by another president. Four years later, however, that sense of
responsibility did not prevent Roosevelt from running again for the presidency,
and he never ceased hoping that he would eventually be re-elected.94
D. Mandatory Union Membership
Within a year after the 1902 anthracite coal strike, Roosevelt upheld the
right of a government employee not to be a union member and yet keep his
job. Because the incident did not involve Roosevelt's usual gallery of infamy namely, violence and the Western Federation of Miners-- it provides an
93
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intriguing case study for assessing Roosevelt's attitude toward what organized
·labor perceived as an essential union interest.
The situation arose when an assistant foreman in the Government
Printing Office (GPO), William A. Miller, was expelled from the Binders' Union
in May 1903 after introducing cost-saving machinery, establishing production
levels higher than those in union rules, making negative comments to a
newspaper about his union, and complaining to a congressman about GPO
inefficiency. The expulsion made him the only one of five hundred GPO
employees who was not a union member, a status that defied the GPO's de
facto "union shop" since its inception in 1860. The chief executive of the GPO
then discharged Miller, arguably to head off an expected union strike if Miller
remained in employment. 95
Miller appealed his discharge to the Civil Service Commission, which
ordered his reinstatement on the basis that the discharge was not justified
under civil service rules. The GPO nevertheless refused to reinstate Miller and
appealed the order to Roosevelt and Secretary of Commerce and Labor
George L. Cortelyou, arguing that all employees of the GPO belonged to one
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or the other of eleven unions and that Congress had never disputed the
practice of employing only union members.
In letters to Secretary Cortelyou, Roosevelt supported Miller and
ordered his reinstatement. First, Roosevelt said that union decisions could not
override federal civil service law. Second, and most importantly for this study,
he invoked the finding of the Anthracite Coal Strike Commission that "no
person shall be refused employment or in any way discriminated against on
account of membership or non-membership in any labor organization, and that
there shall be no discrimination against or interference with any employee who
is not a member of any labor organization by members of such labor
organization." Roosevelt then extended the Miller precedent to all executive
departments by means of an order declaring that they were to follow open
shop principles, namely, that federal employment was not contingent on union
membership.96
Labor leaders emphatically disagreed. AFL president Gompers
regarded the open shop as a weapon to weaken and destroy labor unions.
UMW president Mitchell, who tried hard to be supportive of Roosevelt after the
anthracite coal strike, must have chewed his tongue over the Miller affair. In a
contemporaneous book about the union movement, he set forth the reasons
why organized labor believed mandatory union membership was a necessary
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condition of employment. These included a worker's morat duty to his class,
avoidance of personal animosities in the workplace, and the view that the
majority of non-unionists are "at the worst, stupid and apathetic."97 Some
unions not only opposed Roosevelt's decision, but they also called for his
defeat in the 1904 presidential election. In a demonstration of how ugly the
dispute became, Miller's former union and Gompers unsuccessfully continued
to seek Miller's discharge on the newly advanced grounds of alleged bigamy,
wife-beating, desertion of family, fraud , and theft.
Having tacked to starboard on the substance of the Miller case,
"Roosevelt then responded to union dismay by tacking to port. He agreed to
discuss the Miller case with the AFL executive council, including Gompers and
Mitchell, on September 29, 1903. Based upon a draft he had prepared in
advance, Roosevelt issued a statement at the meeting that was a masterpiece
of giving something to both sides in the open shop dispute. He held the tiller
steady on his Miller decision, emphasizing that "I can no more recognize the
fact that a man does or does not belong to a union as being for or against him
than I can recognize the fact that he is a Protestant or a Catholic, a Jew or a
Gentile, as being for or against him." But he deliberately limited his position to
government employment in order to appease the union officials. Thus, not only
did he omit repetition of his reliance on the authority of the Anthracite Coal
Strike Commission's open shop pronouncement (which related to non97
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government employment), but he also provided a formula to limit the Miller
decision to government employment by telling the AFL executive council that "I
am dealing purely with the relation of the Government to its employees."9 8
That was enough to satisfy the AFL.99 At its convention in November
1903, the AFL declined to pass anti-TR resolutions, while reasserting its
position for "union shop everywhere, as well in federal, state and municipal
employment as in private enterprises." In what a cynic may regard as
Roosevelt's symbolic expression of gratitude, a week after the AFL convention
he invited six labor leaders from Butte, Montana, to visit him at the White
House. 100
Roosevelt's accommodation with the AFL executive council was
disingenuous, given that he had originally cited the Anthracite Coal Strike
Commission's "clearly and fearlessly enunciated" private-employment decision
as the authority for also covering government employment as a matter of
"elementary decency."101 Moreover, the belated distinction between
government and non-government employment does not reflect his bedrock
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labor views. Long after the Miller affair, he reiterated his all-inclusive belief "in
the right of the nonunion man to refuse to join a union and to work side by side
with the union men."102
Roosevelt's actions in the Miller case, from beginning to end, had a
political basis. He believed that Wall Street capitalists were "especially bitter
against me because of my having settled the Anthracite Coal strike" and that
this had contributed to Republican defeats in local elections during November
1903. In a letter to Senator Hanna at an early stage of the Miller controversy,
Roosevelt noted that his opponents and other "curious men" regarded him "as
improperly friendly to organized labor and to the workingmen generally."
Almost simultaneously, Senator Lodge wrote Roosevelt that a group of
railroad managers, fearing an imminent strike, had said that Roosevelt was
"entirely given over to the labor side" and would "not treat the labor men in the
same way that you would treat capital if they violate the law."103 Initially,
therefore, the Miller case enabled TR to show business interests and other
conservatives that he was not invariably friendly to organized labor. Roosevelt
calculated the political risks in reinstating Miller:
The labor unions were very arrogant and domineering because
they did not believe I would face the music, and it was necessary
to give them a good jolt to make them understand at the outset
102
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that I would not tolerate anything in the nature of tyranny on their
part. I was very sorry to have to go into the matter, because I
entirely appreciate the political disadvantages of what I did and I
should be a fool if I did not regret having to do anything that I
thought would be politically disadvantageous to me; but this was
the case where I did not feel that I should be justified in any
hesitancy. 104
Against the political disadvantages of upsetting union leaders,
Roosevelt sought to gain political advantage from the Miller incident "as an
illustration of the fairness with which the administration has tackled the two
sides of the labor-capital question." As he later told his son Kermit, the Miller
case "gave to trades-unions a lesson that had been taught corporations -that
I favored them while they did right and was not in the least afraid of them when
they did wrong."105
Labor history has viewed "open shop" rhetoric at the time of the Miller
case as code for more comprehensive anti-unionism. At the turn of the
century, after it had become apparent that union membership was growing in a
geometric progression, employer associations began forming nationally for the
purpose of achieving a non-union business environment. The best known of
these organizations was the National Association of Manufacturers (NAM),
whose membership consisted mostly of smaller businesses. It had originally
been formed to promote trade and commerce. In early 1903, however, it
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embraced a Declaration of Principles that claimed not to oppose labor
organizations "as such" but condemned strikes, boycotts, closed shops, and
other interference with employer control over the conditions of work. One
manifestation of these principles was requiring employees to sign an
agreement, sometimes known as a yellow-dog contract, not to join unions or
induce others to join. 106
Roosevelt's position in the Miller case should not be confused with the
NAM's adoption of the open shop as part of an anti-union agenda. In his
Autobiography, Roosevelt castigated the NAM for its "selfishness and short-

sighted ness." By opposing "every rational and moderate measure for
benefiting workingmen, such as measures abolishing child labor, or securing
workmen's compensation," the NAM's course and language were "ominous of
evil" and "of such reactionary type as directly to incite revolution."107 His
opposition to mandatory union membership never descended to the yellowdog level of compulsory non-unionism. On the contrary, his words clearly
expressed the right (as distinct from the obligation) of employees to join
unions. In that respect, he shared the philosophy of the National Civic
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Federation, which had been formed in late 1900 to improve relations between
capital and labor.
The NCF was organized on a tripartite model, with representatives of
capital, predominantly from large corporations; labor, predominantly from the
AFL; and the general public. This third group included men who were or
became close to Roosevelt, like his future cabinet appointees Oscar Straus
and Charles Bonaparte. The NCF's goal, at least until1905, was for
employers and unions to work cooperatively on the basis of "reason and
understanding," byproducts of which would be favorable employer treatment of
the unionization of skilled workers in return for union abstention from more
militant activity like the organization of unskilled workers. Implicit in that
philosophy was ·willingness to accept union shops under unspecified
circumstances, a willingness that the NAM used to attack the NCF.108
Marxist labor historian PhilipS. Foner dismisses the contention that the
NCF and NAM had different union values by pointing out that many employer
representatives in the NCF came from demonstrably anti-union, open shop
corporations and that their corporations were the dominant funding source for
the NCF. However, union representatives in the NCF included Gompers,
Mitchell, and .Henry White of the United Garment Workers whom Roosevelt
had once sought to appoint as chief factory inspector in New York State. They
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thought enough of the NCF to reshape their early-AFL class-struggle rhetoric.
In its place, they embraced the NCF view that there was "no necessary
hostility between capital and labor" and endorsed the idea of working with
employers.109 This view paralleled Roosevelt's hopes.
E. Criteria for Supreme Court Nominees

Roosevelt made three appointments to the United States Supreme
Court. They were Massachusetts Judge Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. ( 1902),
federal appellate Judge William Rufus Day (1903), and Attorney General
William Henry Moody (1906). There is no warrant for inferring that labor
considerations were decisive in his selections, but labor-relatedness may
nevertheless shed some light on his thinking.
The Holmes nomination provides the strongest evidence of a labor
connection. Roosevelt wrote to Senator Lodge on July 10, 1902, that his
reasons for nominating Holmes included the following :
The labor decisions which have been criticized by some of the
big railroad men and other members of large corporations
constitute to my mind a strong point in Judge Holmes' favor.
The ablest lawyers and greatest judges are men whose past
has naturally brought them into close relationship with the
wealthiest and most powerful clients, and I am glad when I can
find a judge who has been able to preserve his aloofness of
mind so as to keep his broad humanity of feeling and his
sympathy for the class from which he has not drawn his clients.
I think it eminently desirable that our Supreme Court should
show in unmistakable fashion their entire sympathy with all

109

Foner, History of Labor Movement, 2:386-387; 3:64-68, 71 -72.

116
proper effort to secure the most favorable possible
consideration for the men who most need that consideration. 110
A detailed study of the Holmes nomination, however, concludes that his
labor decisions were not the predominant reason for his selection. More
important was Roosevelt's attitude toward territorial issues growing out of
American expansionism under President McKinley.111
Moreover, since Roosevelt did not identify particular labor decisions, we
do not know which cases he had in mind. While on the Massachusetts
Supreme JudiCial Court, Holmes dealt with both the rights of labor
organizations and, separately, the rights of working people without reference
to organized labor.112 Roosevelt could have been invoking either.
When we consider Holmes's two famous repudiations of injunctions
against union activity, it is also unclear what Roosevelt may have specifically
liked about them. In Vegelahn v. Gunter, Holmes dissented from issuance of a
broad injunction against picketing, because he regarded the injunction as
having unreasonably forbidden peaceful picketing. But he also acknowledged
110
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that an injunction would have been proper if there had been proof (rather than
an unsupported inference) of force or threatened physical harm to prevent
someone from crossing a picket line.
In Plant v. Woods, Holmes dissented from enjoining a threatened stril<e
for a closed shop (where one unlon's.members refused to work with members
of another union) on the basis that •unity of organization" was a justifiable
purpose, a principle that we know Roosevelt rejected when he later decided
the Miller mandatory union membership case. To complicate interpretation
further, Holmes criticized the union action, despite his view of its legality, for
benefiting one group of workers "at the expense of their fellows."113 Despite
the complexity of Holmes's analyses, Roosevelt was almost certainly aware
that the judge's labor injunction views disagreed with the more anti-union
attitudes of a majority of his fellow Massachusetts judges.
A somewhat clearer insight into what labor views Roosevelt wanted in a
Supreme Court Justice came four years after his nomination of Holmes, when
the president briefly considered nominating federal Judge Horace Lurton to
another seat on the Court. Roosevelt regarded Lurton as "sound" and "right"
about labor, making clear that what he meant by judicial soundness was
willingness to insist upon union obligations, rather than union rights. Lurton, he
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wrote, "takes just the attitude we take as regards . .. the checking of labor
people when they go wrong.''114
As for the nomination of Judge Day, his biographer characterizes the
reasons as "somewhat obscure" and suggests that "geographical influence"
may have been determinative because both Day and Taft, Roosevelt's first
choice, were from Ohio. Day, a former lawyer for small corporations, was well
regarded for his work in the State Department, where he eventually served as
secretary of state, and as a federal judge. 115 The only evidence of a labor
connection is that Roosevelt intended to appoint Day to a commission of
investigation just before the settlement of the anthracite coal strike, describing
him variously as "a good man" and an "eminent outside gentleman." Since
Roosevelt was at that time expressing exasperation with the mine owners for
their "gross blindness," insensitivity to the public interest, and responsibility for
the failure of his White House settlement conference,116 it is tempting to
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speculate that Roosevelt regarded Day as sufficiently independent to make a
fair assessment of the dispute between mine owners and their employees.
The Day nomination exemplifies the presidential difficulty of knowing
what a nominee will actually do on the Court. Justice Day took positions in two
cases that are diametrically opposed from a labor standpoint and can only be
reconciled based on his views of the constitutional division of authority
between the national and state governments. In 1905, he joined the majority of
the Court to declare unconstitutional, as a violation of the prevailing doctrine of
liberty of contract, a federal statute that prohibited railroads from requiring
employees to sign so-called yellow-dog contracts that they would not join a
union.117 Seven years later, he voted to uphold a similar state yellow-dog
prohibition, because he thought that state police power (as distinct from
federal commerce power) included the right to restrict such employment
contracts. 118 Issues of federalism; in other words, trumped labor issues.
Of his three nominees, Roosevelt probably knew the most about
Moody, whom he had previously appointed to the offices of secretary of the
navy and attorney general. We know that Roosevelt respected Moody and that
Justice Day recommended him.119 Moody had a reputation from his years in
the House of Representatives ( 1895-1902) for sympathy to pro-worker
legislation as an antidote to socialism, whose proponents had achieved
117
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political success in his congressional distric~. He had also expressed a
willingness to exempt labor unions from antitrust liability. Like Roosevelt, he
believed that "the corporation has come to stay as has the trade union." .Yet,
Moody campaigned actively in 1906 to thwart the AFL's electoral efforts to
defeat congressional candidates who supported labor injunctions. 120 In all
these respects except his early idea of antitrust exemption for unions, Moody
was similar to Roosevelt.
What Roosevelt's three nominees had in common regarding labor
matters was that they were empathetic to wageworkers and neither hostile to
unions nor predisposed to give unquestioning acceptance to union actions.
Insofar as a capsule description may aid our understanding of a person, this
one is also applicable to Roosevelt.

F. Labor Injunctions
Organized labor's leaders regarded the injunction issued against Debs
and the 1894 railroad boycott as a threat to organized labor's effectiveness.
Debs stated that the injunction broke the Pullman strike and restrained union
leaders "from discharging our duties as officers and representatives of the
employees." Perlman, the labor historian, contends that "sporadic" use of labor
injunctions thereafter became "a veritable crop."121

120

Judith Rene McDonough, "William Henry Moody" (Ph .D. diss., Auburn University, 1983),
20-22, 127, 148.
121
Perlman, History of Trade Unionism, 155-156, 159; Frankfurter and Greene, The Labor
Injunction, 17-19. A more recent analysis argues that an accurate tally of the number of labor

121
By 1906, a congressional election year, organized labor was
determined to challenge the legal foundation for court injunctions against
unions and their leaders. One form this took was opposing election of
politicians who did not agree to support laws banning labor injunctions. 122 The
union campaign, which intensified in the 1908 presidential election, aroused
Roosevelt's energetic defense on behalf of two of his most cherished notions:
the continued political dominance of the Republican Party, where organized
labor found most of its foes, and the necessity to maintain a bulwark against
union actions that he regarded as lawless. Despite his willingness to
accommodate organized labor in part, he would not yield to complete
eradication of labor injunctions.
AFL officers met with Roosevelt early in 1906 to express their desires
for an anti-injunction law and for heightened enforcement of existing laws
limiting workdays to eight hours. Emblematic of Roosevelt's sentiments
regarding those issues, his immediate response focused only on obtaining
evidence to enforce the eight-hour requirements.123 Behind the scenes, he
simultaneously began to consider a compromise on the use of labor
injunctions is "impossible," because many were temporary or preliminary decrees, not
published in law reporters, or part of court records that no longer exist. It estimates, however,
that the number of labor injunctions quadrupled in the 1890s compared to the prior decade
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injunctions. In a letter to his attorney general, Roosevelt sought a fairer use of
the injunction power in connection with a broad, anti-union injunction recently
issued by a Philadelphia court. "My own theory," he wrote, "has always been
that while any attempt at violence, or coercion by threat of violence, must be
put down in the strongest manner; yet on the other hand, it is only right that
the labor union people in the event of a strike should be given full liberty to try
to convince by legitimate and peaceable arguments the men who are taking
their places [i.e. , strikebreakers] that they ought not thus to act."124
In framing a response to organized labor's efforts to defeat Republican
candidates who did not support a ban on labor injunctions, Roosevelt
recognized that it was "a bad business to solidify labor against us." He wrote
that "great care should be taken when assuming a position antagonistic to
labor on one point to make it clear as a bell that we are not as a whole
antagonistic, but friendly, to labor." He sought to show the administration's
friendliness to labor by counseling against attacks on Gompers and other labor
leaders, because "a large number of slovenly thinkers" would otherwise
mistakenly confuse such attacks as on all labor men. He believed that a
compromise on the injunction issue might prevent a rift with organized labor.
He speculated that if the government acted "on behalf of one or two labor
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organizations where we regarded the injunction as wrong, it would strengthen
us when we regarded the injunction as right."125
But Roosevelt the applied ethicist pulled in a different direction from
Roosevelt the politician. Although the president conceded that Congress had
not done "all they might have for these labor people," the union position was
"so extreme that they have left us no alternative but to come out squarely
against some of their demands." This meant support of Republican candidates
who shared Roosevelt's opposition to union anti-injunction efforts, even when
that entailed distasteful alliances. One such alliance was with Republican
Representative Charles Littlefield of Maine, whose anti-labor record led the
AFL to make him a primary target for defeat in 1906. Roosevelt delegated
Secretary of War Taft, Senators Lodge and Beveridge, and others to
campaign for Littlefield, despite the congressman's "fool attitude" as a cheap,
dishonorable poseur.126
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Organized labor's failure to defeat the Littlefield persuasion in the 1906
elections did not cause it to retreat from seeking a ban on all labor injunctions.
Roosevelt offered a compromise on the injunction issue in a special message
he sent to Congress in January 1908, the beginning of a presidential election
year. Still of the opinion that it was "most unwise to abolish the use of the
process of injunction," because that would undermine the judiciary's ability "in
effective manner [to] check disorder and violence," Roosevelt suggested a
middle way to accommodate organized labor's concerns. The labor injunction,
he told Congress, should not "prevent the entirely proper and legitimate
actions of labor organizations in their struggle for industrial betterment."
Therefore, surround the injunction procedure with "safeguards," such as
reasonable notice to the party against whom the injunction was sought. 127
. Several days after the special message, the Supreme Court issued its
decision in Loewe v. Lawlor (colloquially known as the Danbury Hatters case),
holding that unions were combinations subject to liability under the Sherman
Antitrust Act. 128 The decision intensified organized labor's efforts to escape
from the antitrust law. It also set the stage for an alliance of government,
business, and labor to amend that law to provide for what Roosevelt
127
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conceived as the joint benefit of all three. The complexity of Roosevelt's
conception underscores how difficult it is for historians to pigeonhole his
attitude toward organized labor.
The Loewe decision coincidentally followed a period when Roosevelt
and large business organizations, as represented in part by the NCF, were
already working on some kind of government regulation of business that would
be coupled with changing the Sherman Antitrust Act to allow "reasonable"
restraints of trade. As the fruit of a carefully prepared conference in October
1907, the NCF prepared a legislative campaign to amend the Sherman Act to
permit reasonable restraints of trade in conjunction with unspecified
government regulation of business. Since labor unions were represented at
the conference and active in the NCF, the amendment was also intended to
protect national and local organizations of labor. 129
Roosevelt was less than enthusiastic about the NCF proposals,
because they would defer implementation of his business regulation goals to
further study before realization of congressionally mandated rules. Instead, he
wanted an amendment that would immediately allow reasonable restraints of
trade, conditioned on a government body's first approving the reasonableness
of the restraints. In other words, he was agreeable to the NCF's ultimate goal
contingent on granting the executive branch of government greatly expanded
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control of business. What was appealing to Roosevelt was that the NCF had
crafted an alliance with organized labor and farm groups. In response to
Roosevelt's interest, the NCF created a three-person directorate composed of
the NCF president, a farm leader, and Gompers to work closely with Roosevelt
and his staff to draft legislation.130
The AFL's participation in the Roosevelt-led effort was galvanized by
the Loewe decision, which it interpreted as threatening the very existence of
labor organizations. When its leaders explained their fears to Speaker of the
House Joseph Cannon in March, he categorically rejected both the union
interpretation and any need for a remedy. Moreover, as discussed above,
unionization efforts were under attack by small employers belonging to the
National Association of Manufacturers, as well as big corporations belonging
to the NCF. Roosevelt's regulatory scheme seemed to offer organized labor a
safer harbor. 131
The Roosevelt-NCF-AFL alliance did not proceed smoothly. It went
through at least thirteen drafts of a bill before the principals could agree on
what to present to Congress. In its final form, known as the Hepburn bill after
the congressman who agreed to introduce it, Roosevelt obtained strong
government regulation of business through a registration procedure, and
business obtained the right to engage in reasonable restraints of ~rade .
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Although organized labor gained a much less demanding registration
procedure than that for corporations, it was not exempted from the Sherman
Antitrust Act. Tension between Roosevelt's and the AFL's primary goals
quickly became apparent. 132
In a special message to Congress on March 25, 1908, regarding the
need to amend antitrust law (without specifically endorsing the Hepburn bill
that he had shaped), Roosevelt both caressed and slapped organized labor.
He said it was unfair and potentially destructive to unions not to clarify the
Sherman Antitrust Act, since labor combinations were "absolutely necessary"
in the modern industrial world; strikes were a legitimate tool for dealing with
"very wealthy individual employer, and still more wealthy corporation"; and the
Sherman Act's treble damages should not be assessed against labor
organizations. But all this was premised on unions' acting "peaceably" (a word
he used several times), and "Nothing should be done to legalize either a
blacklist or a boycott that would be illegal at common law." 133
While supporting the business provisions of the bill, organized labor
continued to seek an outright exemption from the Sherman Antitrust Act.
Moreover, many businesses, not limited to members of the National
Association of Manufacturers, opposed the bill as undermining the labor
leverage that Loewe had given them. In addition, a diverse group of employers
132

Ibid., 235-238.
A Compilation of the Messages and Papers of the Presidents (New York: Bureau of
National Literature, 1911-1922), 15:7343-7346.
133

128
and business associations argued that the bill had gone too far in its statist
implications. In the face of so many objections, the Hepburn bill never got out
of committee.134
After the mildly cooperative Hepburn bill interlude, the AFL's continued
opposition to all labor injunctions became its litmus test in the 1908
presidential election. Roosevelt was unable to persuade the Republican Party
to embrace even a modest compromise with organized labor. He and Taft
desired a plank in the party's platform that would "moderate" the use of labor
injunctions. Without "the slightest expectation of placating or gaining the
ultraviolent labor men," Roosevelt believed this would "enable the labor merr
who would naturally be with us to feel that they had a justification for staying
with us." The Republican Party, however, would go no further than a plank
upholding the authority of the courts to issue injunctions, while urging
legislation that would "more accurately" define court rules in such cases anct
forbid injunctive orders without notice, "except where irreparable injury would
result from delay." It did not identify the labor injunction as a situation needing
special attention. Lodge called it "a colorless plank."135
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This was not nearly enough for the AFL. 136 After a Republican
resolutions committee blocked Gompers' efforts to gain strong anti-labor
injunction language; Gompers declared that labor had been "thrown down,
repudiated and relegated to the discard by the Republican Party." He took his
case to the Democratic convention, where he obtained platform language
under the special interest heading of "Labor and Injunctions" that limited labor
injunctions in broad terms and required trial by jury (not judges) to determine
whether or not compliance with the injunction had occurred. Gompers
expressed his appreciation by endorsing the Democratic presidential
candidate, William Jennings Bryan. 137
Roosevelt, previously willing to seek an accommodation with organized
labor on injunction limitations, used the injunction issue to attack Gompers'
presidential endorsement. In a precisely and sharply phrased letter to Senator
Knox, Roosevelt challenged Bryan to separate himself from what he depicted
as the dangerous implications of the Democrats' labor plank.
Because Gompers claimed that the Democratic plank embodied antiinjunction legislation that organized labor had already proposed, Roosevelt's
letter targeted the legislation proposal. He attacked it and supporting
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comments from organized labor as an attempt simultaneously to treat
business operations as having no legally protected property rights while
protecting all labor actions from being treated as unlawful conspiracies. 138 This
would mean, he argued, that unions could not be enjoined from engaging in
violence, conducting secondary boycotts against innocent third parties away
from the premises of a labor dispute, or establishing blacklists against anyone
who opposed union activity. Roosevelt argued that such union power would
constitute a reversal of the position taken by the Anthracite Coal Strike
Commission that he had created to help organized labor accomplish its strike
aims in 1902.
Lest anyone mistake his letter as a pamphlet for big business,
Roosevelt ended it with a tribute to American workingmen. "I believe both in
the patriotism and the intelligence of the workingmen, the laboring men, of
America," he wrote. Absent, however, was a conciliatory tone toward
Gompers. "I do not believe that they [workingmen] will permit Mr. Gompers to
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deliver them like chattels to Mr. Bryan in exchange for a sham." He then
immediately released the letter to the public. 139
On the day before his letter to Knox, Roosevelt wrote a more personal
letter touching on the same subject to his son Kermit, then a Harvard
freshman who would soon accompany TR on an extensive, post-presidential
hunting trip to Africa. In it, Roosevelt said that "labor people" (the context
suggesting that he was speaking about laborers, not labor unions) had "just
cause of complaint with the Republican party taken as a whole, because
Congress under the lead of [Speaker of the House] Cannon treated them
badly; and the courts representing both the old school Republicans and the
old school Democrats, have been curiously disregardful of their interests."
On the other hand, Roosevelt observed to Kermit that Gompers "and the
Democratic and labor demagogs" were "demanding outrageous and
impossible action both by the legislature and Executive." His letter significantly
contrasts laborers with labor union leaders, the former group's just cause of
complaint with the latter's demagoguery, and the legislature (note the first
letter is lower case) that had treated laborers badly with the Executive (note
the first letter is upper case), Roosevelt himself, whom workers knew "so well
139
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that I think they would support me without regard to their grievances real or
imaginary against the courts and the Congress."140
In his final annual message to Congress, issued after Taft's defeat of
Bryan for the presidency, Roosevelt repeated his and the Republican Party's
pre-election proposals for further definition of the labor injunction procedure
and for due notice before issuance of an injunction, "except where irreparable
injury would otherwise result. " He repeated the critique of proposed union
legislation set forth in his October letter to Knox. The unions, he said, had
refused all compromise, instead making demands that "would mean the
enthronement of class privilege in its crudest and most brutal form, and the
destruction of one of the most essential functions of the judiciary in all civilized
lands." Union class-selfishness would divide society and "would inevitably in
the end cause a violent reaction." What was most important for industrial
reform and betterment, he told Congress, was government action that directly
benefited working people --like child-labor prevention, shortening of hours of
work, a comprehensive employers' liability law, old-age pensions, and

.

unemployment compensation. Soon to step down from the presidency,
Roosevelt seemed to turn away from political accommodation with organized
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labor and focus instead on the government's primacy for obtaining social
justice. 141

G. Foundation for the Promotion of Industrial Peace
In 1906, Roosevelt won the Nobel Peace Prize for mediating an end to
the Russo-Japanese War. It came with a monetary award of what was then
the substantial sum of nearly $40,000. He did not feel that he could morally
accept that part of the prize because being paid "for making peace would in
any event be a little too much like being given money for rescuing a man from
drowning, or for performing a daring feat in war." He and his wife together
142
decided that he must apply the money for a public purpose.

At his request, Congress established a Foundation for the Promotion of
143

Industrial Peace to which he donated the Nobel money.

"In the present state

of the world's development," Roosevelt later said, before the onset of the
Great War in Europe, "industrial peace is even more essential than
international peace; and it is fitting and appropriate to devote the peace prize
to such a purpose."144 Writing to the Norwegian chairman of the Nobel
Committee, he described the object of the "permanent" foundation as "better
141
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and more equitable relations among my countrymen who are engaged,
whether as capitalists or wageworkers, in industrial and agricultural
pursuits."145 Consistent with that vision, the Foundation's trustees included
representatives of labor and capital, the judiciary, politics, and the general
public.146
During the next eight years, however, the Foundation apparently did

.

nothing. In late 1914, after the Great War had begun, a special committee of
the Foundation's trustees recommended that Congress return the
Foundation's assets to Roosevelt for his personal disposition, because the
Foundation had received no additional gifts and "the fund itself is too small to
be successfully administered" by the trustees. Roosevelt agreed, noting in his
characteristically vivid language that his plan, "through no fault of the trustees,
has resulted in the talent being hidden in a napkin for eight years."147
The evidence suggests that Roosevelt had another reason for
terminating the Foundation. In early 1915, he expressed a desire for funds to
meet the "innumerable" demands that he received for pro bono contributions.
He complained that Congress "won't even give me back the Nobel Peace
Prize to make use of." Despite proposed legislation to dissolve the Foundation
145
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in January of 1915, Congress did not take that action until 1918, when
Roosevelt renewed his request for return of the funds. His request was then
quickly approved by Congressional resolution , and the Foundation's existing
assets worth $45,482.83 were transferred to Roosevelt.
Whatever the reason for the demise of the industrial peace foundation ,
Roosevelt donated the funds to individuals and organizations like the Red
Cross and the YMCA "to care," in his words, "for our soldiers, and for the
widows and children and mothers of our soldiers, in this great war."
Roosevelt's dispositions included Amerjcan and Allied beneficiaries. In fulfilling
his moral intentions, he apparently also paid a political price, since $2,000 of
the proceeds, or approximately 5 percent, were donated to the Speaker of the
House and the wives of the three members of Congress who sponsored the
resolution releasing the funds, to be used "for war activities or charities" of
their choosing.
Roosevelt's shift in the use of the Nobel Peace Prize funds from
industrial peace to war-related purposes undoubtedly expressed his sense of
the Great War's overwhelming importance. 148 His way of prioritizing issues, as
he explained in another context, was "a question of the major interest driving
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out the minor interest."149 Shortly after the war began in Europe, he made
clear that American military preparedness was his major interest and that
industrial justice was a distinctly minor interest. "[l]t is of no use talking about
reform and social justice and equality of industrial opportunity inside of a
nation," he wrote, "unless that nation can protect itself from outside attack."150
Not only did war aims supersede Roosevelt's vision of achieving industrial
peace, but it also led him to call on the labor movement to subjugate its
interests to those of the war effort. In a 1915 speech on "Americanism," he
disparaged strikes while the nation was preparing to defend itself as "a
scandal to the country as a whole and discreditable alike to employer and
employee." Just as employers should recognize human rights and work
cooperatively with employees, he argued, their employees should shun the
militancy of labor organizations like the IWW or else brand themselves as "not
merely an open enemy of business but of this entire country."151
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VI. "What Books a Statesman Should Read": Octave Thanet's Fiction
If we could code by color the positions that Roosevelt took in the labor
actions described above, like countries differentiated on a map, their diversity
would require multiple colors to represent the underlying rationales. Indeed, for
some of the actions (like those regarding the coal strike, union membership,
labor injunctions, and the industrial peace foundation} , there would have to be
different shades of color to signify Rooseveltian changes of position. Did
Roosevelt have core beliefs, like roads and bridges on a map, which help to
connect those positions? My contention is that at least part of the answer can
be found in Roosevelt's taste for a certain kind of labor literature.
Roosevelt read widely, and we know a great deal about what he read .1
In November 1903, Roosevelt responded to a letter from Nicholas Murray
Butler, influential Republican and president of Columbia University, asking
what books Roosevelt had read during the first two years of his presidency.
The "catalogue" Roosevelt furnished would be extraordinary even for a person
with more leisure time than a president of the United States. His list identifies
over a hundred works (some multi-volumed), either by title or author, including
classics of literature, history, philosophy, poetry, drama, comedy, children's
books that he "read aloud to [his] children, and often finished afterwards to
myself," travel, and hunting, not to mention "ephemeral novels" whose names

1
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he had forgotten. 2
Deep in Roosevelt's "catalogue" is the pregnant statement that he had
read stories by Octave Thanet, "which I always like when they deal with labor
problems."3 Not only does that comment contain one of the few expressions in
the list of what he liked, but the item is also the only one singled out for
addressing labor matters. It provides a key to understanding Roosevelt's
attitude toward unions because Octave Thanet wrote labor stories that seem
to foreshadow or parallel Roosevelt's own experiences as president.
The French-looking name Octave Thanet was the pseudonym of an
American writer whose family name was "French." Alice French (1850-1934)
was the daughter of wealthy New England parents. She moved as a child with
her family to Davenport, Iowa. There, her father was a successful
manufacturer, banker: and railroad executive.4 She did most of her writing in
Iowa and on a large plantation she later bought in Arkansas. Virtually forgotten
today, she was a popular and prolific writer of regional fiction during
Roosevelt's adult years. Her biographer lists over one hundred fifty short
stories and articles published in magazines between 1871 and 1903, the year

2
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of Roosevelt's reading "catalogue." These were so popular that, by the latter
year, book publishers had issued eight separate compilations of her stories.5
In addition to her reputation based on local color and patois, her work
displays a profound distaste for labor unions. We do not know which of
Thanet's labor stories Roosevelt read, but all the logical suspects (namely,
those published in book form before Roosevelt's revealing letter to Butler)
reflect condemnation of unionism or admiration for salt-of-the-earth business
managers.6 Curiously, Roosevelt's interest in Thanet's labor stories has
received little attention from historians.7

5

McMichael, Journey to Obscurity, 222-231. Magazines by the 1880s were paying for her
stories at twice the standard rate. Ibid., 115. William Allen White, the midwestern newspaper
editor and Roosevelt friend, rated her •one of the best short-story writers of the nineties."
White, Autobiography, 311 .
. s The Thanet stories discussed below are those that deal with labor problems in the eight book
compilations. Although her biographer reports that TR told Thanet in 1910 that he had taken
one of these books on African safari in 1909 as part of his specially bound "pigskin library."
Roosevelt's detailed account of what he actually took does not mention any of Thanet's works.
He did, however, comment on books he had taken on earlier journeys, including "the novels
and stories of Octave Thanet, • a reference immediately followed by his statement, "I have
certainly profited as much by reading really good and interesting novels and stories as by
reading anything else, and from the contemporary ones I have often reached , as in no other
way I could have reached, an understanding of how real people feel in certain country
districts.• Compare McMichael, Journey to Obscurity, 191 , with Roosevelt, African Game
Trails, 513-516. None ofThanet's eight books or her labor stories appears in inventories of
Roosevelt's Sagamore Hill library, but they may have been given away or otherwise disposed
of. Author's telephone conversation with Amy Verone, Chief of Cultural Resources, and e-mail
correspondence with Mark Koziol, Museum Technician, both of the National Park Service,
Sagamore Hill National History Sit e, in July-September, 2009.
7
The fullest account of his presidential labor attitudes and actions does not mention Thanet or
her stories. Greenberg, TR and Labor. The same is true of almost all of the TR biographies
mentioned in this study. Edmund Morris' more recent study of Roosevelt's presidential years
mentions Thanet only by name in connection with the "catalogue" of Roosevelt's reading,
without referring to either Roosevelt's liking for her stories or their labor subject matter. Morris,
TRex, 288.

140

One of her earliest stories, "Communists and Capitalists: A Sketch frcnm
Life" (1878), demonstrates Thanet's thinking about labor organizations.8 The
"story" is actually a series of dialogues in which a woman who works her wcry
from clerk to part owner of a plow factory debates a self-described communist
blacksmith whom she refuses to hire unless he promises to abandon his union
affiliation and strike advocacy. He rejects her offer as "tempting me to turn
traitor" and the capitalist system generally because it "grinds a poor man to
powder, so as to make a rich man richer." She argues that he has ignored
human nature's subjection to a Spencerian "survival of the fittest" and that in
communism "the weak would have less protection than even now, for all those
restraints of morality, which are bound up inseparably with rights of property,
would have been thrown aside."9
Neither the capitalist nor the communist convinces the other, and
Thanet suggests they never will, but the story's moral resides in the character
of the debaters. The capitalist woman is altruistic, tangibly aiding the
blacksmith's wife and children, and kind to animals. Contrary to the accusation
that she wants to exploit workingmen, her goal is for workers to become
company stockholders so that they can share in her factory's profits.
8

Reprinted as ·A Communist's Wife" in Knitters in the Sun {New York: Houghton Mifflin,
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Roosevelt would have been attracted to that labor approach, for, as early as
1886, he had boasted that almost every one of the many wageworkers on his
ranch "has some interest in the profits."10 In contrast, Thanet's labor advocate
is so dedicated to communist principles that his family lives in poverty and
poor health. When he later becomes a leader of Chicago rioters supporting the
1877 railroad strike, he physically rebuffs his terrified wife while he gives
orders to the rioters . He refuses to take any responsibility for her death during
the ensuing rioters' battle with police and troops, blaming it instead on the
capitalist woman's declining to hire him years earlier.

11

Thanet did not remain a dry theoretician. Her story "Otto the Knight"
(1888) is a melodrama that criticizes violent union rhetoric.12 There, Arkansas
mill workers who are members of the Knights of Labor quit work in protest
against the story's hero, their head carpenter, because he had formerly
worked as a strikebreaker. Influenced by union rhetoric and threats against the
hero, a youth named Otto attempts to blow up the hero with dynamite when
the latter is working alone in the mill, but a child wanders into the area after the
fuse has been lit. In the prelude to a happy ending fit for silent movies, the
non-union hero and Otto the union sympathizer together save the child. Guiltridden, Otto confesses to the mill owner, who humanely protects the boy from
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going to jail. The story ends with the community blaming the union for the
dynamiting and the pretty ingenue choosing the non-union hero over a union
suitor.
In one of her most modern stories, Thanet uses domestic conflict to
parody the process of labor-management dispute resolution. In "The Strike at
Glasscock's" (1893), Mrs. Glasscock is the only worker at her husband's mill.
In order to protest Mr. Glasscock's refusal to paint their house, she goes on ·
strike in imitation of what she has read in newspapers about union disputes.
Based on the same newspaper reports, he adopts the management tactic of
locking her out of the house. Instead of talking through their dispute, he
foresees using the method for strike and lockout resolution learned from the
newspapers. Why, nobuddy gives in," he explains to a stranger. "They finds
somebody they can have confidence in, an' they leaves it to him, an' both on
'em will abide by his decidin'." The joke is that the husband believes he knows
"aforehand what a decent arbitrationer" would decide, and he does it himself.
As he paints the house, the wife returns to home and work. Good sense has
resolved their labor dispute without waiting for the formality of a third party's
decision.13 The story is a tongue-in-cheek forerunner of the convoluted path to
third-party resolution taken by the mine owners and the UMW in the 1902
anthracite coal strike.

13

Octave Thanet, A Book of True Lovers (Chicago: Way & Williams, 1897). It was reprinted in
Alice French , A Book of True Lovers (Freeport, N.Y.: Books for Libraries, 1969), 1-20.

143
The most extensive collection of Thanet labor stories was published in
1898 in a book entitled The Heart of Toil. Instead of depicting universal union
villainy or absurdity, Thanet refines her labor critique by contrasting a
thoughtful and decent union leader, Harry Leroy, who appears in several of the
stories, with hotheaded or venal characters who misuse union power for
selfish ends. The reasonable union leader represented by Leroy would
become familiar to Roosevelt during his anthracite coal strike dealings with the
UMW's John Mitchell, who struggled against violence during the strike, argued
against a contract-violating sympathy walkout by bituminous coal miners, and
maintained his composure in front of the president despite vituperation from
mine owners. For Roosevelt, the law-and-order predisposition of union leaders
like Mitchell and the fictitious Leroy was a model for responsible union
leadership. 14
Fictional union leader Leroy actually opposes striking a plow factory in
"The Non-Combatant" (1897). He privately tells a shop owner whose trade has
declined during the strike that when responsible union leaders support strikes,
"[l]t's either because they see no other way to prevent the men's being ground
to powder, or because there's a crazy pressure on them from the hot-heads
that they can't resist." Leroy works hard to maintain peaceful discipline among

14
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the strikers. He then risks his life to save the factory owner from a beating by
hotheaded, inebriated strikers .15
The moral of the story is that the strike damages the entire community.
It impoverishes strikers' families; jeopardizes the economic well-being of other
local businesses and their employees, whether or not they sympathize w ith the
strikers; undermines personal relationships; and encourages anonymous firesetters to bum down a shopkeeper's home and store after he helps leroy
protect the mill owner. Thane! seems to ask the reader to consider the empty
purpose of all this suffering, when we learn that the mill owner and the union
leader find that their joint defense against union violence engenders mutual
trust that enables them to resolve the labor conflict in a single conversation.16
Similarly, in "The Way of an Election" (1897), Harry leroy's logical
advocacy before union members of a conservative political choice prevails
over an ambitious labor editor's emotional arguments against an amorphous
"money power," but only after national politicians have bribed the editor to
change his position. 17 Thanet's opinion of venal union leaders foreshadows
Roosevelt's. In a letter to his secretary of state, John Hay, during a western
trip in 1903, the president w rote that "in Butte, every prominent man is a
millionaire, a gambler, or a labor leader, and generally he had been all three . .
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. The millionaires had been laboring men once, the labor leaders intended to
be millionaires in their turn, or else to pull down all who were."18
Thanet's decent labor leader prevails over another ambitious and
unsympathetic union adversary in "The Moment of Clear Vision" (1898).
Leroy's goal is to obtain a strike settlement that benefits the employees, rather
than yielding to his adversary's desire to prolong the strike in order to achieve
wider union recognition (one of the key stumbling points, it will be
remembered , in Roosevelt's efforts to settle the 1902 anthracite coal strike).
The theory of Leroy's adversary is that "[i]ndividual hardships must be borne
for the sake of the cause." Thanet's dramatic device in this story is Leroy's
kidnapping of the adversary, but only to renew the man's contact with family
and human values from which he has strayed because of union careerism.
Leroy justifies the kidnapping as "better one man should suffer than four or five
hundred, and maybe a great many more."19
The most violent and action-oriented story in The Heart of Toil is
Thanet's defense of a strikebreaker in "The 'Scab"' (1895). Hired as a railroad
fireman to replace a striking worker during the 1894 railroad strike, the "scab"
feels guilty that he has profited from another man's suffering, but justifies his
action by the need to support his wife and six children. (By the time the story
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was published in book form, Roosevelt was also the father of six children. 20)
The train's engineer, conductor, and brakeman, who are members of nonstriking railroad unions. are not entirely sympathetic to the strikebreaker, but
they abhor the striker violence directed at trains still in operation. The "scab"
exposes himself to harm in order to help the train travel safely past dangerous,
striker-placed obstacles and to protect a woman passenger from a pro-strike
mob. He finds later that his guilt for replacing the striking fireman was
misplaced, because it was this same striker who attacked the woman
passenger and who had a reputation among his fellow trainmen for pre-strike
arrogance and laziness.
The story also offers an intellectual defense of the "scab" by arguing
that replacing a striker is morally the same as a union member's replacing a
non-union worker fired for refusing to join the union.21 Whether or not the two
kinds of replacement are equivalent, Roosevelt may have appreciated the
linkage between the equal rights to employment of both strikebreakers and
non-union employees when he reinstated non-union federal employee Miller to
his job at the Government Printing Office.
In The Heart of Toil's final story, "The Conscience of a Business Man"
(1898), Thane! shifts her focus to assess the character of a steel mill
president. Faced by declining business and the unwillingness of banks to
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finance his company during a downturn, the president must decide whether or
not to lay off workers. There is no union involvement, but Thanet shows how
labor agitators try to stir up employees by spreading rumors of an impending
layoff and accusing the company president of greed. The president, however,
is a self-made man with genuine concern for his employees, and he defers a
personal home-buying dream by loaning his available cash to the company in
order to avoid a layoff.22
In 1905, Thanet sent Roosevelt her labor novel, The Man of the Hour,
telling him that the model for the hero was her deceased brother. The hero is a
do-gooder, who abandons a thriving, family-run , machine-manufacturing
business and spends a large inheritance to support workers in a strike whose
purposes he nevertheless distrusts. At this point in the story, he personifies
the principle of backing the union-right-or-wrong, because that is how he
believes he can do the most good for working people.
The novel recounts in detail union strike tactics, both legal (e.g.,
winning public support by offering to arbitrate all disputes with the struck
employer and recruiting non-employee picketers) and potentially illegal (e.g.,
threats and violence against persons and property and secondary boycotts

22
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directed at non-struck employers). 23 Disillusioned by strike-related deaths for
which he feels partially responsible, the hero finds absolution by successfully
leading strikebreakers at his family's factory against a walkout fomented by a
corrupt and violent union official. The hero's rewards are an unqualified return
to his family, an executive position in the family company, and marriage to his
childhood sweetheart. The novel's message is that the alternative to strikes is
helping people through "the only true, sensible, American way, by giving them
a show to help themselves," provided that "the great business man of the
future" understands that he must "have a heart or he can't understand and
manage his men." It is the same golden rule that Roosevelt preached.24
Thanking Thanet for the novel, Mrs. Roosevelt wrote that it showed that
the author's hero/brother was a good man. According to Thanet's biographer,
the president told an Iowa newspaper that he was interested .in the novel,
praising Thanet for her knowledge of factories and the machine business.
Roosevelt later proclaimed the accuracy of her stories about "American labor
people."25
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Thanet's unsubtle labor lessons can be simply summarized. Business
owners do not invariably exploit their workers. In contrast, unions undermine
morality and property rights by becoming vehicles for hotheads and selfaggrandizing leaders. Even the most responsible union leader struggles
against such socially destructive elements. Strikes lead to violence,
impoverishment of families, and harm to the wider community. Strikes and
third-party intervention are not necessary to reach agreement on commonsense labor resolutions.
For Roosevelt the former cowboy and Rough Rider, Thanet's good guy
vs. bad guy mythology was attractive, because it portrayed the kind of life
lessons that were important to him.26 In his Autobiography, Roosevelt
addressed the question of ''what books a statesman should read." His answer
was "poetry and novels - including short stories under the head of novels." He
acknowledged the importance of reading history and government, science and
philosophy. "But, in the final event," Roosevelt explained, "the statesman, and
the publicist, and the reformer, and the agitator for new things, and the
upholder of what is good in old things, all need more than anything else to
know human nature, to know the needs of the human soul; and they will find
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this nature and these needs set forth as nowhere else by the great imaginative
27

writers, whether of prose or of poetry."

Roosevelt made clear to Alice French that he regarded her Octave
Thanet stories as illuminations of human nature and the needs of the human
soul. Shortly after the anthracite coal strike, he told her, "I doubt whether I
have ever seen a story of yours which I have not picked up and read, always
with pleasure, and, especially where you deal with labor problems, real profit."
He praised her stories "on acute phases of the labor problem" as "missionary
work" and invited her to the White House. 28 She dined there twice, in 1906 and
1908. Praising her as "a trump in every way" a short time after the first dinner,
Roosevelt wrote to another writer friend, William Allen White, that Octave
Thanet "has always seemed to preach just the social and economic gospel
that we as a people need." That gospel, as Roosevelt could not have failed to
see in her stories, did not depict unions as part of salvation.29
Roosevelt's comments about Thanet's labor stories and gospel coincide
with his presidential years, and there are no comparable Thanet references in
27
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his published writings thereafter. There is some post-presidential evidence,
however, in his appraisal of another labor-fiction writer, John Hay, that he
retained his underlying distrust of organized labor's tendencies. As discussed
earlier, Hay had anonymously written an anti-strike novel, The Breadwinners,
nearly two decades before Roosevelt's ascension to the presidency. 30 It is
uncertain when Roosevelt read it, but he was certainly familiar with the novel
by 1915, ten years after Hay's death. In a review that year of a biography of
Hay, Roosevelt called the novel "a really powerful presentation of one side of
our complex social and industrial problems; a side which needs to be stated,
but which there is a certain irony in having stated by Lincoln's biographer."
Roosevelt found irony in comparing Hay's radicalism when he worked
for Lincoln with the novel's conservative "instincts and ways of thought." He
attributed Hay's change of heart to "horror of lawlessness and disorder and the
brutal violence unleashed by demagogues who were powerless to control it"
during the 1877 railroad labor riots. Recourse to irony, however, does not
demonstrate disagreement with Hay's "really powerful presentation." What it
does suggest is Rooseveltian evasiveness, for we know that he shared Hay's
horror of labor lawlessness and disorder. Significantly, he did not characterize
as wrong either Hay's radicalism or later conservatism. Indeed, Roosevelt
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minimized the meaning of the words "radical" and "conservative" because of
their "inexactitude in terminology, for the same action may be radical from one
standpoint and conservative from another."31
In his Autobiography, written earlier than the book review but also after
Hay's death, Roosevelt found another indirect way to comment on Hay's labor
views. Noting Hay's "jesting with me about my supposedly dangerous
tendencies in favor of labor against capital," Roosevelt recounted Hay's 1905
inaugural gift to him of a ring containing a cutting of Lincoln's hair. "I often
thereafter told John Hay," Roosevelt wrote, "that when I wore such a ring on
such an occasion I bound myself more than ever to treat the Constitution, after
the manner of Abraham Lincoln, as a document which put human rights above
property rights when the two conflicted."32
Until I read Roosevelt's review of the Hay biography, I found it difficult
to understand where he was heading with the Hay comment in his
Autobiography. Was he returning Hay's labor jest, disagreeing with Hay, or
hiding their agreement? When read together, however, the two references
underscore Roosevelt's deliberate avoidance oJ either rejection or adoption of
Hay's labor views. They nevertheless seem to serve a dual purpose, because
they allowed Roosevelt to offer, indirectly through Hay, disapproval of labor
unions without directly playing the role of critic. Given Roosevelt's skill as a .

31
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writer and his earlier admiration for Thanet's labor views, this seems at least to
suggest that Roosevelt did not abandon his Thanetological perspective in his
post-presidential years.33

33

Roosevelt's comments about Thanet's labor views were almost all private; whereas the two
comments about Hay's views were very public. Roosevelt was, unsurprisingly, more candid in
private than he was in public. One can argue that his circumspection about Hay's labor views
showed respect for a deceased friend. Perhaps, but he was hardly circumspect in his brutal,
albeit private, posthumous criticism of Hay's performance regarding foreign affairs and
administration of the State Department. TR letter to Lodge, January 28, 1909, in Morison,
Letters of TR, 6:1489-1498.
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Figure 5
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Alice French, at the height of her career
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VII. "Labor is the Superior of Capital": Post-Presidency
Roosevelt historiography sometimes treats his post-presidential years
as the flowering of a more liberal social agenda, including in his attitude
toward organized labor. Regarding a man whose career demonstrates
frequent modifications of outlook, this is an appealing concept. It is possible to
find isolated instances that support the interpretation, but easier to show that
Roosevelt's labor views underwent little change during this period. 1
After leaving the presidency, Roosevelt spent a little more than a year
collecting animal trophies in Africa, counseling with royalty and intellectual
leaders in Europe, and considering complaints that President Taft had not
furthered Rooseveltian ideals. In late summer of 1910, he embarked on a
national speaking tour in which he articulated his political philosophy, the New
Nationalism. At the beginning of his itinerary, in Osawatomie, Kansas,
Roosevelt delivered a speech memorable for his most famous labor
statement.
Quoting Lincoln, his political hero, Roosevelt said, "Labor is prior to,
and independent of capital. ... Labor is the superior of capital, and deserves
much the higher consideration." He proclaimed that "I stand for the square
1

Compare Kathleen Dalton, Theodore Roosevelt: A Strenuous Life (New York: Knopf, 2002;
Vintage, 2004}, 417-418 (arguing for his leftward movement}, with Patricia O'Toole, When
Trumpets Call: Theodore Roosevelt after the White House (New York: Simon & Schuster,
2005}, 351 (arguing for lack of evidence of change}. Dalton bases her conclusion largely on
TR's expressed sympathy for striking garment workers in 1913, but as president he had also
sympathized with strikers and supported their right to unionize. O'Toole notes that in 1918
TR's new world of economic justice "was virtually a twin of his old one."
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deal," and by that he meant not just fair play under the current rules, but
"having those rules changed so as to work for a more substantial equality of
opportunity and of reward for equally good service." He wanted "to regulate
the terms and conditions of labor," including wages "more than sufficient to
cover the base cost of living"; shorter hours of work; comprehensive workers'
compensation; regulation of children's and women's labor; practical training in
common schools; and better sanitary conditions and safer equipment.
The Osawatomie speech did not address the role labor unions should
play in realizing Roosevelt's vision for a worker square deal. But when he
invoked the "need to set our faces like flint against mob violence just as
against corporate greed; against violence and injustice and lawlessness by .
wage workers, ~ it was clear that he continued to have concerns about union
irresponsibility.2 He elaborated on this when he told members of the
Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen in early September 1910 how to resolve
potential conflicts between labor rights and labor obligations. "Insist upon your
own rights and remember your own duties," he said. "Of the two, lay a little
more stress on the duties than on the rights."3
As the New Nationalism tour progressed, Roosevelt followed two lines
of thought about organized labor - one friendly and one skeptical -- without
resolving the problem of where they might intersect. The friendly line tracked
2

3

Roosevelt, New Nationalism, 8, 11-12, 24-25.
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the emergence of the nation's "extraordinarily complex industrial
development," which required new protection for employees and recognition of
"the desirability of the right of collective bargaining (through trade unions] on
the part of employees face to face with the great corporation, as was not
necessary when the employer was one man or a partnership of two or three
men employing half a dozen or half a score of men." It was "outrageous" for
employers to discriminate against employees who want union representation
"or to refuse to deal with a union when organized." Roosevelt announced, in
words that unions still quote in organizing drives, "If I were a wage worker, I
should certainly join a union.""
Roosevelt's skeptical line of thought grew from the premise that "labor
organizations have the weaknesses and defects common to all forms of
human organization." When they acted "very well," he was for them. When
they acted "very badly," he was against them. Acting badly encompassed
strikes with "violence, lawlessness, and mob rule." Such instances had to be
dealt with promptly and sternly, "no matter what the cause may be that excites
them," and "all questions of reform had to be postponed until the orderly
process of the law was resumed ." Speaking in Columbus, Ohio, during a street
railway strike that had turned violent, Roosevelt even condemned attorneys
who defended the "miscreants" accused of such behavior. He told the wage
4
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workers to "get rid of the attorneys ... [because] such action inevitably tends
to cast a doubt upon the sincerity of the expressions of the men who disclaim
sympathy with those outrages."5
Roosevelt's inventory of the "weaknesses and defects" of labor unions
was not limited to violence. It was also "outrageous" for unions and employees
to "force a man to join" the union (echoing his presidential action in the 1903
Miller case) or to encourage "secondary boycotts" where unions sought to
pressure the involved primary employer by harming its vendors and
customers. What troubled Roosevelt about such tactics was the union's
extending the labor dispute to harm the public, "the people as a whole."6
Roosevelt's simultaneous endorsement and criticism of organized labor
reads today like the tension embedded in the labor legislation that Congress
passed in the 1930s and 1940s, but he did not propose such legislation?
5

Roosevelt, New Nationalism, 118 (speech in Sioux Falls), 129-130, 133 (Labor Day speech
in Fargo, North Dakota), 172 (speech in Omaha), 207 (speech in Chicago), 219, 221 (speech
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6
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Instead, the New Nationalism as expressed in 1910 relied on the internal
workings of each union's membership to cure organizational defects. His
prescription was to "let the men within the organization realize the necessity of
keeping the organization straight.'18
Running for President ·in 1912 as the leader of the Progressive Party,
Roosevelt effectively abandoned the Republican Party's "colorless" 1908 plank
regarding labor injunctions. In essence, his 1912 platform adopted the
Democrats' 1908 platform, by incorporating broad language restricting labor
injunctions and granting trial by jury to those accused of contempt in labor
disputes. Further, his 1912 platform explicitly favored "the organization of the
workers, men and women, as a means of protecting their interests and of
promoting their progress."
Yet, the gap remained between Roosevelt's Progressive Party outreach
to organized labor and his emphasis on the primacy of government action to
protect workers. The Progressive platform clause favoring worker organization
was placed last of fifteen paragraphs defining the components of "Social and
Industrial Justice," with the earlier paragraphs setting forth government
responsibility for worker health, safety, and job security; minimum wages;
limitations on hours of work; social insurance; and education. As an
exclamation point to government as the source of worker benefits, the
Progressive platform also called for establishment of a cabinet-level
8
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department of labor "with wide [though unspecified] jurisdiction over matters
affecting the conditions of labor and living."9
Roosevelt's 1911 and 1912 writings and speeches likewise emphasized
the government's role in achieving social and industrial justice. He called for
realization of the Progressive Party's labor goals through "legislation."10 .In his
"Confession of Faith" delivered to the Progressive Party convention that
nominated him for the presidency in 1912, Roosevelt supported the party's
."social and industrial justice" platform with unequivocal rhetoric calling for the
establishment of "minimum occupational standards." Any industrial condition
below such standards "should come within the scope of Governmental action
and control," and he pledged that his federal government would have
investigative, standard-setting, and enforcement power over virtually all
aspects of work. 11 In a campaign speech less than two months before the
1912 election, Roosevelt reached a crescendo in asserting the supremacy of
government to remedy social and industrial wrongs. "The only way in which
our people ... can protect the working man in his conditions of work and life,"
he told a San Francisco audience, "the only way in which the people can
prevent children working in industry or secure women an eight-hour day in

9

Schlesinger, History of Elections, 3:2188-2189.
Roosevelt was critical of the judicial branch of government for having thwarted, through
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industry, or secure compensation for men killed or crippled in industry, is by
extending, instead of limiting, the powers of government."12
As for labor unions, Roosevelt refined but did not revise his blueprint for
resolving the tension between labor rights and labor duties. He was for
collective bargaining and for seeing labor organizations become powerful, but
he saw peril ahead when that happened. "The minute any organization
becomes powerful," he wrote, "it becomes powerful for evil as well as for good;
and when organized labor becomes sufficiently powerful the State will have to
regulate the collective use of labor just as it must regulate the collective use of
capital. "13
Organized labor did, however, receive prominence in one of
Roosevelt's most famous 1912 campaign addresses, delivered just after a
would-be assassin had shot him and before he was taken to the hospital. At
that dramatic moment, less than a month before the election, Roosevelt
seemed determined to express his fundamental beliefs. His impromptu
remarks (stenographically captured and "differing considerably from the
prepared manuscript") encompassed both an embrace of unionization and a
desire to circumscribe how unions act. In "one-half of the appeal that I make,"
he asked "the outsider and the capitalist" to recognize "that the laboring man
must organize for his own protection." The other half of his appeal was "to the
12

Hagedorn, Works of TR, 17:309-310.
TR article in Outlook Magazine, February 4, 1911, reprinted in Hagedorn, Works of TR,
17:72.
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labor man himself." Roosevelt asked everyone associated with organized
labor to denounce "crime ... violence ... disorder . . . and the inciting of
riot," the black clouds hanging over the labor movement; and "to feel in their
turn that exactly as justice must be done them so they must do justice." But he
did not indicate what he would do as president if either half of his appeal was
ignored or rejected. 14
Roosevelt's statements in the 1910-1912 post-presidential years raise
the question of Herbert Croly's influence. Croly's book, The Promise of
American Life, appeared in 1909.15 Roosevelt read it before returning to
America from his African and European trip. He regarded it as a "profound and
illuminating study of our national conditions," a watershed book for its
emphasis on "collective responsibility," and a corrective to the prevailing notion .
of "individual responsibility" by which business preeminence had dominated
American life.16 Some historians treat the book as either a stimulant to or
extension of Roosevelt's progressive thinking, and at least one prominent
Roosevelt biographer gives Croly credit for conceiving the New Nationalism

14
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(there is no disagreement that the name was borrowed from Croly) on which
Roosevelt based his 1912 campaign. 17
Croly's book is a dense critique of what he regarded as an essentially
anti-democratic individualism in American political and economic history. His
democratic ideal, which paralleled Roosevelt's, emphasized a wider
distribution of wealth through the actions of a strong national government.
Little attention has been paid, however, to Croly's labor views, how they did or
did not influence Roosevelt, or whether Roosevelt's praise of Croly's notion of
"collective responsibility" encompassed labor organizations.
On labor union matters, The Promise of American Life contains savage
anti-union criticism oddly combined with a call for transforming the union
movement by ceding to it enormously expanded power. Initially, the book
describes labor organization as natural and beneficial to worker standards of
living, but it also condemns some unions' "arrogant and lawless" use of mob
violence for creating an atmosphere in which "the average union laborer"
accepts assaults on strikebreakers as "morally justifiable." Croly's appraisal
was that worker preoccupation with union and class had turned workers away
from American ideals, the national interest, and a democratic future.18

17
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This sounds very Rooseveltian, as does the initial statement of Croly's
solution. He advocated "a more effective body of national opinion, and a mere
powerful organization of the national interest," plus state constabularies to
"prevent the lawlessness which frequently accompanies strikes."19 As Croly
came to the end of his book, however, he took a U-turn. He outlined a "radical
and revolutionary" program that he acknowledged the average American
would rightly regard as "subversive of the established political and economic

°

system of the country."2 Croly's labor program advocated "substantial
discrimination" by the state in favor of unions, through an explicit preference
for union labor over non-union workers. He regarded the latter as "a species of
industrial derelict," because their competition with union laborers tended to
degrade everyone's standard of living. If "worthy [non-union] individuals" were
thus sacrificed, he regarded it as excusable because change "involves
individual cases of injustice."
In return for such pro-union discrimination, Croly suggested imposing
conditions on unions. These would include the right of employers to discharge
any worker "not worthy of the money," to bypass the union in order to arrange
with individual workers for higher rates of pay and hours, and to participate in
setting membership terms for admission to the union. Croly was vague about
how to establish these conditions or what would happen if unions resisted
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them as unacceptable limitations on their organizational rights and authority.
He did say that when unions were "bad," because their "rules and methods are
inimical to the public interest," the state would "relentlessly and aggressively
fight" them and would organize "counter-unions" whose members would have
exclusive rights to the work in question. He did not seem worried about his
theory's potential for civic tumult or government dictatorship of labor relations.
As for strikes, the union manifestation that Croly had criticized earlier in his
book, they would not be forbidden; indeed, they would not go away "unless the
spirit and methods of collective bargaining were very much improved."
Croly recognized that the state's role "can only be indefinitely
answered" and that discriminating between "good" and "bad" unions was
"beyond the courage of existing governments." Not surprisingly, he admitted
that it was "improbable" his program would "prove to be any ultimate solution
of the labor problem."21
Would a re-elected President Roosevelt have tried after 1912 to
implement Croly's "improbable" solution to the labor problem? Roosevelt's
New Nationalism does not address it, and Roosevelt's defeat in the
presidential election of 1912 obviated his having to flesh out his approach to
unions. We know, however, that Roosevelt disagreed categorically with Croly's

21
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conception of favoring unionized workers and abrogating the rights of nonunion workers'.22
In 1917, Roosevelt articulated a package of novel, but non-Crolyan,
concepts for dealing with strikes. 23 First, after the army had acted to restore
order during a violent strike, his usual first response, he added that the
government "clearly" had the further duty "to step in and deal with the
conditions which called forth the violence." This included elimination of
employer security forces, forbidding the importation of strikebreakers, and "a
thoroughgoing and impartial governmental inquiry into the causes of the
strike."24
Second, the notion of a government inquiry should also apply to
"exceptional labor disturbances" where the national interest was affected,
apparently even if violence had not occurred. In those situations, the
government should substantively decide "all of the questions at issue" in the
strike and issue a decree that "will be binding upon the capitalists, the
property-owners." If the capitalist employers did not comply, the government
would run the business until they did. In dramatic contrast, the workers could
ignore the decree and continue the strike, the sole qualification being that "the
22
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government would guarantee, by the exertion of the entire police power of the
nation, that there should be no violence against them [the employers], no
lawless interference with their running the business according to the terms laid
down." In other words, Roosevelt was proposing arbitration of certain labor
disputes that would be binding only on the employers.
Moreover, as Roosevelt framed the concept, government intervention in
"exceptional labor disturbances" would arso apply to any strike that involved
violence. If so, it would mean that even in non-exceptional labor disturbances
unions could unilaterally precipitate the one-sided arbitration scheme by acts
of violence.
Aspects of these radical ideas are so remote from the corpus of
Roosevelt's writings and actions about labor problems that they defy
integration with the rest of his canon. The one-sided resolution of labor
problems (mandatory for employers and voluntary for unions) and what
appears to be a built-in incentive for labor violence were not only departures
from Roosevelt's past approaches, but they were also inconsistent with his
virtually simultaneous expressions about union issues. 25 Indeed, that same
year he told a colleague that improved worker benefits should be "arranged by
common consent of both sides of the community," but if "they cannot be thus
25
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arranged, the State will have to do it."26 And a year earlier, as vice president of
the Authors' League of America, he had opposed the organization's affiliation
with the AFL as too divisive for the membership, belligerently asserting that "I
don't care a rap whether the Federation of Labor does or does not understand
my position. "27
Roosevelt's conservative reaction to the Bolshevik revolution in Russia
at about the same time further illustrates the anomaly of his radical1917 labor
concepts. Before the Bolsheviks gained power, he cautioned a Russian
correspondent against "any of those sinister and dreadful deeds which a
century and a quarter ago in France produced the Red Terror, and then by
reaction the White Terror." 28 When the Bolsheviks seized control of the
government, he condemned them. He saw Bolshevik rule as meaning not only
that Russia would no longer be a war ally against Germany, but also a threat
to liberty and democracy. Although he called himself "a very radical democrat,"
he professed to be "equally radical in the insistence on orderly liberty." He told
a friend that he was "inclined to think Bolshevism a more serious menace to
world democracy than any species of capitalism." To another friend, he said
that the Bolsheviks were operating under "the pretense of lifting the lowly
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[which] merely smashes the man on top and brings down everybody under the
ruins."29
Roosevelt's imagery in describing the Bolshevik revolution is
reminiscent of his earlier association of militant labor unions with the worst
aspects of the French Revolution. Equally interesting is that the

Bolsh~vik

threat to liberty and democracy led him to defend capitalism and capitalists.
None of this is consistent with the tactical advantages that his 1917 labor
concepts showered on labor unions over "the capitalists, the property owners."
Perhaps the novelty of his 1917 labor ideas was a bid for labor support
in anticipation of a future run for the presidency. Perhaps it was a message to
posterity about how radical he was willing to be. Perhaps his preoccupation
with the war in Europe or aging and health issues had affected his intellectual
focus. 30 We may never know, but we do know that he did not repeat the
concepts.
Roosevelt died in January 1919, when he was barely sixty years old.
Nearly six years later, the New York Herald Tribune published five articles that
had been found among Roosevelt's papers. According
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Roosevelt had written them a few months before he died, in reaction to labor
troubles at a Colorado mining company, but had then put them aside. 31 One
has to be cautious in drawing conclusions from those articles about
Roosevelt's beliefs, because he never approved them for publication. Their
style, including redundancies, suggests neither a finished product nor
Roosevelt's usual grace of expression and organization.
The content of the articles nevertheless elaborates on themes that
Roosevelt had developed throughout his career- the right of working people
to organize in unions; the obligation of workers to act "wisely" when they
organize; the right of "a non-union man to work side by side with a union man";
union recognition of "the need that prosperity shall come to the managers and
investors, no less than to the manual workers, in any business"; the public's
interest and right to intervene in labor disputes that are grave enough to affect
the people's welfare; suppression of strike actions (by the army, if necessary)
that menace life and property, before trying to deal with the causes of the labor
conflict; and the establishment of bodies whose "prime function shall be the
exposure of the facts and perhaps the power of mediation."32
These themes are dramatically different from the radical labor concepts
he expressed in 1917. What is perhaps most interesting in the articles is their
emphasis on the benefits of profit-sharing and employees' becoming "actual.
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partners· in the business as a result of the distribution to them of company
stock reflecting a percentage of company profits. Roosevelt had alluded to
those notions previously, but the articles seem to offer them as solutions for a
failed labor-relations model.33 One article says that owners' "benevolent
despotism is not permanently possible under American conditions." Another
says that raising wages from time to time will not "settle the strike question and
whether or not there shall be strikes." The implication is that benefit and pay
increases will never be sufficient to guarantee labor peace. In contrast, when
profit-sharing has been tried, it "has worked admirably, greatly minimizing the
friction that has heretofore existed between capital and labor, minimizing the
strike menace to almost nothing."34 The articles seem to suggest that if
workers become owners, then strikes and labor militancy, and perhaps even
unions, will wither away.
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VIII. "A Sleek Article": Samuel Gompers
Roosevelt's relationship with Samuel Gompers, president of the AFL
and the foremost union leader of their era, provides a coda to the evolution of
TR's attitude toward organized labor. Not only did their careers coincide, but
the two men also frequently interacted during nearly four decades. During that
period, Roosevelt migrated from an early appreciation of Gompers's social
insights and advice, to active courtship of Gompers's support, to increasingly
hostile political opposition, and finally to disdain and a near-physical
altercation in connection with Gompers's defense of labor actions that
Roosevelt considered evil. Examination of that sequence reveals much about
the role Roosevelt expected unions and their leaders to play in his America.
We have already reviewed Gompers's influence on the young
Roosevelt's legislative career in connection with their joint support of the
tenement-house bill. A mutually supportive relationship continued during
Roosevelt's terms as New York City police commissioner and New York State
governor, when Roosevelt accorded Gompers access and consideration on
labor issues, leading Gompers "to believe he had respect for me." 1
By the time Roosevelt became president of the United States, Gompers
had been president of the AFL for more than a decade. According to
Gompers's description of their interactions, President Roosevelt diligently
attempted to woo the AFL president. He was frequently and courteously
1
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greeted at the White House; was the first labor leader invited to a social
function there; was introduced to Mrs. Roosevelt and other members of the
president's family; and received private briefings from Roosevelt about the
government's foreign policy intentions. Not only was Roosevelt the first
president to use the term "organized labor'' in an official message to Congress,
but also "at times [he] accepted my advice and acted upon it." Looking back,
Gompers characterized their relationship as one of friends.2
One can nevertheless see, as early as the second year of Roosevelt's
presidency, that TR had misgivings about Gompers. These appeared in the
Miller case, where Roosevelt had taken a firm stand against organized labor's
insistence on mandatory union membership. After Roosevelt met with labor
leaders to discuss his position, he shared his impressions of the meeting with
his good friend Senator Lodge. The union leaders, he wrote, were "entirely
reasonable," especially the UMW's John Mitchell, with whom Roosevelt had
developed an excellent relationship during the anthracite coal strike. As for
Gompers, however, Roosevelt was not enthusiastic. Calling Gompers "a sleek
article," he dismissed Gompers's reasonable demeanor as something the
labor leader "thought it better to be so."3
A political rupture between the two men became evident in 1906 when
organized labor actively opposed Republican congressional candidates who
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did not support its legislative goals.4 Even then, Roosevelt insisted that
Republicans minimize personal attacks on Gompers, but his restraint did not
inhibit telling his daughter after the

el~ction

was over that "[i]t is very gratifying

to have ridden iron-shod over Gompers and the labor agitators. "5 The break
became more serious two years later when Gompers and other labor leaders
supported Bryan instead of Taft in the election to succeed Roosevelt as
president. As discussed earlier, the dispute between Roosevelt and Gompers
focused on the use of labor injunctions and Roosevelt's devastating critique of
Gompers's position in the president's widely publicized October 1908 letter to
Senator Knox.
What provoked Roosevelt's ire far more than political disagreements
were labor leaders who defended unions that, in Roosevelt's opinion, had
engaged in lawless or unethical conduct. During a period of his exasperation
with the Western Federation of Miners, he set forth his creed about how
responsible union leaders should and should not act:
Moreover, to a man who believes as sincerely as I do in
substituting genuine rights for these equivocal rights of labor, it is
a source of chagrin as well as of anger to see the actions of
labor unions in subscribing money to pay for the defense of the
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in his letter to daughter Alice did not directly call Gompers an agitator, he did elsewhere. TR
letter to Lodge, October 10, 1906, in Morison, Letters of TR, 5:459.
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criminals at the head of that criminal organization, the Western
Federation of Min~rs. 6
In the same vein, Roosevelt sensed "great danger" when labor leaders
"express sympathy with other labor leaders accused of murder, simply
because they are labor leaders."7 Gompers became the object of Roosevelt's
wrath in the aftermath of the dynamite bombing of the Los Angeles Times
building on October 1, 1910, during a city-wide union organizing strike.
Twenty-one employees of the newspaper died in the blast. The owner of the

Times was Harrison Gray Otis, a vocal advocate of "open shops." Gompers
described Otis in his autobiography as a bitter enemy of unions, while also
calling the bombing "a terrible happening." At the time of the bombing,
Roosevelt praised Gompers for his "moderate and gentlemanly tone" in
contrast to Otis's "scurrilous blackguardism."8
Eventually, authorities arrested the two McNamara brothers, one of
whom was an officer of the Bridge and Structural Iron Workers union, and a
third man who confessed to the trio's joint responsibility for the dynamiting.
Gompers agreed to take over the fund-raising and disbursement of funds for
the McNamaras' Legal Defense Committee. He contended that he was not
aware of any connection between the bombing and organized labor. He also
said that he believed "responsibility [for the dynamiting] lay with operatives in
6

TR letter to George Alger, March 20, 1906, in Morison, Letters of TR, 5:189.
TR letter to magazine editor Lyman Abbott, April23, 1906, in Morison, Letters of TR, 5:219
~emphasis in original).
TR letter to Gompers, May 7, 1911 , in Morison, Letters of TR, 7:279.
7
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the service of the

~open-shop'

crowd" that had been

"~aking

war" on the

McNamaras' union.
On December 1, 1911, early in their trial, the McNamara brothers
changed their not-guilty pleas to guilty, ostensibly to avoid the death penalty.
Gompers asserted in his autobiography that if the McNamaras had told him
they were guilty, "I would not have engaged in the work of collecting money for
their defense, neither would I have urged that course upon the labor
movement. "9
Even before the guilty pleas, Roosevelt had challenged labor leaders
over their McNamara advocacy. Arguing that the arrests resulted .from
evidence gathered by "impartial" sources, he announced "hearty reprobation of
those labor leaders who, without wanting to know anything of the facts of the
case, have at once flown to the defense of the alleged dynamiters ... and who
talk about the arrest as being part of a conspiracy against labor unions." While

9

Gompers, Seventy Years, 2:183-193. As to the changed plea, muckraking journalist Lincoln
Steffens claimed that he had brokered a deal w ith the brothers, their attorneys, business
leaders including the owner of the Times, the prosecutor, and the judge, for a lighter sentence,
no further indictments, and a labor-management conference to resolve Los Angeles' labor
problems. Lincoln Steffens, The Autobiography of Lincoln Steffens (New York: Harcourt,
Brace, 1931 ), 668-689. Another view is that the business leaders accepted this resolution
because of their fear that one of the McNamaras' defense attorneys, a socialist, would
otherwise be elected mayor of Los Angeles during the trial. Mowry, California Progressives,
53-55. Whatever the reason, "public opinion, even the labor vote, was against labor and the
settlement"; further arrests followed; and the labor-management conference never occurred\..
Steffens, Autobiography, 685, 688-689; Mowry, California Progressives, 53. Gompers
continued to hover between condemning the dynamiters and justifying their motives. In a 1913
article, he rhetorically followed condemnation with a question -- "were the methods used by
the employers less deadly to humanity and freedom?" - that he answered by criticizing the
presiding judge in the McNamara case for failing "to realize causal relationship." Samuel
Gompers, Labor and the Employer, ed. Hayes Robbins (New York: Dutton, 1920), 231 .
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he concurred that it was proper to fund their legal defense, "it is grossly
improper to try to create a public opinion in favor of the arrested men simply
because ... [they] are members of a labor union."10 Roosevelt did not
mention Gompers by name, but Gompers soon gave him the opportunity.
After the Times's Otis editorially lambasted Roosevelt for currying union
favor by not assuming the guilt of the McNamaras, Gompers's rebuttal
provided an opportunity for Roosevelt to lash both Otis and Gompers.
Roosevelt courteously acknowledged Gompers's "honorable statement" of
opposition to Otis's more extreme comments, but he also observed that some
labor men "so framed their statements about the explosion as to convey the
impression - and, I fear, to excite the feeling among their followers -that this
matter was to be treated as a case of class conflict, and that the labor men
were to rally behind the accused as a matter of class duty and loyalty."
Accordingly, he asked "Mr. Gompers and those associated with him in
the cause of labor" to "make it equally evident that they do not intend to stand
by the men right or wrong." He believed that labor leaders should not wait for a
court verdict, because escaping conviction for murder was not "warrant
enough for upholding a labor leader when the outside circumstances are such
as conclusively to show that . .. the labor leader is an undesirable citizen." He

10

Theodore Roosevelt, uMurder is Murder," The Outlook 98 (May 6, 1911): 12.
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explicitly invoked his similar, prior condemnation of the Western Federation of
Miners.11
Commenting in 1916 on the country's industrial preparedness for
expansion of the war in Europe, Roosevelt archly mentioned Gompers as the
embodiment "in some sense" of what the country wanted in a champion of
labor. The qualifying phrase takes on a negative meaning when compared
with Roosevelt's description the year before of a former railroad union leader
who was "the only prominent labor leader I ever met who was as good a
citizen, as good an adviser politically, and as broad and practical a worker for
social justice as the best of our people generally." 12 Even allowing for
hyperbole, this statement suggests that Roosevelt did not hold Gompers and
most union leaders in high regard .
The low point of the Roosevelt-Gompers relationship came on July 6,
1917, when Roosevelt was the featured speaker at a Carnegie Hall reception
for representatives of the new Russian revolutionary government under
Kerensky. In his speech, Roosevelt criticized recent race riots during a bitter
strike in East St. Louis, where white strikers fatally attacked black
strikebreakers. His ostensible point was that the United States should prevent
such "appalling brutality" if it wanted to be treated as an international model for

11

Theodore Roosevelt, "Mr. Gompers, General Otis, and the Dynamite Charges," The Outlook
98 (June 17, 191 1), 330-332.
12
TR letters to Guy Emerson, May 16, 1916; and the American writer Winston Churchill,
August 4, 1915, in Morison, Letters of TR, 8:1042, 958-959.
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liberty and justice. Roosevelt later insisted that he had not mentioned
organized labor. The next speaker was Gompers, who nonetheless
understood Roosevelt to have "scathingly denounced labor for participating in
the riots." On that basis, Gompers explained the economic background of the
riots, including "luring negroes from the South .. . to be used in undermining
the conditions of the laborer in East St. Louis." Such "luring of these colored
men" was "on a par with the behavior of the brutal, reactionary, and tyrannous
forces that existed in old Russia." What ensued was a bitter confrontation
between the two men.13
Roosevelt regarded Gompers's remarks, in conjunction with a reported
statement by another labor leader, as an unacceptable and anti-democratic
attempt to justify murder and violence because the victims had declined "to
unionize and strike." Accordingly, he rose to reply to Gompers before the next
speaker began. "Never will I sit motionless," he said, "while directly or
indirectly apology is made for murder of the helpless." In brief remarks and
later, he expanded his condemnation of the riots to cover "all persons, whether
representatives of organized labor or not, who attempt to palliate or excuse

13

New York Times, July 7, 1917, pp. 1, 4. The day before the Carnegie Hall meeting, the
AFL's secretary, Frank Morrison, issued a denial of union responsibility for the East St. Louis
riots. New York Times, July 6, 1917. p.18. Roosevelt's side of the Carnegie Hall confrontation
is set forth in his Foes of Our Own Household, 280-286. Gompers' side is set forth in his
Seventy Years. 1:534-535. See also Bishop, TR and His Time, 2:432-435.
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such crimes, or who fail to condemn them in clear-cut and unequivocal
fashion." 14
Gompers's account of their Carnegie Hall confrontation focused less on

.
what Roosevelt said than on the manner in which Roosevelt said it. "He strode
across the stage," Gompers remembered, "until he reached my side where he
stood towering over me and pointing his forefinger at me and shaking his fist in
my face and at one time laying his hand on my shoulder." In contrast,
Roosevelt's account omitted any reference to his physical conduct and instead
was devoted exclusively to the reasonableness of what he had said. For
Roosevelt, the issue between him and Gompers was his statement that
"murder is not debatable."
later the same year, Roosevelt offered through a third party to help
Gompers prevail over unionists who opposed Americ~n participation in the
Great War. It did not represent a full reconciliation between them. Roosevelt
simultaneously asserted that "I do not take back any word I have ever said
about him [Gompers], and ·I don't care whether he takes back anything he has
said about me or not." In contrast, Roosevelt was unequivocal in his open
praise for leaders of labor organizations like the International Typographical
Union and the United Mine Workers, whose support of the war effort included

14

Roosevelt's criticism of people who failed to condemn the criminal behavior of others
belonging to the same affinity group was not limited to organized labor. He made similar
remarks about people of color in connection with a Brownsville, Texas, riot that had been
attributed to African-American soldiers. Gould, Presidency of TR, 238.
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commitments to maximize production and avoid strikes.15 Gompers's
patriotism did not elicit the same reaction from Roosevelt because Gompers at
Carnegie Hall refused to subordinate union militancy to prosecution of the war.

15

Leary, Talks with TR, 251-253, 255; Roosevelt. Kansas City Star. 170-172, 21 1-212.
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Figure 6

SAMUEL GOMPERS AT 65
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IX. Conclusion
The evidence is substantial that Roosevelt tried to improve the working
conditions and benefits of laborers. Not only do his words support that
proposition, but we can also observe him practicing what he preached in his
efforts to obtain legislative improvements for workers, his enforcement of
worker-friendly laws, his intervention to resolve strikes and threatened strikes
for the benefit of workers, and his nominations to the Supreme Court of men
who had open minds on the subject of labor rights . Greenberg contends that
Roosevelt was "inevitably pro-labor" because he wanted to substitute "welfare
capitalism guaranteed by the state" for "socially irresponsible capitalism."

1

This brings us back to the distinction between "labor" and "organized
labor" in Roosevelt's world view. Roosevelt shared his era's widespread
suspicion that organized labor tended to defend and even organize disorder
rather than prevent it. We see this in Roosevelt's frequent condemnations of
labor violence and his insistence upon maintaining some form of injunctive
power to deal with union lawlessness.2 The same suspicion appears in the

1

Greenberg, TR and Labor, 84, 355-356. This study also includes evidence supporting
Hofstadter's speculation that Roosevelt was motivated by the fear of socialism. The ultimate
question here, however, is where organized labor fit within Roosevelt's approach, regardless
of his social motivation.
2
As a Roosevelt scholar notes, TR's "exercise of power at home, the concerts of power the
world over, were intended first of all to provide order. · Blum, Republican Roosevelt, 6.
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writings of his era's intellectuals, whether they were conseNatives like John
Hay and Octave Thanet or radicals like Henry George and Herbert Croly. 3
That Roosevelt gravitated toward Thanet's view of labor problems
should not, however. obscure the evidence that he was willing to make
common cause with organized labor when it served his larger purposes, as
shown by his intervention to resolve the anthracite coal strike, his alliance with
Gompers to amend the Sherman Antitrust Act, and the inclusion of union
leadership in the foundation he conceived to promote industrial peace through
collective action. It is nevertheless difficult to avoid the conclusion that
Roosevelt's tolerance for union activism was thin. This was not limited to his
disapproval of organized labor's manifestations of violence and attempted
justifications of violence. To the same effect, labor union insistence on
mandatory union membership offended Roosevelt's democratic instincts by
seeming like a discriminatory bid for special interest power that would
complicate his goal of a society that benefited all classes.
Horrified by the specter of bloody class conflict that he had condemned
in the French Revolution's reign of terror, Roosevelt believed that a
democratically elected government should be the primary and indispensable
instrument for obtaining social and industrial justice. This remained true even
when politicians like Speaker of the House Cannon and the courts thwarted

3

J use the words •conservative" and 'radical" only in a relative sense, with due regard for
Roosevelrs aforementioned disdain for their "inexactitude In terminology.'
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legislation that was beneficial to working people. Union leaders like Gompers
were welcome in Roosevelt's ethical universe, provided they were willing to
accept the government's- and especially TR's --guidance.
Arguments have been made that for Roosevelt labor issues were just
politics. Sometimes, those arguments attribute his positive rhetoric and actions
regarding organized labor as designed merely to gain worker votes. The
inverse arguments focus on the less union-friendly aspects of his rhetoric and
actions as reflecting his protection of privilege and the necessity to curry favor
with the businessmen who financed the Republican Party. The first set of
arguments fails to account for Roosevelt's actions that were politically
unpopular with unions and their labor constituency, e.g., those regarding
. mandatory union membership, the Western Federation of Miners, and labor
injunctions. The second set fails to account for the sincerity of his efforts
generally to improve social and industrial conditions and his criticism of
businesses that did not treat their workers with respect.
Roosevelt's labor words and actions went deeper than political
calculation. Their roots are visible in his admiration for Octave Thanet's literary
descriptions of labor problems, namely, her positive view of the potential
fairness of non-monopolistic employers, ethically motivated workers, and
occasionally an exceptional union leader; and her negative depiction of the
suffering inflicted by union-led labor conflict on union supporters, antagonists,
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and neutrals. Roosevelt did not always follow the Thanet creed, but his
fondness for it shows his philosophical starting point for approaching union
issues.
If his attitude toward organized labor was fundamentally skeptical,
rather than politically generated, the question remains where organized labor
fit within his ethical universe. There is some guidance in a series of lectures he
gave at the University of California, Berkeley, in the spring of 1911, when he
placed the phrases "applied ethics" and "realizable ideals" on the same plane.
They both stood for "the only spirit which I think counts for anything in
preaching," he said. It was incumbent on the nation to have a "lofty ideal," but
it was deSirable to avoid preaching "ideals which cannot be measurably
attained" because "[i)f we consciously or carelessly preach ideals which
cannot be realized and which we do not intend to have realized, then so far
from accomplishing a worthy purpose we actually tend to weaken the morality
we ostensibly preach.'14
When Roosevelt commented in the Berkeley lectures about labor
unions, they were not part of a lofty ideal. A wageworker, he said, should be
wary of candidates who condone violence or "recognize the rules of a labor
organization of any kind as standing above the Constitution and the laws of his
country," because that was the road "where democracy would come to an end,

4

Theodore Roosevelt, Realizable Ideals (San Francisco: Whittaker & Ray-Wiggin , 1912), 2,
32.
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where self-rule would come to an end." For Roosevelt, it was shameful if "a
multi-millionaire or a wage-worker, whether the member of a big corporation or
the member of a labor union," ever placed "loyalty to cast or class ahead of
loyalty to good citizenship." In his declaration that the way to stand up to big
corporations was "to replace our individual strength by the strength of all of us
collectively," the collective entity that he invoked was the government, not a
union. 5
Unable to dissuade union leaders from what he regarded as their
misguided defenses of mandatory union membership, labor violence, and total
insulation against labor injunctions, Roosevelt may have wondered whether
the. tactics of organized labor would ever enable America to realize his ideals
for social and industrial justice. This may also explain why he never offered a
comprehensive legislative or administrative program to define union rights,
because he regarded union responsibilities as equally important and did not
believe that organized labor was ready to accept the responsibilities as the
price for the rights.
Nevertheless, Roosevelt traveled a long way from his early doubts
about the societal value of unions and his approval of President Cleveland's
unhesitating use of the courts and the army to quell union militancy. He arrived
at a general acceptance of union involvement in bettering social conditions. As
he put it in a 1910 Labor Day speech, "Wherever there is organized capital on
5

1bid., 103, 115-116, 134-135.
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a considerable scale I believe in the principle of organized labor and in the
practice of collective bargaining. "6 There were tangible manifestations of this
acceptance in his responses to actual (coal) and threatened (railroad) strikes,
in his efforts to bring greater fairness to the labor injunction process, and in his
willingness to address the AFL's fears that organized labor faced jeopardy
under the antitrust law.
The greatest impact of Roosevelt's labor journey as it affected unions
was in the intangibles. Instead of the perceived government approach
represented by President Cleveland's dispatching the army to control unions,
President Roosevelt was more interested in vindicating the rights of organized
labor (excluding those of the Western Federation of Miners). He may not have
treated organized labor as an equal partner in his welfare capitalism, but he
was willing to give it a "respectable" partnership interest. 7 He shared many of
organized labor's industrial and social goals. Where he departed from
organized labor was in the details of how to arrive at the destination.
'
A relatively recent appraisal of TR's presidency concludes that, "In his
policies and such preachments as the Square Deal, Roosevelt posed some of
the right questions about conservation, the control of corporations, the welfare
of the average American, and what constitute~ a just society."8 Posing

6

Roosevelt, New Nationalism, 128-129.
Compare Greenberg, TR and Labor, 85, 173-175, 451 .
8
Gould, Presidency of TR, 300. See also the introduction by Henry Steele Commager and
Richard Brandon Morris in George E. Mowry, The Era of Theodore Roosevelt (New York:
7
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questions is admittedly not equivalent to developing policy answers. Before
criticizing Roosevelt's failure to develop policies and procedures for what he
identified as the needs and tendencies of organized labor, however, we should
consider a crucial point. He was no different in that respect from other leaders
of his time or those in the generation that immediately followed him.
For a quarter of a century after his presidency, both Democratic and
Republican national governments also failed to frame comprehensive labor
policies. Even the New Deal Congress and the second President Roosevelt
answered only some of the questions that the first President Roosevelt had
posed about the proper governmental treatment of organized labor. Congress
did not address the full sweep of those questions until after World War II.
The first step occurred twenty-six years after Theodore Roosevelt left
the White House. Senator Robert F. Wagner, Democrat of New York,
introduced a bill that became the National Labor Relations Act of 1935, often
referred to as the Wagner Act. 9 As finally passed and signed into law by FOR,
a distant cousin of TR who had married TR's niece, the Wagner Act began by
blaming "strikes and other forms of industrial strife or unrest" on employer
denials of union organization rights and collective bargaining. Its solutions to

Harper, 1958), xi-xii, stating that Roosevelt •ushered in a revolution" with respect to "the
relations of the different elements of the economy- capital, labor, and agriculture -to each
other." Mowry makes the same point in his earlier book, TR and Progressive Movement, 16
(while TR "did little himself to solve the numerous questions he broached, he did create a
national demand that these questions be met and answered.").
9
Legislative History of the National Labor Relations Act of 1935 (Washington, D.C.:
Government Printing Office, 1949; reprint, 1985), 1:1295-1310.
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that declared problem were establishment of government-run procedures for
employee selection of union representatives through whom employees could
collectively bargain, legalization of their further right "to engage.in concerted
activities [including strikes] for the purpose of collective bargaining or other
mutual aid or protection," and enumeration of prohibited employer "unfair labor
practices." What the Wagner Act did not address was the idea of union unfair
labor practices or the existence of other reasons for strikes.
Theodore Roosevelt had advocated for employee rights to engage in
collective bargaining. Yet, only one reference to him appears in theWagner
Act's legislative history. A Republican congressman from California, who
supported the bill, invoked TR's name, along with the names of Lincoln,
Woodrow Wilson, Pope Leo Ill, former British Prime Minister William E.
Gladstone, and Bismarck, "the great Iron Chancellor" of Germany, for the
proposition that "[t]he right of collective bargaining has been subscribed to by

°

many of the greatest minds this world has ever produced."1 Flattering
company for TR, but it also diminished his groundbreaking role as the
American president who first articulated government's support of the rights of
organized labor and, at key moments, provided such support.

10

National Labor Relations Act Legislative History, 1:clxv, 2:3183.
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Despite its good intentions, the Wagner Act did not end labor conflict. 11
In the winter of 1945 and the first half of 1946, the country experienced what a
congressional leader called an "unprecedented wave of strikes." Although the
House of Representatives passed a bill to broaden the reach of the Wagner
Act, the Senate did not- until, as one Republican congressman sarcastically
observed, "John L. Lewis came to the rescue."
Lewis was a successor of John Mitchell as head of the United Mine
Workers, the union that TR helped in the 1902 anthracite coal strike. The postWorld War II strike militancy of Lewis's UMW against coal operators "closed
down industry after industry, while across the nation cities and towns dug up
wartime 'brownout' regulations to conserve power." In contrast to the positive
outcome for the UMW under Mitchell, Lewis's UMW galvanized the Senate to
curb union powers. The result was congressional passage of the Labor
Management Relations Act of 1947, familiarly called the Taft-Hartley Act, over
President Harry S. Truman's veto. 12
The Taft-Hartley Act contained the responsibility side of TR's view of
organized labor, the side that saw a need to restrain unions and protect nonunion workers. It prohibited union unfair labor practices. These prohibitions

11

Its backers stressed that securing employee rights to union organization would "remove a
primary cause of strikes" and promote industrial peace. Other arguments for the act included
political recognition of organized labor and smoothing out business cycles by increasing
employee purchasing power through collective bargaining. J. Joseph Huthmacher, Senator
Robart F. Wagner and the Rise of Urban Liberalism (New York: Atheneum, 1968), 191-193.
12
Fred A. Hartley, Our New National Labor Policy: The Taft-Hartley Act and the Next Steps
(New York: Funk & Wagnalls, 1948), 18-20.
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included bad faith collective bargaining and secondary boycotts against
employers not directly involved in a particular labor dispute. It also allowed
states to prohibit mandatory union membership within their jurisdictions.

13

Although Theodore Roosevelt had advocated for something akin to these
concepts, no legislator invoked his name during the debates over the TaftHartley Act.

14

The failure to give TR credit for the principles underlying either the
Wagner Act or the Taft-Hartley Act suggests that his two-sided, though
structurally Jacking, reactions to organized labor did not fit neatly into either a
pro-union or a union-restraint perspective. Because TR's labor record did not
unequivocally support either side of the conflict between unions and
15

employers, neither camp could claim him as its unqualified champion.

After well over a half century of experience with the two post-TR laws
that were intended to accomplish labor peace, their goal has still not been fully
realized . As society continues to grapple with labor problems, it is worth
recalling that Theodore Roosevelt was the first president who actively
abandone'\the old government hostility to unions. His importance to American
13

For a graphic comparison of the Wagner and Taft-Hartley Acts, see Legislative History of
the Labor Management Relations Act, 1947 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office,
1948; reprint, 1985), 2:1661-1680.
1
• An irony of the Taft-Hartley·Act was that it was named after Senator Robert A. Taft, who
shepherded it through the Senate. He was the son of President William Howard Taft, whose
defeat for re-election in 1912 was ensured by TR's decision to run against him as the
candidate of the Progressive Party.
15
With respect to organized labor's views of Roosevelt after his death, it is interesting that a
1920 compilation of Gompers's public statements did not contain any reference to TR.
Gompers, Labor and the Employer.
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labor history is that he was the first president who committed, albeit irregularly,
to seeking peaceful solutions to labor conflict based more or less on
government neutrality, rather than on a partisan perspective. That he did so
despite his philosophical concerns about organized labor is a tribute to his
capacity for separating his public actions from his personal views and to his
refusal in labor matters to subordinate his office and his sense of the public
good to the interests of either business or organized labor.
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